Stuart L. Koehl & Stephen P. Glick
Fleet-footed Ivan

Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr.
Taking Stock of the Market

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR®

VOL. 13 JUNE 1980 NO. 6

Eric Hoffer: Muhammad's Sloth

William R. Havender: What Intelligence Tests

Charles Horner: Nuclear Metaphysics

Dr. Commoner Takes Off

$1.00
FOR ONE COPY

A MONTHLY REVIEW
EDITED BY R. EMMETT TYRRELL, JR.

$12.00
BY THE YEAR

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTINUING CRISIS

• April, and M. Jean-Paul Sartre, prophet of the absurd, has passed on; yet the old quack departed too soon. On April 24 the Hon. John Anderson of the Land of Lincoln declared his presidential candidacy and within days it was revealed that our nation's self-proclaimed spokesman for the intelligentsia might select Mr. Walter Cronkite as running mate. What is more, the *New Republic* quoted the Crooner of Television News as saying: "I'd be so honored. I wouldn't turn it down." A misquote, says Walter; but Papa Sartre, wherever you are, you are missing something really swell. This Anderson is a 24-carat zany.

• Late in the month a mysterious turkey appeared on the White House grounds, and it bespeaks volumes about the genius now fermenting within our government that the Carter administration was blotto when confronted by this idiotic guest. Within the White House the Wonderboy fevered earnestly over all the problems now confronting us: inflation, recession, 'furiners; without, the turkey flapped and gobbled inviolable for all the world to see. Foreign dignitaries visiting the White House made nervous jokes, narrowed their eyes, and listened for hysterical laughter from the President's quarters. Journalists joshed and took pictures. Still the idiot bird strutted beyond the outstretched arms of the gendarmes while our President monitored the situation. Had the bird been a hippopotamus the Rose Garden might now be a ruin, and our President would be solemnly condemning rose fever; Secretary of State Vance would be urging negotiations.

• Yet Secretary of State Vance is Secretary of State no more. On April 28 he resigned over an aborted military attempt to free the 53 American nationals now being held in thriving Teheran. The attempt came 172 days after the Americans were taken hostage, yet there Mr. Vance was, on automatic pilot, calmly prescribing negotiations. He even contemplated negotiations with the Soviets over their invasion of Afghanistan. Mr. Vance is the first secretary of state to resign on a point of principle since William Jennings Bryan—a symmetry full of romantic implications. Bryan was a monomaniac too, but louder. Mr. Vance's replacement will be Senator Edmund Muskie. A lamb is followed by a fish. On April 22 Americans for a repristinated planet and a smile button on every breast turned out for Earth Day. Those of us on the other side celebrated the day by watching film clips of Elizabeth, New Jersey, bursting into flame as a giant chemical dump gloriously ignited.

• America's all-volunteer Army, the only military force in the world conforming to the American judiciary's sexual abstractions, is now attracting the same kind of admiration that the estimable judges themselves fetch, that is to say, nigh unto stupefacient guffaws. Yet, as they say over at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is it not better to have an army that amuses than one that causes bodily injury and makes loud noises?

• On April 2 Sgt. Arthur Briscoe's attempt to lay amorous hands upon a somewhat Victorian-minded female soldier ended in an unseemly row and two dead GIs, the first being a soldier who attempted to rescue Sgt. Briscoe's prey and the second being Sgt. Briscoe, who self-destructed. On April 4 surgeons in Lawton, Oklahoma, reattached the tongue of Booker T. Whitfield, a 37-year-old Fort Sill soldier who lost "a significant portion" of it in an ill-starred carnal assault on a 33-year-old tigress. On April 12 an inebriated sailor had his ear sown to his bedding at a Virginia Beach naval clinic, possibly in conformity with some little-heralded judicial decision requiring that drunks be vetted by drunks. The thing is not unthinkable: Over 40 percent of our federal judges have now been appointed by the Wonderboy. Finally, Pvt. Cheryl Taylor, 20, who joined the Army to "avoid men," has become the first woman to be convicted of sexual harassment in our newly integrated U.S. Army, a development that must have brought fleeting joy even to the bone-crushers at the National Organization for Women. According to reports from Regensburg, Germany, where Pvt. Taylor has served with B Battery, Third Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery, all was going well for the comely trooper until she encountered 19-year-old Pvt. Kevin Knox, "a very moralistic, a very good soldier." Unfortunately, trooper Taylor could not keep her hands off him and on January 29 she chased him into her unit's dispensary while hollering: "give me a light, you shrimp." Once in the dispensary she inexplicably "grabbed his private parts and squeezed them," an indiscretion that won her 30 days in the calaboose, a $298 fine, and demotion to the Army's lowest rank—a devastating career setback for this would-be Patton, but a historic moment for the feminist murrain.

• In Baton Rouge, Mr. Lawrence E. Day received his first good news in months when Judge Doug Moreau ruled that Mr. Day cannot be tried on burglary and firearms charges simultaneously. Poor Mr. Day, though originally arrested as a mere Peeping Tom, now stands accused of being the Baton Rouge "Gorilla Man," that unique nocturnal intruder who was given to surprising women in their boudoirs and forcing them to model underwear at inconvenient times. And all over Mongolia scholars are rejoicing. Late in April it was revealed that the now defunct Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas willed that his Canadian retreat be turned into a creative study center for visiting scholars from Iran, Vietnam, Russia, China, and Mongolia. Imagine the treatises that will pour forth! Bill Douglas will be missed and not a thousand fingernails scratching across a hundred blackboards could match the music in his brain.

• In California, a seven-man, five-woman Orange County jury has acquitted Winnie the Pooh on charges that the large furry Disneyland character used his plastic paw to belt a nine-year-old girl. Mr. Robert L. Hill, the Disneyland employee under indictment, made a stunning courtroom peroration. Wearing his famed costume, he proved beyond question that a "wiggly plastic ear" and not a paw was the assault weapon, and that he was pushed from behind when he struck the little brat. The brat, now 15, had sought $15,000 in damages.

• Patrons of the arts in Denver are sounding alarums and preparing for yet another battle on behalf of cosmopolitan taste. Denver dog lovers are attempting to bring legal action against Mr. Tom Otterness over his latest film, despite the fact that it is one of the few films since *Lassie Come Home* to actually cast a dog in a starring role. Produced with funds from the National Endowment for the Arts, the film, entitled *Shot Dog Film*, sensitively depicts the shooting of a small dog and then repeats the scene 60 times. Nonetheless, Denver animal lovers are out to get Mr. Otterness, and it is a sad footnote to our time that he has had to flee the city.

• In Memphis, Tennessee, former mayoral candidate, Prince Mongo of the planet Zambodia, also known as Robert Hodges, successfully contested an insurance company's decision to stop his $2000-a-month mental disability benefits when he appeared in court barefoot, with rings on his fingers and toes, and wearing a loincloth, a thigh-length fur coat, and a floppy hat. What makes this story all the more curious is that Prince Mongo was never called up to Wisconsin to assist Jerry Brown during the Wisconsin primary. Perhaps the boy governor had his mind on other matters, for early in the month Judge L. Eugene Rasmussen ordered the seizing of the Governor's celebrated 1974 Plymouth to settle a California hospital's $808 non-payment claim against the state. Whatever the reason, Governor Brown was piteously walloped in Wisconsin and forced to abscond for the Zen pits of his native land behind clouds of orphic rumble-bumble about "the crisis of birth, the crisis of a beginning" and so forth.

• Finally, in Frederick, Maryland, Mr. Melvin Perkins, the skid-row politico to whose career *The American Spectator* has long been committed, has hit upon another ingenious plan to make democracy work. Mr. Perkins is attempting legally to assume the name of Goodloe E. Byron so that he might hoodwink the voters in Maryland's Sixth Congressional District, where Congressman Byron served until his death in 1978. The result could be America's first self-proclaimed bum in Congress. —*RET*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR
Volume 13, Number 6, June 1980

Editor-in-Chief
R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.
Publisher
Ronald E. Burr
of the Saturday Evening Club
Managing Editor
Erich Eichman
Business Manager
William B. Head
Executive Secretary
Deborah S. Grubb
Circulation Manager
Susan F. Leiby
Research Director
Paul H. Vivian
Production Manager
Jan Hoffman Sharkey
Senior Editors
A. Lawrence Chickering,
Adam Meyerson, Karl O'Lessker
Art Advisor
Sheila Wolfe
New York Editor
Whit Stillman
Americana Editor
Joseph P. Duggan
Chief Saloon Correspondent
Douglas Bartholomew
Associates
Robert Asahina, Jameson G. Campaigne, Jr.,
John R. Coyne, Jr., Stephen Miller,
Alan Reynolds
Contributors
Aram Bakshian, Jr., Linda Calkins,
Christopher C. DeMuth, Terry Eastland,
Jerry Gerde, K.E. Grubbs, Jr., Neil Howe,
Roger Kaplan, William Kristol,
Leslie Lenkowski, A. James McAdams III,
Robert McTiernan, Judy Mathews,
William H. Nolte, Terry O'Rourke,
Marc F. Plattner, John Podhoretz,
Peter Rusthoven, Benjamin Stein
Legal Counsel
Solitary, Poor, Nasty, Brutish & Short

The American Spectator was founded in 1924 by George Nathan and Truman Newberry over a cheap domestic ale in McSorley's Old Ale House. In 1967 the Saturday Evening Club took it over, rechristening it *The Alternative: An American Spectator*; but by November 1977 the word "alternative" had acquired such an esoteric fragrance that in order to discourage unsolicited manuscripts from florists, beauticians, and other creative types the Club reverted to the magazine's original name. *The American Spectator* is now published monthly at 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, Indiana. Second class postage paid at Bloomington, Indiana, and additional mailing offices.

A one-year subscription (12 issues) costs $12, outside the United States $14. Foreign air mail rates sent on request. All correspondence (manuscripts, subscriptions, threatening letters, federal grants, etc.) should be sent to *The American Spectator*, P.O. Box 1969, Bloomington, Indiana 47402, (812) 334-2715; New York office, (212) 724-3799. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by self-addressed stamped envelopes.

Microfilm editions of *The American Spectator* are available from Xerox University Microfilms, 200 N. Zeeb Rd., Ann Arbor, MI 48106. ISSN 0148-8414.

Published remarkably without regard to sex, life-style, race, color, creed, or (most redundantly of all) national origin.

Copyright © *The American Spectator* 1980.
Volume 13, Number 6, June 1980.

CONTENTS

How to Fail at Being Safe.....Charles Horner 7
In a world of nuclear weapons, our strategists say, preparedness is aggression and strategic superiority is a threat to peace. But the real irony is this: By making nuclear war "unthinkable," the strategists themselves have made it more likely.

Islam and Modernization .....Eric Hoffer 11
Muhammad, messenger of plod.

When Intelligence Passes the Test .....William R. Havender 12
The bias in mental tests is all in the criticizing of them.

The New Red Army.....Stuart L. Koehl & Stephen P. Glick 16
What's fast, deadly, and all over?

Rich Man, Poor Man, Chinaman 18
..... Miriam London & Ma Yuan
In the New China, the mendicant arts survive—necessarily.

The New World Disorder .....F.S. Manor 19
If terrorism is war by other means, we aren't even holding our position.

The Power Elite.....John Nollson 22

DEPARTMENTS

The Continuing Crisis..... 2
Editorial / The Great White Ph.D.....
.....R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr. 4
Capitol Ideas / Citizen Nader's Loaded Dais .....Tom Bethell 5
Presswatch / Imam We Trust .....Michael Ledeen 23
The Public Policy / An Imminent Electric Orgy.....
.....Fred D. Baldwin 24
European Document / Old Europe, New Relations.....
.....Raymond Aron 27
The Nation's Pulse / America's Stock in Trade .....
.....Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr. 28
Correspondence..... 39
Current Wisdom .....Assorted Jackasses 41

BOOK REVIEWS

A History of the World, by Hugh Thomas.....Fred Baumann 29
American Government: Institutions and Policies, by James Q. Wilson.....James Piereson 32
Zebra, by Clark Howard .....Mike Parrish 36
Who's on First, by William F. Buckley, Jr.....
.....Joseph Shattan 37
The Right Stuff, by Tom Wolfe.....Mitchell S. Ross 38

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL

THE GREAT WHITE PH.D.

by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

At this writing the nomination of Barry Commoner as presidential candidate for the newly-hatched Citizens Party is not yet official, and it is my sad mission to report that his nomination may never become official. The Citizens Party, a splendid goulash of radicals and enthusiasts, has set out to be the pristinely democratic party of the land. Hence, its convention's nominee will not actually be certified until a majority of the party's members, now numbering some 3500 conscientious Americanoes, has voted on his nomination. Unfortunately, the ballots are being sent by mail. Better it would be for Dr. Commoner's political career had the votes been sent via United Parcel Service or a privately-owned carrier pigeon service. Truth be known, our U.S. Postal Service, though safely insulated from the capitalists' clutches, is an exceedingly uncertain communications channel, and though it grows ever more expensive it also seems to grow ever less useful.

This phenomenon of ceaselessly rising governmental costs and steadily lowering governmental performance seems to be one of the invincible laws of modern collectivist government. One sees it at work everywhere, in Social Security, in federally-aided education, even in the military. It is a wonder that Dr. Commoner, a trained scientist and proud member of the intelligentsia, has yet to trip over it. Yet there seem to be many political realities that Dr. Commoner has failed to note.

For instance, Dr. Commoner apparently has failed to note that there is a considerable difference between the two most probable presidential candidates, for he complains of their sameness indignantly and darkly hints that it is all part of a conspiracy against average Americans like himself. Of course the differences between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan are easily observable. Reagan stands pretty much for the foreign policy that has governed us since World War II. Jimmy is for McGovernism ineptly executed. Domestically Reagan is markedly less statist than Jimmy.

The Citizens Party is about as far to the left as the Birch Society is to the right, and to read its party platform is to read the howls of the *Nation*, the *Progressive*, and *Mother Jones* simultaneously. Which brings to mind another thing that Dr. Commoner seems to have missed. During this year's primaries the plain folk of the Republic have given the candidates of the Left short shrift and few votes.

The miseries of the Massachusetts Messiah are far more the product of his positions than the product of his indiscretions on that infamous isle. When all he had against him was Chappaquiddick, Teddy was as popular as springtime and laughter. When he apprised the citizenry of his positions on the issues, the swoon set in. Beyond the borders of a few college campuses the Hon. Brown's campaign never could get the wind up. Parson Anderson is a winner only at Beverly Hills fundraisers.

Yet it is not just the American voter who has grown deaf to the sirens and unguents of the American Left. Our nation's professional demonstrators too seem to have lost their gung-ho spirit. Mid-April's "Big Business Day" dawned full of sunshine and balmy breezes, nonetheless very few demonstrators turned out to growl about corporate infamy. The thing flopped everywhere but on National Public Radio, where it was treated as a matter of very great moment. For that matter every enthusiasm of our bizarre Left is treated as a matter of moment on NPR, and perhaps this is the source of Dr. Commoner's belief that, as he puts it, "We are undergoing a sea change in American politics."

Alas, the great white Ph.D. deludes himself here, just as he deludes himself when he claims he wants the average American to have a larger voice in government. Would Dr.Commoner really like to live under a government whose policies accurately reflected average American's views on busing, capital punishment, prayer in public schools and Proposition 13 fever?

The Left that Dr. Commoner espouses is most comfortable, not with the electorate, but with the mandarins in the judiciary and in the bureaucracy. Now, there is the dirty little secret. The forces of left-wing reform—that gallimaufry of environmentalists, consumerists, anti-nuclear activists, and personal liberationists—have worked their will, not with the American voters, but in spite of them. Their reforms, which have been extensive, have been implemented through America's least democratic institutions, the courts and the bureaucracy.

This, of course, is a burlesque of democracy, and inasmuch as these reforms for which the Citizens Party thumps so earnestly amount to moonshine the burlesque grows all the more lurid and ludicrous. In listening to Dr. Commoner and his colleagues' complaints about inflation, unemployment, the dislocations of modern life, the aggrieved environment, and so forth one is reminded that many of these problems are now actually being exacerbated by the foolishness that these popinjays have already inflicted on us through their control of the judiciary and the bureaucracy. They are at once the problem and the "solution."

Moreover, my guess is that the Goody-Goodies of the Citizens Party are about to grow more concerned; that is to say, they are about to grow violent again and to send their

Adapted from RET's Monday Column in the Washington Post.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

students out to fight their good fights for them. Not only was "Big Business Day" a flop, but, when Earth Day 1980 was celebrated on April 22 only the *Wall Street Journal* seemed to care. When the morally upright of the American Left cannot get their own way quietly, they usually commence the demonstrations, the threats, and the lamentations that democracy is being thwarted. They bust up the joint and then repine that any politician resistant to their threats is endangering the Republic.

Much of the misery of the last 15 years can be laid to these nuisances. They and their burning causes are rendering America ungovernable, undemocratic, and absurd to those who watch us from afar. The fact that the average American sees the inhabitants of the Citizens Party as increasingly absurd is reassuring but not reassuring enough. The members of the most pristinely democratic party of all have a long record of disdaining the views of the American majority.

Nonetheless, I am glad Dr. Commoner is running, and I have a plan to enliven the proceedings. I urge the officers of the Fortune 500 to have their corporations donate to his campaign. One look at the fellow tells you he is too piggish to turn down their loot, and I should very much relish the day when it was revealed that he was in the pay of the Giant Corporations. Captains of industry show some spunk. The time for dirty tricks is now. □

CAPITOL IDEAS



CITIZEN NADER'S LOADED DAIS

by Tom Bethell

As I sat in the resplendent Cannon Caucus Room (the size of an aircraft hanger, with glistening chandeliers, gilded moldings, bright television lights) awaiting the commencement of Ralph Nader's "Big Business Day" ceremonies, I found myself thinking about that preeminent Keynesian inversion of truth—one of the most influential falsehoods of the twentieth century—to the effect that "demand creates supply." Children, old-age pensioners, college students, hospital patients, welfare recipients, and numerous government employees contribute solely to the demand side of economic life, and to that list could be added Naderites, I concluded as I observed Nader's willing minions filing into the room. What, after all, do they produce? They demand rather than supply, and that no doubt is why they champion the interests of "consumers," a category that serves merely to demarcate the productive.

Does demand create supply, then? How comforting it must be to Naderites, welfare recipients, et al., to believe that by depositing their checks at the bank they thereby keep the wheels of industry turning! And further, that by demanding cost-of-living increases they will simply summon forth even greater efforts on the part of the productive . . .

Hush, here to interrupt my reveries comes Ralph Nader himself, tall, angular, and blue-suited, accompanied by his tousle-headed deputy, Mark Green. They carry files and stand together in frowning conversation while the still-photographers and television cameras give them their focused attention. So earnestly do they converse, with such an evident lack of awareness of the pressing paparazzi, that they almost succeed in convincing me that they are oblivious of the media's attention. They nod and then frown, transferring file folders from one hand to the other (click-click-click, whirrr . . .). I'll swear Nader has a sun tan today. Has he perhaps been living it up in the Caribbean? No such luck, I'm afraid.

Presently, the ruler of what the *Wall Street Journal* has described as a "vast conglomerate" with "interlocking directorships" strode off and I had a brief word with Mark Green, who is as charmingly boyish as ever. I barely had time to ask him why he so disapproved of voluntary transactions between consenting adults, capitalism in a nutshell, and he barely had time to reply that in his view capitalism entailed a lot of "coerced consumption," citing chemical dumping at Love Canal to prove his point, before the Rev. David Burgess, one-time CIO organizer, began to deliver the invocation:

". . . condemn those who sell the righteous for silver . . . textile workers slowly dying of brown lung . . . chemical workers slowly poisoned by waste . . . struggle for equity . . . never-ending struggle for justice," Amen. We all sit down, as tardy Nader-lovers with labels on lapels continue to arrive. "Hello, My Name Is Marcia." "Hello, My Name Is Rachel." "Hello, My Name Is Sister Antonelle." Most wear longish skirts with side slits, some wear well-cut riding jackets with ties, giving a mannish look. But the nuns, still stuck in the late 1960s, wear short habits, almost to the knee. What, I wonder, are they doing here, auditing this anti-business conclave? Could anyone in the world prevail on them to return to their nunnery and say the rosary? Perhaps only someone whose kingdom was not of this world could do that.

We then listened to a speech by someone called Bob Peterson (wearing a three-piece business suit, with red spotted tie), who was pleased to inform us that big business had "declared war on the workers,"

Tom Bethell is The American Spectator*'s Washington columnist and Washington editor of* Harper's.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whose patience was wearing thin, and, in consequence, he promised: "if it's war they want, it's war they'll get." Amen to that, and a big hand for Bob.

Next some whiny words from a flinty, glinty eye-glassed moderator named Ruth Jordan, who surprised me by saying: "The media are essentially controlled by the corporate world . . . some did not pay their fair share, and they're in the corporate sector . . . cribs with slats too wide . . . cars designed to explode . . . asbestos blowing hair-dryers . . . victims of random violence by corporate criminals. . . . Let me introduce now a sister—my sister—Bella Abzug."

Sister Bella spake on this wise: ". . . the wage-gap is widening: sex discrimination in employment means extra profits . . . big business would prefer to keep women down . . . we are assaulted by expert TV advertising . . . sugar saturated cereals . . . overpriced jeans [a nervous tittering from the audience here] . . . drug companies are virtual drug-pushers . . . cancer in our daughters." Q.E.D. The status of women derives from the voluntary nature of our social arrangements. Bella's continued refusal to emigrate to the Soviet Union must be accounted one of life's minor mysteries.

Throughout all this Nader sat at the curved dais (normally occupied by Congressmen hearing testimony), but it was interesting to see that he never looked up or reacted while the others spoke. While Bella bellowed, and the audience oohed, Nader steadfastly studied documents in front of him, occasionally turning a page. With never a minute to waste, dossiers to memorize, this man struck me as being as incorruptible as . . . Robespierre.

Next up was James Farmer of CORE, "a leader in many freedom lines." The possessor of an impressive, Orson Welles-like voice, he wore an eyepatch. "It is an honor to share this platform with Bella Abzug and Ralph Nader," he commenced. "They have become in a meaningful sense the conscience of this nation." Anything further might be superfluous, but he told us an anecdote: Once he was travelling on an airplane, and a man next to him asked, "Why are you against business—especially after all business has done for your people?"

Can you hear the hollow, mirthless, derisory laughter that mocked and echoed throughout the room? Did anyone present realize that only the surplus created by profitable enterprise enabled them to spend the morning in such luxuriant idleness? Not James Farmer, who continued: "What they're telling you is we know what's best for you. But if you've ever been discriminated against, if you've ever had your taxes raised because the company wanted to lower *its* taxes, then you know that corporations do *not* know what's best for you!" The hoots then turned to whoops, but still Nader studied and frowned at his dossiers. Farmer went on to say that if a work force is going to stay productive it must stay healthy, which meant that public health, community health, and mental health agencies were indeed necessary. Finally, he noted, big business has "a scorched earth policy."

I wondered at that point if Nader would be able to improve on this general level of nuttiness. "In the boardrooms of American," Bella then introduced, "the very mention of his name creates a shiver . . . our leader in this struggle to democratize corporate America. I give you Ralph Nader."

He stood at the lectern with one hand thrust into his coat pocket, his knuckles jammed against his ribs as though he himself shivered. He started out cautiously, claiming that he was merely a representative of "the long historic tradition of challenges to big business abuses over the past 100 years." But soon enough he warmed up, talking about corporations that "relieve themselves in rivers," the 15,000 Washington lobbyists "whose cynical full-time job it is to defeat the public interest," the "vast array of predatory, anti-competitive practices," corporations that "undermine respect for and integrity of government," corporations that send "legions of robbers to Capitol Hill."

Then he started to get carried away, and I noticed a national reporter close his eyes and quietly shake his head when Nader said the Environmental Protection Agency "is the manager of environmental violence in America." You kind of blew it there, Ralph, attacking your friends like that. But then he went further and complained that the auto safety agency was "deliberately withholding life-saving technology," showing "how drunk with their own power these business moguls are."

You just don't say things like that in Washington, the home of centrism, and expect to be taken seriously. Perhaps we see here a hint of desperation from Nader, who I should imagine does not get as much attention from the news media as formerly, and in response is turning up the volume level of his accusations.



The final section of the morning program consisted of a rather sorry parade of sisters—sob sisters—who bravely bore witness to their status as victims of corporate abuse. These poor people, professional victims, gave me the impression that they had embarked on hazardous careers of grievance, thereby risking the attendant danger of laying all of life's hardships at someone else's door—the corporate door, in this case. One unfortunate woman began her address to the cameras and remaining audience (about half had left by now) as follows: "I am here today because the Eli Lilly company has given me cancer."

We also heard from a rather strange man who had written a book about the Dupont Company, published over seven years ago by Prentice-Hall. His victim-status was somehow obscurely related to the book's subsequent failure to be selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club. But I can think of other, perfectly good reasons why it was not (unconnected with corporate arm-twisting). In the course of his remarks the gentleman said that Dupont Co. had "made $250 million off World War I" and was then somehow involved in "a bizarre plot to overthrow the U.S. government." It looks to me as though Nader could be scraping at the bottom of the barrel at last.

I joined the others for a sandwich lunch laid out on tables at the back of the room. Not much of a turnout—by now only about 100 people were present. Also, Nader received only a brief mention on CBS News that night, with the Heritage Foundation's "Growth Day" given nearly equal time. Who paid for all this, by the way? Does Nader now get free use of government offices? Is he the recipient of any CETA grants other than the ones detailed in the *Wall Street Journal*'s April 17 editorial? Nader might one day care to unveil his elaborate financial arrangements.

I decided to forget it and enjoy lunch: pre-sliced Jewish rye bread, potato salad, cole slaw, neatly rolled up slices of roast beef and ham. Mmmmmmm. Goes very well with the Peas Farm 100% Natural Apple Juice, which has been poured out into white foam cups from Giant Corp.

Giant? That looks like one more slip-up to me. Giant Corp. sounds as though it could be a candidate for the Corporate Hall of Shame. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR VOL. 13, NO. 6 / JUNE 1980

Charles Horner

HOW TO FAIL AT BEING SAFE

In a world of nuclear weapons, our strategists say, preparedness is aggression and strategic superiority is a threat to peace. But the real irony is this: By making nuclear war "unthinkable," the strategists themselves have made it more likely.

The United States has had a rather limited experience of war. No one has conducted organized warfare on our territory since we ourselves did in the mid-nineteenth century. Our foreign wars have involved, directly, only a small fraction of our population. Naturally, we have been affected by them, but what we know of war through first-hand experience is less than what the Germans or the Japanese or the Soviets or the Chinese know. For most of us to know what war is "really like," therefore, we must rely on art—on literature and films especially. As a subject for art, war seems as old as civilization itself, and there is, therefore, a good deal to imagine.

One understands immediately that nuclear war is a different matter. There has never been one; there is no real experience, only artistic imagination, sometimes disguised as scientific analysis. Literary treatments seem to have derived from John Hersey's brilliant reporting, first printed in the *New Yorker* in August of 1946, and to multiply *Hiroshima* by the number of nuclear explosions that a nuclear war would involve is to imagine unprecedented death and devastation. Thus, fictional treatments of nuclear war have tended to take as their theme "the end of the world." But nuclear warfare is only one *leitmotif* in a broader genre. After all, the literature of science fiction has always been dreary. In it, chemicals and machines tend to destroy civilization "as we have known it," one way or the other. In particular, the society of the future sketched in science fiction is almost invariably totalitarian; to die in such bleak surroundings is never especially ennobling. Indeed, there are better and worse ways die, and some of them are wonderfully romantic and heroic. To die of a broken heart or by a bullet or by a well-aimed arrow is one thing; to succumb to gamma radiation is ugly and, ultimately, futile. No one has yet established a satisfyingly poetic mode of death in a nuclear war.

This is probably what makes the subject so very depressing. All of us are potential casualties, but none of us gives to the rest any sense that our demise in a nuclear war will ever be regarded as beautiful by anyone, either in the immediate or long-term future. No one will paint us into an immortal "Guernica." Our suffering will be neither inspirational nor redemptive. Thus, nuclear war has acquired a special role in defining the "human condition" It places twentieth century technology at the service of a twentieth century philosophy. Indeed, it helps prove an "existential" point in a way that death alone cannot; having created the means of destroying all life, man has made of "human achievement" a *reductio ad absurdum.*

All this is very grim, and yet there must be something deeply satisfying about it. For such pessimistic imagery has dominated our approach to almost every aspect of the problems raised by the existence of nuclear weapons—even those political approaches which, on the surface, stress that this, too, is a problem amenable to rational solutions. Except that the solutions, viewed at a certain distance, tend to become increasingly irrational, more rooted in pessimism, seemingly intent on pushing us closer to the condition that we ostensibly seek to avoid. For all the supposed legalism and rationalism and positivism that animates our arms control efforts, for instance—for all the physics, arithmetic, and algorithms in them—there appears to be an almost vested interest in catastrophe. The prospect of Armageddon is the best deterrent; diminish the prospect and people will cease to be serious.

In this respect, a contemplation of nuclear annihilation becomes mankind's last hope. Thirty-five years ago the nuclear weapon was supposed to herald the end of civilization. If that was a bad thing then, modern deterrence theory has transformed it into a good thing. It has become fashionable, almost obligatory, to argue, for example, that the emergence of nuclear forces has helped to maintain the peace, that the strategic nuclear balance as currently constituted—on the basis of the possibility of mutual annihilation, that is—is far more "stable" than people might suppose. Through the nuclear weapon, we have found a way of making war so horrible that war becomes unthinkable. The best way to limit war is to link it to "total" war on a scale hitherto unimagined. But for this system to work we must constantly keep the abyss in sight, constantly hover about it without quite falling into it.

Thus, the nuclear weapon helps to define the "human condition"; some would say it defines a primary responsi-

Charles Horner is adjunct professor in the school of foreign service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bility in the "modern condition," namely, the avoidance of a catastrophic nuclear war, by keeping the possibility of it quite alive. But whatever these conclusions teach us, they nonetheless present us with as many questions as they answer. Both by implication and by necessity they argue against any new technological solution to what is now an old "nuclear question." They argue that the existence of the nuclear weapon has had a transforming effect on the practice of politics, but they do not prove that it has. In particular, they do not tell us very much about either the "operational code" or the ideology of a totalitarian Marxist state which is itself acquiring nuclear weapons in ever-increasing numbers. Yet for all these obvious defects, this paradigm has become the *strategy* in our own country for dealing with thermonuclear weapons.

In the 1950s, when it was not yet "understood" that prior remedies were futile, the reaction to nuclear weapons was remarkably simple. It seemed that nuclear war was a real possibility and preparations were made after a fashion. School children participated in air-raid drills, even if the desk in an elementary school seemed to offer only pathetic protection. Civil defense programs were taken seriously, even if their results were meager. If all this seems simple-minded in retrospect—and we are now *supposed* to think that it was simple-minded—it seems so only because of a simple historical fact: At that time, when the instinct for "preservation" was greatest, the prospect of nuclear war was least. For, in the 1950s, the damage that might be done to the United States in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union was quite minimal compared with the damage that would certainly be done today. As late as the early 1960s in fact, an American "first strike" would almost certainly have deprived the Soviets of their ability to damage us at all. At a time when the "economics" of nuclear war favored us by an enormous margin, we were most disturbed by another kind of calculation. For thirty years ago, the emerging "existential" concern with nuclear weapons encountered a prior American attitude that would not be easily displaced. Call it tough-minded or pragmatic or middle-American, it was the attitude that, whatever one might say about nuclear war philosophically, it was, for the United States, *economical*.

The representative proponent of this point of view was Charles E. Wilson, President Eisenhower's first Secretary of Defense, formerly Chief Executive Officer of General Motors. Wilson, who served from 1953 to 1957, is remembered for the dictum, "more bang for the buck." He was succeeded by Neil McElroy, formerly president of Proctor and Gamble. (McElroy was succeeded by Thomas S. Gates, an investment banker.) For such men, economics was hardly the dismal science. Instead, in deciding how to deal with the conventional military superiority enjoyed in key theaters by the Soviets and their allies the Chinese, nuclear weapons were seen as the cheapest, most efficient, alternative. "Massive retaliation" as a strategy was grounded in basic economics. Strategically, however, it could make sense only so long as the United States was prepared to maintain the strategic nuclear balance which made it "credible," that is, American superiority. But the maintenance of such a balance would become increasingly expensive over time. The laws of supply and demand which created the doctrine would soon make it vulnerable.

In retrospect, the economic vulnerability of the strategy of the 1950s led to a great insight in the early 1960s. Those who gained ascendency over strategic policy at that time were dissatisfied with the state of thinking about the subject for reasons which really had little to do with mere dollars. What concerned them was that a national strategy which accepted the fighting of a nuclear war as a real possibility served only to make nuclear war more likely. There was an awesome danger in the "demystification" of the nuclear weapon which businessmen and like-minded generals and admirals did not grasp. They had shown themselves flippant and, therefore, dangerous. But the older view would not be so easily overthrown if the attack upon it partook in any way of the "sissified" or "muddleheaded" approaches of scientists or clergymen or left-leaning apologists for the Soviet Union. Instead—and here was the insight—the attack against older attitudes would first have to be made on the same basis which had established them. It would be necessary, in other words, to place the dismal science at the service of a more despairing strategic doctrine. But it would all have to be done, once again, in characteristically American fashion.

It began with the development of a strategic theory, built up from unexceptionable premises. Nuclear war should be avoided and, therefore, its avoidance should be the primary focus of our energies. The problem of nuclear war could be seen, therefore, as a problem of controlling nuclear weapons and, eventually, of eliminating them. One needed, accordingly, a paradigm which could establish an upper limit on the number of nuclear weapons in the world, not a paradigm which could establish no such ceiling, let alone a basis for reductions and ultimate elimination. Preparedness, traditionally thought of as a deterrent to war, would become in the nuclear age a stimulus to war.

The "arms control" problem has come to permeate almost all intellectual activity related to the larger problem of nuclear weapons. As the dominant concern of the academic community, it has likewise dominated most thinking and publishing in the field. So much, indeed, has been invested in the study of arms control that we find it hard to imagine a world where some measure of strategic arms control is not operative; at the least, we have scarcely examined how we might best live in such a world (even though the questionable prospects of the SALT II treaty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may make such an examination a pressing, not a theoretical, concern). But what has given American arms control theorizing a profound impact on government policy is the way the theoreticians have found a practical method of implementing their ideas. It has not been utopian speculation which they have produced; rather, it has been policy, and at least some parts of an international legal regime for the "management" of nuclear weapons. They have produced ideas as influential as any in recent times, yet how they did it, and how they came to implement them—and what those ideas are and what they imply—are relatively unknown.

The key insight of the arms control theoreticians was their recognition that their formulations had to have the appearance of genuine "tough-mindedness." And they acquired "legitimacy" for their notions by employing that most American of virtues: good business sense. The theory of "deterrence" or "war avoidance" is easily summarized. Those who possess nuclear weapons must come to understand that their use is futile. They will realize this if strategic nuclear forces are of such a character that the initiation of nuclear war will result in the "assured destruction" of the party who initiates the war. Two physical conditions must be met: First, the nuclear forces themselves must be invulnerable to attack or "preemption"; second, the populations of countries must be vulnerable to attack. They must become hostage to each country's good intentions. Implicit in this is a grave threat: If one country attempts to preempt the nuclear forces of the other, the victim of that attack will respond by destroying the "hostages" in the other country. The peace can be kept, provided both parties have confidence in each other's fundamental hostility. To believe at any point that one's partner in this arrangement will not rapidly make use of his capability to annihilate millions is to dissolve the trust—a trust in the eagerness of man to do the worst of which he is capable, of course—that holds the world together.

This arrangement is held to be an "irony" of modern times. A subsidiary irony has to do with the fact that if one side is seen making preparations to defend its people from nuclear attack, it may be a reasonable presumption on the other side that such defense implies a willingness to attack, a willingness to deprive the other of the hostages on which the peace depends. Once this paradigm is accepted, an upper limit on nuclear forces can be defined, at least in theory. It is the number required to destroy a certain fraction of the partner's population, assuming that the worst happens to one's own nuclear forces. What constitutes this "assured destruction" is, of course, arbitrary. It need not be all of the partner's population, nor even the larger part of it.

Though the paradigm appears rather abstract, it showed itself to be a powerful analytic tool, a means of determining "how much is enough" when introduced into the Department of Defense during the tenure of Secretary Robert McNamara. McNamara, like Wilson before him, had been an automotive executive, the president of Ford. That he therefore brought to this methodology the authority of big business and modernity was important, for "assured destruction" as a strategic doctrine seemed to derive from the application of management science to military problems. Thus, in the 1960s a doctrine was created which argued that "superiority" could be safely abandoned, that a new condition of "parity" would be not only cheaper but, more important, *safer.*

Now, it is not the "reasonableness" of this approach as such which need be examined, so much as the conditions it presumes. Here we leave the realm of economics and enter the realm of faith. For the most conspicuous aspect of this paradigm is the permanence it presumes. It seeks to define a condition which is true more or less forever, a condition which cannot be changed, a condition born of the immutable irony of the nuclear age. The paradigm is not seen as a temporary condition imposed on us, enjoining us to devote energy and resources to finding a way out of its brutal logic, but rather as something which ought to be institutionalized. Because it is seen as being derived from physical law, it is thought to warrant the force of man-made law, to the extent possible. It is this prior assumption which underlies the oftentimes furious response which greets any suggestion that this is not so, and ought not to be so.

For example, it is not self-evident that the nuclear weapon is the ultimate weapon, ultimate in the sense that there is no defense against it. Nuclear forces embody technology which is now about 40 years old. They are essentially elaborations on the atomic bomb and the V-2 rocket. True, they are refined and enhanced, more destructive, speedier, more reliable, and more expensive versions of these devices, but they are, still and all, almost 40 years old. One could imagine, over time, that new technologies might appear which would make these weapons less menacing. And one could imagine further that someone concerned with the devastating potential of nuclear war would want to make the appearance of such technologies easier, not more difficult. But this is precisely what our arms control policy has sought to avoid.

Various ballistic missile defense schemes have been proposed, of course, and just as it is reasonable to suppose that some could not have worked, it is just as reasonable to suppose that some might have. What is less reasonable, however, is the *a priori* assumption that nothing can work and, even if it could be shown to work, that "something" would prove more dangerous than otherwise. In 1969, when an anti-ballistic missile system was proposed, the debate over it was heated and, ultimately, overwhelming—for the system was approved but the argument was lost. Perhaps this "Safeguard/Sentinel" system really was the "white elephant" it was said to be. But the



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

argument did not stop there. Instead, it began to take on all the character of a credo, beginning with the idea that Safeguard could not work, but ending with the conviction that nothing else will work—ever.

For example, even *Scientific American,* which introduces each of its issues with extracts of items which appeared in its pages both 100 and 50 years ago, applies an ahistorical dogmatism to this particular realm of human ingenuity. Within this most prestigious chronicler of the world's scientific and technological progress there is consistently presented the *a priori* argument that nothing can work against ballistic missiles. Thus, the magazine has launched a campaign of sorts against high-technology missile defenses. A good example of this is an article by Kosta Tsipsis and John Parmentola in the April, 1979, *Scientific American* which in its affect was reminiscent of ancient arguments that no heavier-than-air craft could ever fly. After concluding that certain essential anti-ballistic functions of the new systems they examine are "extraordinarily difficult if not impossible to perform," Tsipsis and Parmentola conclude that it is "highly questionable that such a system could function at all, let alone be operationally effective."

By contrast, Carnes Lord, writing in the May, 1980, *Commentary,* takes a view which seems more in accordance with our "common sense" of technological possibility:

> What may prove truly revolutionary in this connection, however, are unconventional ABM systems, based on so-called directed-energy technology, particularly high-energy laser technology. The development of lasers as anti-missile weapons is by now relatively far advanced, and they are likely to prove useful eventually in a variety of air defense roles. But recent tests in this country have also shown that laser weapons could be considerably more lethal against Soviet ballistic missiles than had previously been thought.

The conviction that nothing will work is now written into law in the form of the SALT I ABM treaty of 1972, ratified in the Senate by a vote of 88-2. Ostensibly, the treaty prevents the construction of systems like Safeguard. But it was hailed by those who wrote it not merely for this, but for the permanence it gives to the "assured destruction" model. It is a treaty of unlimited duration. It commits us not to undertake a physical defense of the United States against nuclear attack—ever. There is no logical reason the treaty ought to have been written this way, except to protect a certain vision of how a nuclear-armed world must perforce exist. Yet there is hardly a widespread understanding of what has happened; indeed, probably few Americans know that their government is now pledged never to defend them against this particular form of attack. To borrow a phrase from the title of a 1960 book by Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, this is what has become of the Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.

It may be readily argued, of course, that the chronology of these events has been reversed, that a particular strategic theory was merely a *post hoc* rationalization for prior economic and managerial impulses, that mere "efficiency" had to be justified by an elegant nuclear "ideal." One hopes that this is not what happened, however; for the chronology of "theory" first, "economics" second at least has the benefit of imputing some serious, larger concerns to those who brought about this significant revolution in our affairs. To believe that we are in our current predicament primarily because "economics" was allowed to override all other considerations is to wonder whether the "business ethic" has anything much to contribute to the management of our strategic problems.

All this is but the briefest sketch of what is, in fact, one of the more important topics in the recent cultural history of the United States. We pride ourselves on being an innovative, dynamic, moral people, and yet our collective intelligence has produced a situation where we must rely, for a national strategy, on concepts which imply stagnation, stasis, and barbarism. Our culture accepts a "solution" to the problems created by the existence of nuclear weapons which embodies a refutation of everything we think ourselves to be. A particular approach to the question of our survival, although patently "absurd" (in twentieth century parlance), is nonetheless embraced as an absolute good by scholars, poets, and, especially, clergymen.



Toward the beginning of his memorable book on SALT I, *Cold Dawn,* John Newhouse likens the discussion of the strategic arms control theorists to the disputes among medieval scholastics. The analogy is useful but, in the deepest sense, profoundly misleading. For if there is any relationship between contemporary arms control doctrine and traditional Christian theology, the comparison is deeply unflattering to the latter. The dominant school in contemporary arms control doctrine may be theological in its method, but it is not theological in its content. It may appear to be grappling with "ultimate questions," but what it is producing is not theology at all, but mythology. In its prideful adherence to its past product, it offers a mythology of "perpetual peace" based on only the haziest outline of the future. Its faith is the faith of a believer who has no sense of either science or history. Thus, unlike the theology it nominally emulates, it numbs the mind and corrodes the soul. It implies that we are helpless by maintaining not only that there is no way out of the nuclear predicament, but, even more, that it is good that we are in it. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eric Hoffer

ISLAM AND MODERNIZATION

Muhammad, messenger of plod.

There is a fact that stares us in the face yet is rarely mentioned: No Islamic country has so far been modernized. No Islamic country has mastered industrial production or achieved anything remotely comparable to what was accomplished in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and India. Egypt began to modernize itself in the wake of the Napoleonic invasion, almost 50 years before Japan, yet Egypt is still a backward country.

In countries where Moslems live side by side, either as a majority or a minority, with members of other creeds, the Moslems remain as a rule backward while the non-Moslems usually display some facility for modernization. This has been true in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, and Nigeria.

Through most of its history Islam has acted as a tranquilizer. It is a most congenial religion, without contradictions between state and church, profession and practice, the spirit and the flesh. The impressive mass calisthenics at prayer in spacious, carpeted mosques give the Moslem a profound sense of egality. The result of this lack of inner contradictions and tensions has been intellectual and economic stagnation.

The deep conviction that Islam is the only true faith, superior to all religions past, present, and future, gives the Moslem an unequaled sense of certitude and pride. In the Islamic world an individual is a Moslem before he is anything else. Even without a pilgrimage to Mecca he is aware of being one of a vast brotherhood. He is not under a pressing need to prove his worth day in, day out. Just being a Moslem is enough. Thus, a plunge into the hectic atmosphere of rapid modernization is experienced by a Moslem as an expulsion from Eden. He cannot become inured to the ceaseless striving and vying which fuel advanced societies.

It is natural for a Moslem to see the failure of modernization in an Islamic country not as a demonstration of inferiority but as a reassertion of a superior way of life against corrupt views and practices introduced by outsiders. In Christian Britain the present economic breakdown caused by the lethargy of workers and managers is seen as an aspect of Britain's decline from greatness. But in Islamic Iran the failure of modernization is resulting in a triumphant return to Islam. An Iran that tried and failed to achieve material plenty by mastering modern means of production is supposedly contrasting the naked materialism of the West with the spirituality of Islam. Actually, despite the forbiddance of alcohol, Islam caters to the appetites and is the least ascetic of religions. It is a trick of pride to put up defenses against something we want and cannot have.

Now it is true that in its early phase, lasting about three centuries, Islamic civilization was in the vanguard of mankind. It displayed a remarkable ingenuity in putting to practical use theories and processes borrowed from near and far. Paper factories, sugar refineries, manufactories of textiles, leather, glazed tile, steel, and chemicals dotted the Moslem world from Spain to Central Asia. For the first time there was a systematic employment of the water wheel and the windmill. Artesian wells were bored in North Africa and other semi-arid regions and vast irrigation projects developed. The magnetic compass, the astrolabe, and Indian arithmetic were put to practical use. All crafts were in a flourishing state.

Then, almost abruptly, Islam's golden age came to an end. The reason for the ensuing stagnation was the hardening of orthodoxy. The fact is that practically all the outstanding personalities of Islam's brief golden age were non-Arabs and many of them non-Moslems. They were Persians, Greeks, Jews, Berbers, Turks, and Spaniards, and so notoriously impious that orthodox Moslems refused to break bread with them. Hence, as orthodoxy asserted itself it became more difficult for outsiders to play the role of culture bearers. The Mongol invasion in the East during the thirteenth century made the decline seem cataclysmic. That Islam did not recover after the ruinous Mongol invasions the way Japan and Germany recovered after their ruinous defeat in the Second World War is obviously due to the fact that in the Islamic world energies and skills were not widely diffused, that the creative impulse originated in a relatively small group of outsiders.

When in the early 1920s Kemal Atatürk set out to modernize Turkey, he deliberately tried to uproot Islam by laicizing everyday life and banishing Arab influences. He knew of the incompatibility between Islam and the modern spirit and persecuted Islam with a personal passion. His spectacular reforms seemed to modernize Turkey overnight. Yet 40 years after Atatürk's death it is obvious that his attempt to de-Islamize Turkey has failed. Islam is regaining ground, and Turkey has not joined the advanced countries.

Atatürk did not know what he was up against. He was not aware of the paradox that although Islam cannot generate the social vigor requisite for effective industrial production, it is singularly vigorous as a religion and a way of life. No other religion can rival Islam's lasting hold on its adher-

---

Eric Hoffer, a retired longshoreman, is the author of nine books, including The True Believer *and his latest,* Before the Sabbath.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ents. One hardly ever hears of a Moslem abandoning Islam for another faith. There is no instance of a country being de-Islamized the way the Middle East and North Africa were totally de-Christianized. Even when, as in Spain, the Balkans, and Russia, Islam was driven out by force, its imprint has endured. Seven centuries after its expulsion from Spain the flavor of Islam is tangible in Spanish life. In the Balkans several cities retain an Islamic way of life long after Turkey's withdrawal. In Russia, the continuity with the Tartar khanate is evident in every department of life. Even under Communism, Tartar khans are ensconced in the Kremlin.

It is also worth noting that although Islam proclaimed itself a religion of the sword it won adherents wherever it competed peacefully with other religions. Christianity and Islam arrived simultaneously in Indonesia. The Portuguese were as zealous as the Arabs, but today Indonesia is largely Islamic. Islam is also winning Negro adherents not only in Africa but in Christian America despite the fact that the slave trade in Africa was for a long time an Islamic monopoly. Finally, it is curious that Christianity, a champion of the meek, of "the weak things of the world," made its greatest headway among the warrior tribes of Europe while Islam appeals to victors and victims alike.

Can Communism modernize an Islamic country? There are about 70 million Moslems in Soviet Central Asia. Although the Communists have broken the power of the Ulema, Islam's caste of scholars and priests, and are modernizing industry and agriculture at breakneck speed, the vigor of Islam has remained undiminished. The mosques and shrines are packed with worshipers and the Islamic way of life persists.

Would it be legitimate to predict that once Communism loses its ruthlessness the incompatibility between Islam and modernization would make itself felt, and some religious leader would recapitulate in Samarkand, the capital of Soviet Uzbekistan, what the Ayatollah Khomeini has done in Teheran? The answer is no, for the simple reason that Soviet Central Asia has a large number of Russians and Ukrainians concentrated in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan where modernization has gone farthest. The Moslem-population is shy of factories and sticks to the countryside. Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, and Alma Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, are "Russian towns set down in the center of Asia."

As things are now it seems that the Communist ability to modernize an Islamic society may eventually be tested in Afghanistan and Southern Yemen, under the eyes of fanatical Islamic neighbors. □

William R. Havender

WHEN INTELLIGENCE PASSES THE TEST

The bias in mental tests is all in the criticizing of them.

It is not without cause that mental tests have become one of the most hotly debated social issues of the past decade, for, along with other closely related measures of academic achievement, they guard the gates to academic advancement in the current scheme of things, and hence play an important role in determining who gets ahead. The received wisdom has been that the allocation of academic opportunities over the last decades *has* been made largely on the basis of demonstrated talent and competence, and that mental tests are a superior tool, indeed the best single one we have, for ferreting beneath the veneer of social class, race, and ethnicity to reveal occluded capabilities. But if true, this lends a measure of desert to the way rewards are distributed in American society; *some* inequalities in income, prestige, and, yes, access to writing opportunities could then be said to be deserved. Predictably, this component of the "merit system" has drawn critics the way ripe meat draws flies, critics who cannot abide any residual trace of that special moral validation that once characterized the American political experiment.

Historically, the introduction of standardized mental tests was a liberating revolution relative to what went before, and they were successful in displacing the old ways largely because they made it easy to show that the then-usual means of distributing access to educational opportunities—in the South, by means of race, and in the rest of the country, by means of having attended the right prep schools, having recommendations from the right kinds of Protestant family ministers, and having alumni as relatives—were systematically overlooking many academically superior students. It was precisely the availability of this alternative means of demonstrating academic capability that gave both compelling plausibility and moral force to the movement to base admissions on objectively measured merit. Certainly, vast numbers of blacks, and newly-immigrant Jews, Asians, and Slavs thus got the chance to become "gentlemen" long before they routinely started being born that way. The lesson coming out of that old and noble battle was that we should assess individuals and let the group ratios fall where they may, even when this results, as it puzzlingly did, in a worrisome *under*-representation of white Protestants, upon whom these new measures had largely been validated.

Despite this laudable history, there remained a detail that gives nourishment to the current attack on mental tests. This is the recurrent finding that, though members of all ethnic, religious, and socio-economic groups are found throughout the grade distribution when such tests are given to large, representative samples of the citizenry, they are not found in constant proportions at all levels. Specifically, the central tendency of both Asians and Jews is above that of gentile whites, and that of the latter above that of blacks. Too, the central tendency of higher socio-economic groups is above that of lower socio-economic groups, that of Southern whites below that of Northern whites, and that of California Hispanics between those of whites and blacks. And while the data are not yet available, it is likely that the median of West Indian blacks and Cubans in this country will be at

William R. Havender is a research biochemist at the University of California at Berkeley and a contributing editor to Regulation *magazine.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least as high as that of whites. There is, of course, a wide overlap in all of these distributions, and it is a generally overlooked virtue of standardized tests that by thus demonstrating the interblending of mental ability between different groups, they refute rather than affirm the typological thinking that has historically been the *fons et origo* of the archetypes of racism, such as the official treatment of the Jews in Hitler's Germany and the blacks in this country until the past few decades.*

Now one might speculate about the cause of these differences in group averages, and an obvious place to begin is to examine the measuring instrument itself to see if it is giving accurate readings. Perhaps the tests are biased in favor of certain social groups, with the bias lying not at such a blatant level as unfair grading, but in the sorts of questions asked and the kinds of experiences and cultural knowledge presupposed. It is this limited question that Arthur Jensen examines in his massive new book, *Bias in Mental Testing*.† No more than a brief sampling of its argument will be attempted here. The work comprises both a lengthy introduction to the theory and methodology of mental test construction (including an explanation at a simple level of the statistical tools one needs to understand how psychometricians think), as well as a comprehensive, detailed review of the enormous research literature pertaining to the question of bias.

The usual questions that laymen ask are thoroughly discussed, not least important of which are: Do mental tests really measure true intelligence, and does what they measure have much significance for life in the real world? A simple way to begin answering the first of these questions is to take a situation where there isn't any doubt about there being greater or lesser amounts of what in everyday life we mean by intelligence, for instance, by testing children at different ages, to see if tests can distinguish between their differing mental capabilities. That children get smarter as they get older is, of course, so commonplace and incontestable that it is the foundation of school curricula the world over. That is, however, just how intelligence tests were originally validated. And tests that distinguish among children of different ages also distinguish among children of the same age, and also among adults. The faculty whose differences are made evident by this means is what laymen mean by "intelligence" and what psychometricians call *g* (for general mental ability).

The faculty signified by *g* is, basically, the ability to "educe relations and correlates," that is, to infer relationships from a set of specifics and to apply such generalizations to new specifics. Differences in *g* can be shown to be related to differences in performance on a wide variety of specific tasks. Its generality shows up, for example, in the way that all mental tests of any complexity (and there are a great many) correlate highly with one another (that is, a person doing well on one tends to do well on the others, too). Moreover, differences in *g* also correlate to a fair degree with differences in performance in areas that most of us would agree are unarguably of social importance, such as scholastic achievement, and occupational level and earnings. It is the easily demonstrated commonality of *g* to performance both on mental tests and in the more obviously socially and educationally important tasks that makes these tests useful for predicting later success.

How good are these predictions? Mental testers use the term "predictive validity" to measure how successful a test is in predicting performance on any criterion of interest (typically, scholastic or job performance). According to Jensen, the results of the "thousands of studies of the correlation between intelligence test scores and scholastic performance" are so "generally consistent and statistically incontestable . . . that even the harshest critics . . .wholly concede the substantial relationship between IQ and scholastic achievement." But while the correlations between IQ or aptitude tests and actual scholastic achievement are substantial, they are far from perfect: about .6 to .7 (on a scale from 0 to 1) at the elementary school level, declining to around .4 to .5 at the college level.‡ This leaves ample room for our experiential impression that self-discipline and plain old-fashioned *Sitzfleisch* make a big contribution to actual levels of performance.

The matter of greatest interest apropos the question of bias is of course whether the predictive validity varies for different social groups. Most of the studies compare whites and blacks, and, after an exhaustive review of this evidence, Jensen concludes "that tests' predictive validities are actually the same for blacks and whites, and probably for other native-born, English-speaking groups as well [although the data pertaining to the latter are relatively scant]. . . . the little bias that has been found in some studies has been in a direction that actually favors the selection of blacks when the selection procedure is colorblind."

There are other, more sophisticated ways of detecting test bias that look for


The Hat. The Door.
The Mat. The Man.
The Key. The Boy.
The Cup. The Desk.
The Vase. The Jug.
The Pail. The Pen.
The Saucer. The Ink.
The Box. The Eye.
The Nose. The Ear.
The Hand. The Hair.

*Hence, the David Levine drawing in the May 1, 1980, *New York Review of Books* depicting Arthur Jensen in what looks like storm-trooper regalia is slander pure and simple, although such is not out of character for that tabloid.

†Macmillan, $29.95.

‡Such tests are of course not used by themselves in determining college or graduate admissions, but in conjunction with previous grades, recommendations, and other considerations. The overall prediction is thereby significantly improved over aptitude tests alone.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

differences in the pattern of responses to the specific items that make up a given test. Bias might show up, for example, in a group difference in the rank order of test item difficulty or in the "factorial structure" of a given test (this is a technical way of analyzing test results so as to isolate the various components of mental ability that account for them). There exists a massive collection of findings bearing on these sensitive measures of bias, most of them relating to differences between blacks and whites, and, writes Jensen, they "quite unequivocally either fail to support, or else diametrically contradict, the expectations that follow from the hypothesis that most current standard tests of mental ability are culturally biased for American-born blacks."

There are many such "expectations." For example, if variations between group means are caused by the cultural content of tests, then one would expect group differences to be reduced on items and tests that are purely abstract. But in fact mean group differences are *increased* on such items and tests. Another expectation is that the group on which a test has been standardized would necessarily have the greatest cultural affinity for the test items, hence would do the best, whereas the fact is that minority groups are distributed on *both* sides of the "norm": Jews, American-born Asians, Eskimos, and Japanese-born-and-raised Japanese do *better* on tests normed on American whites than do American whites. Such "norming bias" cannot, then, be a general explanation of mean group disparities. Perhaps, then, the use of standard English in these tests is the cause of difficulty for ghetto-raised blacks. But blacks do relatively better on verbal tests written in standard English than on nonverbal tests; moreover, translation of the Stanford-Binet test into black ghetto dialect produced no significant difference.**

Other factors besides test content have been thought to have significant influences on test scores. One is the race of the examiner; perhaps each person should be examined by a member of his own race. This has been looked at in more than thirty studies, the results of which conclusively contradict the hypothesis. Too, much has been popularly written about the "Pygmalion effect": the influence a teacher's expectation of his or her student's ability might have on a child's performance on an IQ test. But the original study purporting to prove this failed to stand up under scrutiny, and a dozen attempts to repeat it were all without success. Yet another idea was that groups differed in their previous experience with tests, and hence in their "testwiseness." But Jensen's review of the literature concerning whether practice or even direct coaching in test strategy can raise test scores finds only modest gains, mainly for persons who have had little or no prior test experience at all (an unlikely situation for college applicants). The gains are, however, the same for both races, that is, the mean difference between groups is not reduced.

There is, then, an impressive concurrence of evidence coming out of an enormous array of varied studies supporting the conclusion that obvious differences in the "culture" presupposed by standardized tests, or any other source of bias in the tests, do not account for group average differences for persons born in this country and speaking English. These sorts of data can of course never fully exclude the bias hypothesis, because it is always possible to reformulate it to accommodate whatever empirical data are adduced. One could argue, for example, that the cultural deprivation affects not only test performance but also performance on the judgment criterion to the very same degree (thus accounting for the similar predictive validities), and that the cultural effect acts uniformly on every test item (hence accounting for the similarity between groups in rank order of item difficulty and factorial structures), and that the culture-reduced items and tests, no matter how superficially culture-free they appear, simply haven't got at the deeper sources of cultural bias. But this constantly rearguard, *post hoc* sort of hypothesizing, unable ever to generate a robust, empirically verifiable prediction proving the existence of overlooked ability, begins to wear a little thin in the face of the overwhelming marshaling of mutually supportive evidence contained in Jensen's book. More important, *pari passu* as the "cultural" determinants of differential group performance become ever more elusive, they become ever more useless for inspiring specific policy initiatives. What, for example, would we actually set out to *do* to make group differences vanish, if we still prefer in the face of this mass of evidence a cultural interpretation of group disparities? It is not obvious, and indeed, in its current etiolated form the cultural bias interpretation is far *less* able to generate effective policy prescriptions for reducing individual and group differences in achievement—which after all is what really matters—than its diametric opposite, the hypothesis of the genetic causation of group differences (a matter I took up at length in these pages in April, 1976).

**It is not really surprising that these tests' dependence on culture-specific content is so low, because despite the superficial appearance of some items, the denotative content of items on tests of IQ or aptitude (as distinct from achievement tests) is used merely as a vehicle for the reasoning problem being posed. That is, the items are selected so that the cultural content is typically of such wide familiarity that it contributes negligibly to whether one gets the item right or wrong.

This is a very brief overview of the contents of this book. It is entirely inadequate to convey the sense of its empirical thoroughness and its theoretical sophistication, and the extraordinary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coherence with which it ties together the many independent lines of investigation supporting the fairness of these tests in evaluating the mental capabilities of individuals, at least for members of native-born, English-speaking groups. Virtually all of the popular criticisms of mental tests *have* been scrutinized in empirical studies and ruled out. Mean group differences, then, do seem, on the basis of the available evidence, to be the outcome of evaluative procedures that at the level of individuals *are* as fair as we can now make them.

This poses a problem only if one believes that parity in group-average statistics is the proper barometer to monitor in making inferences about social justice. And the problem is insoluble. For if one holds that any manifest differences in group "merit" are spurious, then groups currently overrepresented in the economic and educational elites must inevitably be early targets for redistribution, since they cannot have *earned* these exalted positions. This would have only a limited impact on the white gentile majority (since they would lose on average no more than 10 to 20 percent of the positions they now hold), but the impact on such minorities as the Jews and Asians would be devastating.†† Regardless of intent, the effect of this social view will assuredly be anti-Semitic. And the flip side of this belief is the eager assent to the pernicious proposition that if a group average difference ever *were* one day demonstrated in an incontestable manner, then the entire structure of liberal democracy would come tumbling down, and we would have no further defenses against reinstituting racially segregated schools and a South Africa-like allocation of jobs on ethnic, racial, and religious grounds. But this is nonsense, as Hayek pointed out two decades ago in *The Constitution of Liberty:*

> To rest the case for equal treatment of national or racial minorities on the assertion that they do not differ from other men is implicitly to admit that factual inequality would justify unequal treatment; and the proof that some differences do, in fact, exist would not be long in forthcoming. It is of the essence of the demand for equality before the law that people should be treated alike in spite of the fact that they are different.

The problem vanishes, however, as soon as one understands that group averages are not the proper statistic to watch in judging the degree of a pluralistic society's justice. And there is an elementary reason why one *should* understand this. For groups consist only of the individuals that compose them, and have no moral standing apart from that of their component persons. This means that *whatever* group ratio results from the just treatment of *individuals* must be a fair one. Readers fortunate enough to be acquainted with Hayek's writings will recognize here an instance of the distinction Hayek draws between "methodological individualism" and "methodological collectivism." Readers not so graced will still recognize this as no more than the familiar philosophy of merit that happily, though precariously, is still officially espoused in this land.

A tell-tale feature of the current attack on standardized testing is the lack of any demonstrably better alternative for making merit allocations. This is the salient distinction between the current debate and its predecessor where, you remember, there did exist a means of readily showing the superior academic capabilities of substantial numbers of people being excluded by the then-prevailing methods. Were this the case today, the remedy would be simple, in fact the same as before: adopt the alternative means as the standard. But no method yet exists that has been demonstrated to be superior in detecting hidden academic abilities, and the sole animating force now in the movement against standardized tests is the disparity in group means.

Nor are the critics of tests willing to abide by the outcome of any conceivable practical demonstration. In this past decade of affirmative action, it has happened many times that large numbers of students have been admitted in place of others that did satisfy the normal criteria, with disproportionate amounts of teaching and tutorial resources expended to nurture any faintest flicker of scholastic ability. The outcome typically has been that no founts of achievement were uncovered beyond what was already predicted by the usual means. The reaction of these critics, however, has not been to pause and perhaps think, but to vilify those who would point out the factual nudity of their hypothesis. (One such experiment was described in these pages, March, 1978).

The characteristic feature of this debate is the test critics' compulsive focus on "anecdotal" deviations-from-perfection in the application of standardized tests, oddly contrasted with a vast, yawning silence concerning the feasible alternatives, and an unbudgeable unconcern with the outcome when alternatives *are* tried out. This attitude is all too familiar from other debates of the past two decades, including the debate over Vietnam. The reader will recall that during the later stages of the war we were supposed to focus our critical attention only on the petty bribery of the Thieu regime and on American "war crimes" and never for an instant on the possibility that the only feasible alternative would be a horror of catastrophic proportions. That horror now confronts us, and "unbudgeably unconcerned" is certainly an apt, if too mild, description of the present attitude of most of those who worked to bring it about.

Despite the differing characters of the questions being debated, one cannot refrain from noting this parallel, both in order to assess the balance of credibility in the current flap over mental tests and by way of warning about the absolute necessity of knowing in advance what we will use in place of mental tests for ascertaining merit. It is in fact rather easy to see where vagueness about the alternatives is liable to lead us: on an individual level, to many destroyed careers among otherwise meritorious people, and to an overall weakening of incentives to accumulate good marks for merit of all kinds; on the collective level, to the inevitable escalation of social divisiveness as groups wrangle over the distribution of desirable positions.

And like that previous debate, there are clearly deeper motivations at work. For one, there is the manifest intent not to strengthen the use of demonstrated merit in allocating academic opportunities but to *replace* it by political allocation (which means, of course, allocation by intimidation). For another, there is that exaggerated sensitivity to any hint that there might be some measure of justice in the current system.

This is a sorry tale, and it is a dreadful sign of the times that those who *favor* individual assessment without regard to one's ethnicity, religion, or race are now forced to argue for the reality of group differences, while those who abominate the distribution of rewards in proportion to proven individual merit and shamelessly prefer making one's chances conditional upon ethnicity have managed to gull much of the media, in particular certain New York editors, into granting them the halo of virtue. It must not be forgotten that the unwillingness to permit group properties to fluctuate as the *dependent* outcome of individually fair treatment must have the unfair treatment of individuals as its concomitant. This is an old fight, one that clearly shall have to be fought and won again. □

††That Jews have won extraordinary standing is well known, but it is not well known that the Asians have, for example, won election to the National Academy of Sciences in a ratio ten times their proportion in the general population.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stuart L. Koehl & Stephen P. Glick

THE NEW RED ARMY

What's fast, deadly, and all over?

By now, the invasion of Afghanistan has driven the debate over American foreign policy toward an appropriate rethinking of Soviet intentions, but so much so that the political implications of the Soviets' decision to invade threaten to dwarf the invasion itself, as a military event. The two are, of course, inseparable: Concerning the Soviets, the beginning of wisdom about intentions often begins somewhere in an understanding of their military. If for no other reason, this makes the invasion's scenario worth recounting:

On December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union began an around-the-clock airlift of an airborne division into the Afghani capital, Kabul, over 200 miles from the Soviet border. It continued the airlift well into the New Year. Simultaneously, Soviet motorized rifle divisions assembled on the Soviet-Afghan border. In the early evening of Thursday, December 27, the Soviet paratroopers in the city went into action. Explosions sounded in downtown Kabul; government buildings and communications centers were seized. Soviets assaulted the Presidential Palace, where Hafizullah Amin had dug in with a force of loyal soldiers.

An Afghani armored division, brought to the city by Amin, was immobilized by Soviet advisors, who had solicitously removed key parts from the tanks "for repairs" prior to a planned large exercise. Artillery ammunition had also been collected for the same reason. Middle echelon Afghani officers were all invited to a party by their Soviet comrades-in-arms, who, in the spirit of good clean fun, locked them into the building.

While this was happening in Kabul, the Soviet divisions on the border crossed into Afghanistan and dashed down the major highways to Kabul and Herat, securing these vital routes, including a seven-mile tunnel on the road to Kabul. Throughout Afghanistan, Soviet advisors with Afghani army units assumed their units' direct control and awaited further orders. Soviet soldiers on Afghani army bases and in major cities seized centers of communications and control. By the next morning, the situation was well in hand and the official radio in Kabul announced that "the monster Amin" had been overthrown. The Soviet Union had gained control of the organs of Afghanistan's government by *coup de main*.

The conventional view of the Soviet military machine, like that of the Russian army before it, is of a force both massive and clumsy, its thousands of tanks and hordes of soldiers advancing slowly but inexorably, relying on the sheer weight of numbers, rather than subtle strategems or elegant maneuvers, to achieve victory. Within the United States Army this view of the Soviets as a kind of military "steamroller" is expressed in the new operations manual, FM 100-5. On the offensive the Soviet Army is believed to concentrate three or four divisions on a narrow front, with several more divisions assembled to the rear in a second echelon. Advancing under a tremendous artillery barrage, with possible chemical and tactical nuclear support, the first echelon divisions go right at the defender, taking heavy losses, but also overwhelming the opposition and creating a breakthrough into which the second echelon divisions charge. In short, the machine crushes anything that stands in its way, rather than going around it.

What a surprise, then, was the Soviet *coup de main* in Afghanistan: no great masses of troops, no heavy-handedness. Instead, there was superb planning based upon excellent intelligence and a sophistication in the details of execution that we associate with Israelis and Germans rather than with Russians. The swift seizure of all the key nerve centers (with little actual fighting) accomplished what no mere superiority of numbers and firepower could have: It presented Afghanistan and the world with a *fait accompli*.

Obviously, the Soviet Army is no longer the awkward juggernaut of conventional Western conception, slowly deploying and easily targeted and dislocated, but a war fighting instrument of great flexibility, which moreover has an operational confidence lacking in a good many Western armies. True, the Soviets did have troops in place before the coup, and the Afghani Army was demoralized and enervated by civil war and political dissension, but these facts do not obscure the proficiency and boldness of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

To demonstrate just how boldly the Soviets have operated, consider that the American armed forces are not only

Stuart L. Koehl and Stephen P. Glick are practicing research analysts for a Washington-based defense consulting firm and long-time observers of military affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unwilling to contemplate such operations but are totally unable to execute them. The United States, with its present force structure and deployment plans, lacks the necessary amount of long-range airlift and trained aircrews needed to intervene with a speed and strength comparable to that which the Soviets demonstrated in Afghanistan. To deploy appropriately the entire 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East would take the United States *two weeks*—and this is the American Rapid Deployment Force!

When the Soviets moved into Kabul they faced an Afghani armored division, yet this did not stop the operation as planned. Had similar circumstances confronted American military planners, the ill-fated Operation Market-Garden of World War II might well have come to mind, where British 1st Airborne dropped next to German Panzer troops and were annihilated. And the analogy would have been justified, since American airborne troops are equipped for all intents and purposes exactly as they were in 1944. The weapons have changed, but the airborne troops are still armed with light weapons, lacking armor and artillery. In contrast, Soviet airborne divisions have organic armor, artillery, and transport (such as the BMD light tank and personnel carrier, and the ASU-85 tank destroyer). These weapons give the Soviet division greater firepower and immeasurably greater mobility than its American counterpart. The American airborne division is configured for World War II "drop and hold" operations, not *coups de main*. Soviet divisions are much more flexible, and the Soviets possess sufficient airlift capability to move a division in one day, rather than two weeks.

To engage in *coup de main* operations requires precise intelligence, concerning, among other things, the organization of the enemy's command structures, its forces, leaders, and intentions. The Soviets were able to gather this information because they had an effective *human* intelligence system in place. Should the United States seek to intervene, say, in Iran, it would be operating blindfolded because it long ago dismantled CIA operations in that country. Advanced technology can tell something of the what and where of enemy forces, but only human agents-in-place can supply the all important how, when, and why. The Soviets have such agents—we do not.

Recent operations involving Soviet "advisors" and their Cuban auxiliaries (Angola and Ethiopia) have shown increasing degrees of adventurism, spurred on by the lack of American response. On the whole, these operations do not demonstrate any great skill; aside from expanding Soviet influence into new regions they were militarily unremarkable. The last operation involving substantial numbers of Soviet troops, the 1968 freezing of the Prague Thaw, was marred by massive logistical problems: supply shortages, delays, and traffic jams several miles long. These planning disasters sufficed to convince Western analysts that even if not totally incompetent, the Soviet Army was incapable of handling any but the simplest of operations involving large units.

Evidently the Soviets have been working hard to improve their staff and supply systems, and this reorganization has resulted in an enormous improvement in efficiency. Unlike Czechoslovakia, which has well developed communications systems and a relatively docile population, Afghanistan is a logistician's nightmare. Yet in this nightmare, in the midst of a civil war, the Soviets have been able to maintain, not an occupation army, as in 1968, but a fighting army of more than 90,000 men.

Above all else, the ease and efficiency of the Afghanistan invasion show that the Soviets now relate their operational methods to their opponents. They examine the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, working backwards from these points to develop a strategy and tactics which will circumvent effective opposition. And if this method works in Afghanistan, it is logical to assume that the Soviets are applying a similar approach to the defenses of NATO.

Even so, Western analysts, particularly those in the American Army, have not bothered to reexamine their perceptions of the Soviet Army. They still see the Soviet military machine as knocking down obstacles rather than circumventing them, carrying out a doctrine based on inflexible, blind obedience. This lack of attention to the changes in Soviet methods could have serious consequences for American forces in any conflict with the Soviets. American doctrines and weapons systems are so carefully tuned to the outdated "steamroller" conception of the Soviet military machine that any deviation from this by the Soviets would completely unhinge our defense capabilities on the day of judgment.

Moreover, the Afghanistan coup has several strategic implications, all of which increase the likelihood of our defenses being tested. First, the success of the coup is likely to increase the strength of that Politburo faction which feels that military force is a useful solution to external problems. Second, the lack of a serious response by the United States can only encourage further Soviet adventures. Third, if Afghani resistance proves more formidable than anticipated, and Soviet efforts at pacification fail, this confidence in the success of Soviet arms could turn to a deep pessimism. This could lead the Kremlin to feel that their "strategic window" is closing more quickly than expected, driving them to desperation measures (much in the same way the Imperial Japanese government felt driven to general war in 1941).

In the short term, the Soviets will gain all of the advantages inherent in the occupation of the Afghanistan salient. They secure yet another section of the Soviet border with the complete subjugation of Afghanistan. They magnify their geopolitical dominance of Asia by their demonstration of willingness to use force, a willingness not matched by their chief rival, the United States. No nation in Asia will be able to engage in foreign (and even certain domestic) initiatives without calculating the response of the Soviet Union first. To the minds of foreign leaders will come images of the Soviet invasion juxtaposed with the dispatch of *unarmed* American F-15s to Saudi Arabia. Which power projects an image worthy of fear and respect? They will not take long to decide. □



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Miriam London & Ma Yuan

RICH MAN, POOR MAN, CHINAMAN

In the New China, the mendicant arts survive—necessarily.

In the old days before Communist liberation, when China was still unprogressive and Heaven regularly visited disaster at will on the country's rice, millet, sorghum, and wheat, a certain number of the peasantry yearly abandoned their stricken lands and went off to beg for their livelihood in the towns. Begging became a tradition, a vocation for some, and even—if anyone would only stop and pay heed—a performing art.

The beggar's "stage" might be improvised before some busy noodle stall, where poorer folk went to fill up on a starchy meal, or before the front door of some rich man's household. For each audience the beggar appropriately varied his act—usually a rhymed chant, which he might accompany, for example, by knocking two pieces of wood together, like castanets. Whatever his act, the beggar always began on the upbeat. His debut was benevolent and premised on the positive in human nature. (There is something to be learned from centuries of beggary.) Not only would he praise the noodle merchant, for instance, and invoke blessings on the stall, but he was not beyond commenting favorably on the noodles:

So pleasing to the eye
As well as nice to eat
And when but 24 taels you buy
You get a catty and half complete.

(Of course, since one and a half catties precisely equaled 24 taels in weight, the beggar was permitting himself a little joke—but with the best intentions.)

Before the rich man's door the beggar would review his repertory of auspicious sayings for the deserving household. The lords and ladies of this household, he would affirm, were destined to live in a glorious house like this and to have many children and grandchildren. Their kind hearts would never allow anyone to suffer poverty or starvation. In due course, he would explain his mission, as in these lines from an old Peking beggar ditty:

If I had at home a peck of rice,
I'd not come here to look for you,
If I had at home a peck of flour,
I'd not come plague you at this hour,
If I had at home a peck of bran,
I'd not come here to make a din.

When it happened, however, that the lords and ladies of the household did not hand over evidence of their virtue, or that the noodle merchant remained unmoved, the beggar literally changed his tune. Blessings gave way to curses and the script for the denouement switched abruptly from fair to foul. Thus, the beggar's parting couplet to an ungrateful merchant:

You won't give, I won't beg anymore!
But I'll sport with your wife before
your own door!

Where have the beggars of old China gone, those poor minstrels with their ritual wit and wisdom? Have they, happily, vanished from the brighter streets of socialist society?

Recently a party of three Chinese traveled to the Swatow area of Kwangtung Province to visit relatives. They were relieved to observe along the way a "prosperous air" in the agricultural markets, contrasting with the "bleak situation of several years ago." To their dismay, however, they discovered that "not only had beggars failed to diminish in number, but there were more than ever."

Scarcely had a couple of the travelers entered their relatives' house "when an old fellow came to the door with a string instrument made of a coconut shell and began to sing some nondescript [local] song. After singing briefly, he stuck out his hand for money. A little while later, a middle-aged man carrying a six-cornered instrument appeared, accompanied by a child. The adult played and the child sang. After one such performance, the child held out his hand for money, reciting auspicious sayings all the while."

The visitors received not only a musical welcome, but a grand finale farewell. Two days later, while they were taking leave of their relatives, "along came a trio, one beating a drum, another striking a gong, and a third bearing a large sheet of red paper inscribed with the four characters *Kung hsi fa ts'ai* (congratulations, good fortune), which he waved before the door as though introducing an opera performance. Then they held out a broken bowl for money." The relatives gave them one yuan (66 cents), but they refused to budge until the visitors added four more, just to be rid of them.

"When you went outside the overseas Chinese building in Swatow," the third traveler reported, "you felt as though you

---

Miriam London is a researcher in Soviet and Chinese studies. Ma Yuan is the pseudonym of a Chinese colleague.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were fighting your way past five city gates and six generals. Beggars, male and female, old and young, blocked you off front and back. Some would even tug at your clothes to attract attention. Ten to twenty cents was not enough for them. Sometimes they would also resort to verbal abuse, like 'stinking overseas Chinese'. . . . You went to the store, one of them followed you to the store. You went to the restaurant and he accompanied you to the restaurant. He would never give up until he achieved his goal." There was even a "new breed of presentably dressed high-class beggars" who would "suavely overtake you, walk with you shoulder to shoulder, and then whisper softly, 'Overseas visitor, how about helping me out with 8-9 yuan?' If you gave him less, he would continue walking alongside, pestering."

In some places, beggar children pestered the travelers. "In small restaurants or at food stalls, whenever an overseas Chinese or someone from Hong Kong or Macao is spotted eating, he is surrounded by little beggars demanding money and food. A particularly vicious one will initiate a surprise attack. Like a hawk snatching a little chick, he will grab all the chicken or fried bean curd on the table in a single swoop."

In such conditions some visitors "actually shut themselves inside the hotel." The three travelers, however, complained to the Swatow authorities and asked why nothing was done to "solve" these problems. "The reply: There was no one to take charge. The Public Security Bureau said that the commune should be in charge of this. The commune, city and district said they were powerless to do anything. The departments of overseas Chinese and foreign affairs said they were not authorized to handle such matters. The result was, it was no one's affair."

The preceding details of a travel report were published in the Hong Kong *Ming Pao Daily* on November 21, 1979—30 years after Mao Tse-tung arrived triumphant in Peking and began a new era in China. □

F.S. Manor

THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

If terrorism is war by other means,
we aren't even holding our position.

We live in a peculiar age. For a long time we sold to the Soviet Union, on cheap credit subsidized by the taxpayer, sophisticated computers and other technology that the Soviet Union has used in weaponry against the West. Indeed, we were very proud of the commercial side of the venture: Before Afghanistan, many American politicians sold the idea of detente on the basis of its economic reward, never mind the political consequences. At the same time, here at home, money was, and is, freely expended to mobilize the police forces of two countries, Canada and the United States, against malefactors like those from a Canadian border town who allegedly shipped conventional weapons to South Africa; it appears to be the ultimate crime when the South African government believes it should defend itself against Russian-armed and KGB-trained terrorists whose principal aim is to deprive the West of strategic raw materials in southern Africa. Something similar is behind the way the West refused to recognize the results of a democratic election in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia when a majority of citizens elected Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who was pro-Western. Every Western country, with Washington in the lead, insisted that the Soviet-armed terrorists of the "Patriotic Front" be given an equal chance to seize power.

We have forgotten the lessons of such "compromises" between democracies and Marxists as were attempted at the end of the war in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans. We still refuse to recognize the axiom that there can be no common ground between democracy, however imperfect, and Marxist tyranny. More important, we ignore that there *is* a common ground between Marxist tyranny and international terrorism. All of which is symptomatic of a disposition that has led the West to appease international terrorists of all kinds, especially those on whom we confer some political legitimacy by regarding as real their bogus claims to national recognition, or, as in the case of Iran, to national retribution.

Iran, of course, is the best example of the West's appeasement: But one needn't refer to the Iranian crisis only, for appeasement and the character of mind to which it appeals long preceded Khomeini. Washington, for example, pressured by the oil states, has pressed Israel for some time to install on the west bank of the Jordan River an independent Palestinian state that cannot but become the most dangerous addition to a host of states already providing official backing for international terrorism, states like Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Libya—and now Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. Even as Carter was courting Yassir Arafat, the PLO helped to topple the Shah. It has since helped to stir unrest in

F.S. Manor is a retired journalist who throughout a long career reported on Nazi, Arab, and Communist terrorism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Turkey. It has strong links with the Marxist wing of the Kurds. And it is now spreading its wings in our hemisphere as well: The PLO has a close relationship with the Argentinian Monteneros, whose leaders come from the converging streams of anti-Semitic ultra-nationalism and Marxist extremism.

And Washington alone is not to blame. Douglas Hurd, the junior minister at the British Foreign Office urged the Israelis during his pre-Christmas visit to Jerusalem to reach an early agreement with the PLO because, he said, it was now prepared to renounce the use of force. A few days later, on Christmas Eve, the PLO opened artillery fire in Southern Lebanon, shelling Christian church-goers on their way to midnight mass. Similarly, American money and weapons are flowing to the IRA terrorists, which makes Britain very angry but not angry enough to forgo the sale of highly sophisticated weapons to Jordan, weapons that inevitably end up in PLO hands. And there is perhaps an ironic reciprocity to the weakness shown among Western powers: Washington bans the sale of weapons to the British police forces in Northern Ireland because Washington has to be neutral in the battle between the Irish terrorists and the forces of law and order. But Washington then is disappointed when the British talk about their "national interest" when giving less than full support to the United States in its fight with the Iranian terrorists.

Of course, this vacillation and pusillanimity of the Western powers, together with the latent sympathy that exists among their press for terrorism, have greatly facilitated the aims of terrorists and of the powers that back them, so that, as Richard Clutterbuck pointed out in his *Guerrillas and Terrorists*, "individual violence is now more often used than invasion or bombardment as a means of international coercion." Thus, in the first nine months of 1979 there were 2,662 terrorist attacks in the Western world. In 1972 the total number was 206. Nor is it correct to say that terrorists never achieve anything: About 80 percent of terrorist attacks succeed either in gaining freedom for imprisoned comrades or in obtaining substantial ransom or in achieving publicity. Again, the clearest example of this last is Iran, where the attack against the United States embassy has dominated headlines for months, providing a daily platform for the most mendacious propaganda, the effect of which may be judged by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's poll showing a substantial majority favoring the surrender of a former ally, the Shah.

To his great credit, Prince Charles of Britain broke from the euphemisms habitually used by Western spokesmen in regard to international terrorism when, eschewing official circumlocution, he gave vent to his indignation over the murder of his great-uncle, Lord Admiral Mountbatten. It was bitter irony, Prince Charles said, that a man who had helped defeat tyranny and oppression should get blown to bits "through the agency of some of the most cowardly minds imaginable. . . . Perhaps the manner of his passing will awaken us—if it is not too late—to civilized democracy's vulnerability to the kind of sub-human extremism that blows up people when it feels like it." One wonders whether it might not be too late, especially as one watched American television's reaction to the Prince's words. One of the czars of television news (I cannot recall whether it was CBS or NBC), having reported the indictment of terrorism by the "angry young man" then proceeded, with the evenhandedness that equates the robber with the robbed, to read on: "On the other side, the anger of IRA was expressed today by the deaths of . . ."

Prince Charles was sounding a theme that had been taken up at length by Paul Johnson, the British writer and journalist, a few months before at a conference on international terrorism held at the Jonathan Institute in Jerusalem. There Johnson described as a part of terrorists' strategy their demands "for official inquiries, or international inquiries. . . . We find governments failing, time and again, in their duty to persuade the public—and this is the real heart of the matter—that terrorists are not misguided politicians; they are, first, last and all the time, *criminals*—extraordinary criminals, indeed, in that they are exceptionally dangerous to us all and pose a unique threat not merely to the individuals they murder without compunction but to the whole fabric of society—but criminals just the same."



Johnson is obviously talking about the method by which democracies come to suffer that vulnerability about which Prince Charles spoke so eloquently, and, again, one has only to turn to the media, especially television, to give the proposition empirical validity. Press and electronic reporting have always magnified terrorist exploits, irrespective of their intrinsic importance, especially by adopting the vocabulary of terrorism. Thus, they describe terrorist groups as "armies," they broadcast "official communiqués," they identify murderers as "chiefs of staff" or "brigade commanders," they describe brutal murders as "executions." In Iran they refer to "trials," as if we are dealing with a legitimate government that knows the proper rule of law, rather than with gangsters and their kangaroo courts.

In this way, the argot of terrorism, together with the ideology which lies behind it, has taken on a certain international respectability, especially when aligned with political predilections derived from theories of revolution. Thus, at the United Nations, where such predilections flourish, no majority can be found that will introduce effective measures against it. Chaim Herzog, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, has described how the UN majority has succeeded in perverting the 1972 anti-terrorist resolution until it now reads, in its draft form, like a terrorist's charter. Last year the *ad hoc* committee that has already spent eight years in drafting the text of the anti-terrorism resolution suggested that one of the causes of international terrorism is "connivance of states with regards to groups and organizations of Fascist, neo-Fascist and Zionist countries, including racism, racial domination, apartheid and policy of genocide." (I presume that in Russian it makes sense.)

Modern political philosophies now giving force to the agents of terrorism and intensity to their threat to the democratic West have valid historical precedents, historical analogies by which we may see just how serious the consequences of terrorism may be. Most of the people writing about terrorism (the psychology and sociology of terrorism have become a major literary industry) maintain that terrorism as we know it is only two centuries old. Its roots, they say, are in the French Revolution and the Russian nihilist movement. But the idea of destabilizing an enemy country with terrorists, and then fleeing to sanctuary, is as old as written history. Piracy, for instance, was a kind of terrorism, combining as it did criminal gain and political power, just as today's terrorism does. Mediterranean pirates, during Rome's ascendancy, not only extorted ransom but destabilized the Roman state, for which they received the full support of King Mithridates of Pontus,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in northern Asia Minor. Together, they almost brought the Republic to its knees. But even short of that, the pirates' depredations caused periodical food shortages in Rome and disrupted communications, just as today's hijackings so often disrupt the ease and safety of air travel.

In 78 B.C. Mediterranean pirates captured Julius Caesar, already a rising military politician, then on his way to Rhodes. They held him for 40 days, and although they were friendly, Caesar appeared wholly immune to the so-called Stockholm syndrome (by which the captured come to sympathize with their captors). According to Suetonius, "he had often smilingly sworn, while in their power, that he would capture and crucify them; and this is exactly what he did." Moreover, with the defeat of Mithridates by Rome and the termination with extreme prejudice of the pirates, the plague was ended and travel on the Mediterranean was safe.

This, however, was one of the rare instances in history where terrorism came off second best. In the seventeenth century pirates supported by the enemies of Venice (mainly the Austrian Empire) fatally undermined the power and splendor of Venice. The *Uskoks*, as these predecessors of modern terrorists were called, were never more than a thousand men, yet they succeeded in building an organization so efficient that nothing could uproot it. They had spies within the highest reaches of Venetian government, and, according to the historian Alberto Tenenti, did not fail "to revenge themselves savagely on those who had betrayed them. The terror was such that Dalmatian subjects [of Venice] preferred to incur the rigors of Venetian law rather than expose themselves to the reprisals of these plunderers."

A certain mystique of violence pervaded this extraordinary society, and here one cannot but recall Frantz Fanon's preaching that violence is psychologically beneficial. Even so, the *Uskoks* believed in the violence they practiced without the help of psychology, and the Venetian republic had the same ambivalent attitude towards these terrorists as the Western countries have towards the terrorists of our times. Ostensibly, the pirates' depredations were aimed at "the enemies of Christianity"—the Turks and Jews (which did not prevent the *Uskoks* from capturing and selling into slavery an entire boatload of Franciscan monks)—but the main sufferers from the terror in the Adriatic were Venetian merchants and shippers. Yet many influential Venetians were so blinded by terrorist propaganda that they argued that the pirates were as useful to Venice as they were to Austria, Venice's chief foe. In the end, piracy so disrupted the maritime trade of Venice that the republic sank to the rank of a second-class power.

The parallels with today's terrorism, and the West's response to it, are as obvious as the implications are ominous. Like the Venetians of 300 years ago, we continue to employ double standards. We expect democratic order to prevail everywhere in the world but fail to oppose those bent on its destruction. That is why there is a kind of justice in Teheran. The Carter administration is merely reaping the fruits sown by a State Department which has appeased terrorists of every kind, whether politically "incorporated" or not. In fact, as in the examples I cited earlier, by failing to oppose terrorists we have lifted them to power, where we "re-name" them. Were not the Sandinistas officially favored as fine upstanding democrats?

The reasons for this are many, and if history is any guide there is more coming into play than merely the ideologies of the moment. Even so, it is not difficult to assign the blame. Washington, for instance, has been explicit about siding with radicals in the hopes of moderating them, on the assumption that they will win out in the end with or without us. Behind this lies the idea that terrorist movements and their revolutionary organizations are spontaneous, isolated, and, because they derive from specific regional conditions, somehow legitimate. But this is not the case. General George Keegan told the Jonathan Institute conference that over 150,000 full-time Soviet military intelligence officers, including KGB and military personnel, are involved in the training of foreign terrorists. The estimated expenditure for these operations by the Soviet Union amounts to about half a billion dollars annually, and 75 percent of this effort has been directed toward operations around the Persian Gulf.

Clearly, the Soviets see what the West has yet to understand: that terrorism today is war by other means. This, of course, makes the West's appeasing of terrorists, whether they be Iranian militants, Sandinistas in Nicaragua, or the PLO, all the more execrable, because, seen this way, what is at stake is no less than the future of the West.

"How long will it take for governments and peoples to realize that the effects of modern terrorism are as contagious as smallpox and as poisonous as air-pollution and as dangerous to non-immunized societies as measles was to the American Indians?" asked a writer in *Encounter* magazine in 1973. Seven years of unremittent Soviet-sponsored terror does not seem to have produced an answer. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

John Nollson

THE POWER ELITE

For the past thousand or so years, the middle class has been rising and the aristocracy has been declining. After the French Revolution, the surviving aristocrats thought it prudent to abandon knickers in favor of long pants. This has made it harder to tell who belongs in what class. Meanwhile, not so long ago, a Yugoslav writer introduced the notion of the "new class," which is, to simplify, the class that runs everything. Recent studies, however, indicate that the composition of the class that runs everything has undergone a rapid transformation in the wake of recent crises. It is to this new New Class that we must now turn our attention.

Who are its members? First of all, there is the new aristocracy, namely the operators of filling stations. With their enormous power and their characteristic mode of dress, speech, and musical preferences, they show all the markings of traditional aristocracy. They are, for example, landed, and their filling stations are passed on to the oldest son intact. They are treated with extraordinary deference, since an ordinary *bourgeois* cannot get his tank filled unless he removes his hat when asking the operator to fill 'er up. Like the guilds of old, filling stations are exempt from the prerogatives of the state; enforcers of the alleged price control system are not allowed to cross the boundary of a filling station unless the operator allows it. Like the baronies of old, filling stations have come to resemble feudal castles, surrounded by moats designed to keep out the rabble. Most filling stations are capable of withstanding long sieges, especially on weekends, when they pull up their drawbridges and exclude the outer world.

The more powerful filling station operators resemble the medieval barons in another essential respect. Whenever a car bearing the sign "Just Married" appears, the operator insists upon exercising the right of *prima nocte* before dispensing the unleaded. Some of the serfs have come to resent this, but there is nothing they can do about it. The State refuses to intervene, and the Church thinks it serves them right.

Another influential segment of the new New Class is the dental mechanics. Because dental mechanics control a significant fraction of the world's gold supply, they are now afforded more deference than even the gnomes of Zurich. Dental mechanics believe in Gresham's Law, and practice it. They are withholding gold from fillings in order to horde it. Instead, they make fillings and other dental fixtures from baser metals such as lead and antimony. It is no pleasantry to have one's jaw weighted down by lead fillings, but there is nothing that can be done about it. Like filling station operators, dental mechanics demand their pick of the prettiest hygienists before they will supply the dentist with dental bullion. They are allowed to get away with this since every central banker knows that the survival of the world's financial and monetary system depends on the cooperation of dental mechanics. This is why dentists have thus far escaped a windfall profits tax, though everyone knows that they are filling teeth with fifty dollar gold while pretending that it's five hundred and twenty-five dollar gold.

Not yet so influential as either filling station operators or dental mechanics, but rising steadily nonetheless, are the purveyors of flashlight batteries. They show all the arrogance of the parvenu. So vital have their products become that they literally dare any consumer to knock a battery off their shoulder. The battery makers established their control over society by deliberately withholding double-A batteries from the market at the height of Christmas season. Through this ploy, they were able to quintuple the price of batteries, and everyone who owned either a transistor radio or an electronic game was forced to bend the knee. Battery purveyors show their contempt for a society powerless to restrain them by claiming to pack power into their little cylinders under a pressure that exceeds 10,000 pounds per square inch. People suspect that this is a lie or, if true, supremely irrelevant, but they are cowed into silence. Pedophilia is rampant among battery purveyors, and pre-teenage boys willingly deliver their younger sisters to the beasts in order to keep their little beeping machines charged up. Meanwhile, the battery makers trade in lead with the dental mechanics, each group reinforcing the other's power, wealth, and influence.

The most interesting members of the new New Class, though the least commented upon, are of course the exact-change machines that control access to bridges, tunnels, and turnpikes. They are beyond the control of the ordinary citizen and are literally untouchable, often unreachable, by the citizens they mercilessly exploit. In the tradition of the Elizabethan cavalier, they disdain pennies. Nor do they accept scrip. Neither will they deign to give receipts. They will perform no service unless they are first honored with a characteristic salute, which consists of raising the left arm while holding within a clenched fist the requisite coins. The machine then silently demands that the coins be thrown into it with a thud. After thinking it over for a while, the machine decides, in a wholly arbitrary manner, whether it will consent to raise the toll gate. As often as not, it decides in the negative. No amount of protest will affect it. It remains adamant. If the citizen seeks to trespass upon its immunity by assaulting it, he is immediately arrested and incarcerated. There is no appeal. Such abuses far exceed anything the barons had against bad King John, even before he signed the Magna Carta.

Our only hope in combatting the new New Class is to get its members fighting among themselves. Let the exact-change machines feast on a diet of slugs which, in the chewing, will wreck its teeth. Maybe when it discovers the cost of having its teeth repaired, it will learn a little humility. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRESSWATCH

IMAM WE TRUST

by Michael Ledeen

This month's award for runaway prose goes to the world press in general for its coverage of American-Iranian affairs during the first half of March. That, you'll recall, is when the Carter folks put out the idea that the hostage "situation" had finally come to an end. For a while I had reserved the award for the *Washington Post* for its six-column (that is to say, full page) headline on March 7, MILITANTS TO YIELD HOSTAGES TO COUNCIL, along with its tantalizing single-column subhead, "Ghotbzadeh: Their Return Not Imminent," but after looking at the rest of the newpapers I concluded that the honor should be spread around. Furthermore, the germs that were implanted in the body press in early March are still with us, as will be seen.

You may think the *Post* should have been more careful with its headline (and I agree), but consider the performance of the pride of French political culture, *Le Monde,* on Saturday, March 8. By that time, the editors had decided that the transfer of the American prisoners from "student" control to that of the Revolutionary Council was a certainty, and so it was proper to speak of it *in the past tense.* In an unsigned comment on the front page, the editors analyzed the significance of the event (which had not, and still has not, occurred):

> The decision of the "Islamic students" to return their hostages to the Revolutionary Council constitutes a new and important victory of M. Bani-Sadr over the "parallel powers" that have so singularly limited his authority ever since his election in January. . . . The attitude of the Imam Khomeini was decisive. . . . Pressured by the "students" who called upon him to condemn "every effort at compromise," he took a clear position in favor of the new President of the Republic.

As Parisians read these words on the weekend, it was becoming clear that there had been no breakthrough of any sort and that Bani-Sadr had received yet another lesson from his Imam about political cunning.

Why did virtually every newspaper in the West assume that the hostage transfer was a sure thing? Why were there not strong words reminding the public that the Iranians had been lying for months and that there was no reason to believe them now? And what grounds were there for the banner headlines, for the total gullibility of normally skeptical newspapers like the *Post*? One's first temptation is to say that the press was fooled by President Carter, who had good reasons for wishing the public to believe that a breakthrough had been achieved. But papers like *Le Monde* don't place great faith in Carter's words. What's going on?

First of all, there is the usual cultural distortion: If a group of American "students" issued a statement, and a French parliamentary body confirmed it, it would be safe to announce an "event" in the press. The newspapers forgot who they were dealing with.

Second, and more important, was the "who's winning?" part of the story. From the very beginning of the Iranian drama (not just from the time the hostages were taken), the press has dealt with Khomeini as something other than a clerical fascist, even though his every action confirms that evaluation. By and large he gets described as a deeply religious man with some strong feelings about things but no particular political acumen. The real politician—for the *Post* and *Le Monde*—was, of course, the man who won the "elections," Bani-Sadr. (The French also find him the most attractive figure because he speaks their language perfectly and looks like Peter Sellers playing a bumbling French detective.)

So the press has been rooting for Bani-Sadr against Khomeini. This is easy to understand, but it hopelessly distorts the Iranian realities, since Khomeini is the only man in the country who can fill the streets simply by making a speech on television (or by ordering the mullahs to give a certain speech in the mosques). Bani-Sadr has no comparable power. The newspapers decided that "our guy" had beaten the "other guy" (or the "other guys"—the students), but they forgot that in a theocracy the top priest always wins against the top lay spokesman.

A final Iran note: It would be nice if the newspapers would identify accurately the major participants. Thus, Henry Villalon should not be called—as he was by Jonathan C. Randal in the *Washington Post* on 16 April—"a political exile of sorts in Paris as a supporter of Argentina's late president Juan Perón." Villalon is part of the menagerie of lawyers who acted as secret intermediaries between the United States and Iran. But Villalon is under indictment in Argentina, which makes him something other than "a political exile of sorts." The second character who is invariably mis-labelled is Hilarion Capucci, who often passes as the "Greek Archbishop of Jerusalem," as if he were a Greek Orthodox prelate. In reality, Capucci is an archbishop of the Greek Catholic Church, which is tied to the Vatican, and not Orthodox at all. Moreover, Capucci's main claim to fame is that he was convicted of terrorism in Israel, where he ran weapons for the PLO from Lebanon to Jerusalem. One rarely sees this in print.

Jack Anderson Department: Last month we found our hero attacking the Pentagon for throwing away money on gadgets and generally spending too much. This month, in the April 10 *Washington Post,* he bemoans (and rightly so) the sorry state of the Navy:

> The Pentagon's plight can be summed up in these stark statistics: During the past two decades, the Navy has shrunk from 900 ships to fewer than 500. The reserve fleet is down from 2,277 ships to 317, many of them fit only for the scrap pile.
>
> Yet the need for sea power has increased dramatically, as U.S. bases around the world have dwindled from more than 100 to less than 30 and as the Russians have assembled the world's largest Navy.

But then, in one of those illogical jumps that characterize his writing, Anderson says: "Ironically, the Navy has tried to obstruct the sea lift build-up, preferring to spend every available tax dollar for fighting ships." What is so strange about that? With the Navy on the way toward 300 ships, one has to conserve at least some hard core of firepower and hope that existing sea-lift capacity will get us by. You can be sure that if the Navy had opted for more

---

Michael Ledeen is Executive Editor of the Washington Quarterly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sea lift and fewer fighting ships Anderson would have announced the discovery of a secret memorandum showing that the Pentagon was neglecting fighting ships. The point, of course, is that the Navy is being cruelly and dangerously reduced. And, as the *Wall Street Journal* (followed a bit later by the *New York Times*) discovered in early April, the President is now fudging the figures on the defense budget: cutting this year's in order to make next year's little budget look like a 3 percent increase.

It's hard to know what to make of Jack Anderson. On the one hand, he has some of the best information in the country. On the other, he rarely spends the time necessary to digest and analyze it thoroughly. I suppose the conclusion is, read Jack Anderson for the data—very high quality ore—but swallow slowly the packaged product.

"All The News That's Fit To Print" Department: The *New York Times* has some bad habits it would do well to scrap. Among these bad habits is that of acting as if any story printed in the *Times* is its own. Thus, readers of the Sunday, April 20 *Times* saw a front-page story dealing with the mission of General Robert Huyser to Iran in the final days of the Shah's rule. In it, readers heard that the American government was contemplating a military coup d'état in Iran in late January and early February, 1979. They also heard that Huyser's mission had followed a recommendation from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that James Schlesinger be sent to Teheran to encourage the Shah to defend himself. For those who read the whole story, it emerged around paragraph nine (on the inside of the paper) that there was also an article on the same subject in the spring issue of the *Washington Quarterly,* written by me and Professor William Lewis of George Washington University.

As many careful readers deduced, the *Times* had been given an advance copy of the *Washington Quarterly,* which was the starting point for the *Times* article. Starting from our analysis of Carter administration policy during the Iranian crisis, Richard Burt and Phil Taubman (who himself had been working on the story for months, but with the understanding that he would publish nothing until the hostage crisis had been resolved) gathered additional information and developed their own story. This was sent to the editors in New York, who re-worked the article, producing the final product. I am given to understand that the original version properly credited the *Quarterly* with the original breakthrough and also indicated those areas in which Burt and Taubman had done their own work. The final story made it appear that virtually all the information had been dug out by the *Times*.

You may think this is small potatoes, but in reality it reflects a small-mindedness and lack of professionalism on the part of the *Times* that ill-befits the "newspaper of record." For on several other occasions in the past, the *Times* has refused to give the *Quarterly* (and the Center for Strategic and International Studies that publishes it) proper credit. On one occasion, the *Times* quoted an entire paragraph from the *Quarterly* without attribution, and on another it failed to mention that the conference at which Henry Kissinger delivered his famous speech on the strategic balance was organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Is it all sloppiness, or is there an unwillingness at the *Times* to give proper credit to an institution it may not admire? □

AN IMMINENT ELECTRIC ORGY

by Fred D. Baldwin

Naturalists bestow their names on out-of-the-way flora and fauna, giving us Fowler's toad and Nuttall's cockle. Economists seek a duller immortality by lending names to things that are under our noses, for example, that there is a trade-off between employment and inflation (Phillip's curve). This spring, while strolling past toads and cockles, and while listening for Swainton's thrush, pause to consider the Averch-Johnson effect. If you do, you may reflect that the anti-nuclear people aren't all crazies.

The Averch-Johnson effect, A-J for short, refers to a tendency in a regulated industry to over-invest in whatever factor of production determines its rate base.* It's about as startling an observation as Engel's law: that poor people spend proportionately more of their money on food than do rich people. To do the economists justice, however, we often overlook the economic distortions caused by regulations until they are given a name, because they are as common as toads.

What has the A-J effect to do with nuclear power? Quite a bit, as it turns out. The electric power industry is a regulated industry, treated as if it were a monopoly, and its investors are supposedly permitted to earn a return on their capital investment, up to some designated percentage, which varies from state to state. (The "supposedly" is necessary because utilities have not been allowed returns that look attractive at recent interest rates nor do they always earn even as much as they are allowed, which is why some utility stocks are selling below book value. Although the rationale for regulation is that electric utilities are monopolies, this may arise from a misdefinition of their business, as will be discussed later. The remarks here refer most obviously to investor-owned utilities, which account for about 80 percent of the nation's electric generating capacity, but they apply in some cases to publicly-owned utilities as well.)

Now if you are allowed to earn, say, 8 percent profit on whatever is in your rate base and, at best, will only be allowed to recapture costs outside of your rate base, you will try to shove as much into your rate base as possible. You will have an incentive to reduce labor and other operating costs, which is a good thing for your customers, but you will have little incentive to reduce capital investments, which may or may not be a good thing for them. More precisely, you will have a strong incentive to make the ratio of capital to operating costs as high as possible in favor of capital. Moreover, what Messrs. Averch and Johnson stated, and what others have attempted to document, is that you will almost certainly go further in this direction than if you were forced to optimize your investments based on market competition.

A large power plant, whether coal-fired or nuclear, is one of the most capital-intensive forms of investment in our economy. Something like $250,000 must be invested for every job created. A typical advertisement for nuclear power shows a single engineer in a bright yellow hard hat gazing out over acres of shiny plumbing, or a white-coated technician facing a bank of computers. The message is subliminal A-J: Pipes and tubes and wires are in the rate base; employees aren't. We may be grateful for the latter, of course. If utilities were permitted to base their profits on their payrolls, their ads would show plants swarming with smiling workers. Utility executives would make speeches about the importance to the economy of direct job creation, and suggest that electricity, like homemade ice cream, would be better if cranked out by hand.

That utility executives instead make speeches on the virtues of nuclear power does not mean they are wrong, of course. It is, however, important to keep their economic

Fred D. Baldwin is a consultant on public program management living in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

*The A-J effect takes its name from two economists, Harvey Averch and L.L. Johnson, authors of "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Restraint," *American Economic Review*, December, 1962. It is sometimes called the A-J-W effect because of a subsequent article by S.H. Wellisz.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

situation in mind, not only as a possible source of bias, but as a clue to what might be done to take some of the irrationality out of the nuclear-power debate. If it were possible to reduce or eliminate the A-J effect in generating electricity, critics of nuclear energy would be deprived of some arguments, but large parts of the public might conclude that the critics had been right all along.

Much of the debate hinges on how much electricity the country is going to need in the future—next year, ten years from now, or by the year 2000. If the amount were as large as the industry has claimed, the case would be strong that we could only get it through nuclear power. If it is not so large, we have many more options, and we should choose the most cost-effective. Putting the matter in these terms sidesteps debates over the relative safety of nuclear energy and coal. These debates are important, but it may be possible to move them off center stage.

Because the country as a whole uses prodigious amounts of energy, the unit of discussion for long-range planning purposes is usually the "quad," short for "quadrillions of BTU's," that is, a million billion BTU's or a "one" followed by 15 zeroes. In 1979, the United States consumed roughly 80 quads of energy, the primary sources of which were oil (about 45 percent), natural gas (about 25 percent), coal (about 20 percent), and hydropower and nuclear (about 5 percent each).† Of the 80-quad total, roughly 27 quads, or about 35 percent, went to generation and distribution of electricity, of which about eight quads actually reached homeowners, businesses, and factories in the form of electricity. (The loss occurs because it is possible to get only about 30 percent of the energy in a barrel of oil or ton of coal distributed as electricity. Similar losses occur in other processes, such as refining oil into gasoline, though not so dramatically.)

A quad or so of polemical heat has been generated over projections about what our total consumption will be in the future, the year 2000 being a favorite cutoff date. As one would expect, the estimates have differed dramatically in recent years, depending on the assumptions made by various estimators. One thing that can be said with some confidence is that, based on the recent past ("recent" here meaning since 1970), the estimates coming from what one would normally consider the "authoritative" sources—that is, the federal government and the electric utility industry—have been so bad that the analysts responsible would have better been employed in studying the nesting patterns of Bewick's wren.

In the early part of the decade the most frequently quoted estimate was a 1972 Department of Interior study projecting about 95 quads by 1980 and 192 quads by 2000. The 15-quad overestimate of current consumption is equivalent to roughly 7.5 million barrels of oil a day, an amount that can be put in perspective by considering that the current physical production capability of Saudi Arabia is on the order of 11 million barrels a day. If the unused 15 quads were being used in the form of electricity, we would now need more than 350 more power plants than we currently have. In dollar terms, the analysts missed this year's requirements by an amount approximately the size of the national defense budget.

What happened was that as prices shot up Americans used energy more prudently, not all at once, as if conservation were the moral equivalent of war, but fairly steadily, as if it were the exact equivalent of saving money. In the case of electricity, consumption in the 1960s had risen at a rate of 7 percent a year (that is, doubling every decade), but the rate of increase has averaged only 3 percent a year since 1973 (2.8 percent in 1979). Perhaps more important than total use is the increase in peak-load demand, for this really determines the need for new plant capacity. Industry sources gave varying estimates for 1979: 4 percent (Edison Electric Institute), 5.4 percent (*Electrical World*), and 7 percent (National Electric Reliability Council). The actual rate was 0.6 percent.

The current "authoritative" estimates for total energy consumption by the year 2000 tend to be in the 95- to 120-quad range, mostly toward the lower end of that still rather wide spread. A good many respectable estimates are lower still, in the 80- to 95-quad range, and some utopian-sounding analysts put the total much lower than that. The only reason for mentioning the latter group is that it consists of people who have been more nearly right so far than the establishment analysts. Re-reading recent energy projections makes one feel the way one feels on re-reading old investment advisory newsletters, knowing that one listened to the solid folks who touted blue-chip stocks and high-grade bonds and disregarded the crazies who were saying one should buy gold.



Ironically, the reason is much the same in both cases. Like the gold-bugs, many of the strongest anti-nuclear critics arrived at their position because they disbelieved that OPEC nations would sell us cheap oil indefinitely and assumed that consumers would respond to price signals. Of course, not all anti-nuclear critics are free-market enthusiasts. As Joseph Shattan observed in a March *American Spectator* article ("The No-Nuke Wind Ensemble"), many of them are just the reverse. Others consider the economic arguments secondary to what they believe are the health and safety risks of nuclear plants, a position that may be mistaken but is not silly. It needs to be understood, however, that some anti-nuclear critics rely on the *Wall Street Journal* both for their numbers and for their frame of reference, and many others, who would not define themselves as anti-nuclear in principle, regard it as a dubious investment.

For such critics, the issue is not whether we should shut down nuclear plants but whether we should continue to subsidize them. In 1978 the Battelle Institute estimated the magnitude of federal subsidies to various energy sources, using "subsidy" to include research and development, preferential tax treatment, investment credits, marketing assistance, and so on. It estimated the cumulative subsidy to nuclear energy at from $15 to $17 billion, second only to oil. This sum consisted mainly of research and development and the operation of uranium enrichment plants, which are necessary to the nuclear fuel cycle. It excluded weapons-related nuclear research, the stabilization (primarily for military reasons) of the domestic uranium mining industry, and the passage of the Price-Anderson Act in 1957, which limited the liability of nuclear plant owners in the case of a catastrophic accident. The latter benefit to the industry cannot be quantified to anyone's satisfaction, but whenever the legislation has been challenged industry spokesmen have suggested that the industry would collapse without it. More generally, a study sponsored by the American Gas Association concluded that 78 percent of the 1980 federal research and development budget for energy is related to electricity. Even where such expenditures are not nuclear-specific, they tend to benefit the industry just as highway expen-

†Because of my rough roundings, and some problems associated with accounting for sources that cannot be metered, I have omitted solar, wood, and other renewable sources, an omission that is extremely serious for many analytic purposes, but not so here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ditures benefit trucks over trains.

An anti-nuclear critic who relies heavily on free-market arguments is Amory Lovins, whose essay, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken" (*Foreign Affairs,* October, 1976), and subsequent writings have been immensely influential.‡ Because of his use of the phrase "soft path" to characterize a diverse mix of technologies and policies he regards as desirable, his critics have tried to characterize him as a mystic. Examples of those who have arrived at an effectively anti-nuclear position on economic grounds are the analysts for the Harvard Business School Energy Project, who published in 1979 under the title *Energy Future,*** and Roger Sant, formerly the Ford administration's top energy conservation official, who has advocated something he calls the "least-cost" approach.††

For the latter class of critics, the point is not whether we should build more nuclear plants but on what basis those decisions should be made. Like Lovins, Sant begins with the point that we do not need "nuclear-generated electricity" or "coal-generated electricity," any more than we need "hand-cranked electricity." Strictly speaking, we do not even need electricity; we need what it can do for us, that is, provide heat, light, and the power to run machinery. Not at all incidentally, electricity is a form of energy almost ideally suited for the latter two tasks, providing light and mechanical power, and badly wasted on providing heat. This waste is reflected in its price. At the current national average price, electric resistance heating is appreciably more expensive than oil, even allowing for the inefficiencies of oil-burning furnaces. More important, the average cost of electricity produced from existing plants is much lower than the cost of that which can be produced from any new plants, whether coal-fired or electric, to be built in the future.

What Lovins, the Harvard Business School analysts, and Sant have in common is a stubborn insistence on comparing apples only to apples—specifically, the cost of a quad of new energy over and above our present level of production from any source in 1980 (or any given year in the future) with the cost of the same quad from any other source in the same year. As elementary as this principle sounds, it is violated every time a reporter compares the costs and benefits of solar collectors with the current cost of artificially priced natural gas or when an electric utility spokesman quotes an average price with the lower costs of older plants "rolled in."

Sant and the staff of the Energy Productivity Center of the Mellon Institute, of which he is now director, have done a particularly interesting analysis in this regard. They asked how current American energy consumption would look in 1978 if optimum investments had been made since 1973. "Optimum" does not mean a crash program to save energy for its own sake but getting the same level of "energy services" we now get at least cost. Under their model, when that could have been done by buying oil, we would have bought oil; when by building a new nuclear plant, we would have built the plant; and when by paying more for a more efficient motor or a better-insulated building, we would have invested in conservation. ("Conservation" is used to mean improved efficiency, not doing without.) They concluded that under this "least-cost" strategy the market share of electricity would have dropped from an actual 30 percent to 17 percent, that of oil from 36 percent to 26 percent, that of natural gas and coal (excluding coal burned to generate electricity) would have remained about the same, and that of energy services due to technological improvements would have jumped from 10 percent to 32 percent. Projected to 1990 they estimate that we could get the equivalent of 117 quads in "energy services" for approximately the same 80 quads we are using now, the difference being made up by improved efficiencies. The largest shifts would be away from oil and electricity—the energy forms that respectively cause our most severe foreign and domestic problems.

A number of things would have to happen for this to occur, such as making stronger efforts to reduce waste in heating and cooling buildings and adopting a price structure for fossil fuels that more closely approximates replacement costs. For the electric industry, however, the most dramatic change might be a reconsideration of its monopoly status where the production of electricity is concerned. An electric utility today is a natural monopoly with respect to distribution of electricity, just as a natural gas pipeline company is, but electricity itself is no more inherently monopolistic as an energy source than is gas, oil, or coal. In fact, all these sources do compete against each other, both for residential heating and industrial process uses. Yet industries that are using temperatures of thousands of degrees Fahrenheit in manufacturing processes are forbidden under many state regulations from using their "waste" heat to make steam to generate their own electricity or to sell the surplus electricity back into power grids, a process called co-generation. Similarly, utilities should be free to compete in the building weatherization market (by financing insulation, for example), a development Congress discouraged in 1978, partly because of pressure from another regulated group, the bank and financial community.

The electric power industry complains, and fairly so, that its capacity to build new plants has been crippled by environmental and safety regulations, and that the costs of the regulatory process may bear little relation to the public benefits involved. Nevertheless, it owes its present prominence in America's energy economy to a long history of federal subsidies and a regulatory structure that hampers the entry of new competition into the energy services field. In this regard, the nuclear power industry is similar to a good many other regulated industries that have a love-hate relationship with the federal and state agencies that harass them but simultaneously shelter them from potential competitors.

To the extent that we subsidize, we ought to be subsidizing (through research and development) the renewable energy technologies, like solar, wind, and biomass, that can reduce our dependence on fossil fuels. More important, however, we should emphasize removing unnecessary barriers to increased competition among any firms that want to supply the services we need—heat, light, transportation, etc.—without regard to how they go about it. The current evidencé suggests that the most effective competitors will be those who first show us how to use energy efficiently, and that should render moot a good many of the arguments about how we generate that which we do need. □



‡Lovins expanded his article into a book called *Soft Energy Paths,* published jointly by Friends of the Earth and Ballinger in 1977. Friends of the Earth has also collected the attacks of his major critics, and his rejoinders, in a single volume called *The Energy Controversy,* edited by Hugh Nash, 1977.

**"*Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School,*" edited by Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, New York, Random House, 1979.

††In "The Least-Cost Energy Strategy: Minimizing Consumer Costs Through Competition," The Energy Productivity Center, Arlington, Virginia, 1979. (This is a 50-page pamphlet supported by a longer technical appendix.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OLD EUROPE, NEW RELATIONS

by Raymond Aron

The lines are drawn: Barring an unforeseeable accident, the presidential contest this November will take place between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. The titleholder, to use a sporting term, will have a head start. The Democratic Party is more popular nation-wide; in recent years, candidates representing extremes—McGovern on the left of the Democrats, Goldwater on the right of the Republicans—have been overwhelmed by moderates or centrists. Reagan belongs to the hard conservative faction of the GOP.

Despite the rightward movement of American public opinion, Reagan needs some good fortune if he is to win. Between now and November, Carter may be the victim either of some spectacular mistakes of his own or of events. A national defeat would destroy trust in the President, who is already considered by many voters to be incompetent and not up to his responsibilities.

Why, Europeans ask themselves, does this great country, so rich in scientists and writers, find itself having to choose in the end between two apparently mediocre men, to whom no president of a large corporation would entrust the running of a division? Before entering the White House, Harry Truman, too, was perceived as mediocre; but he rose to his tasks. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon were not mediocre men. Elections have been democratized: There are more primaries now, which augments the difficulty of being a candidate. The enhanced role of the primaries provides opportunities to candidates like Carter and Reagan, candidates who know nothing about Washington, Congress, or even the outside world.

Carter—why deny it?—is judged even more severely abroad than at home. Without denying his weaknesses or his mistakes, however, I would like to recall some extenuating circumstances, a few facts about the world and the American situation which ought to suggest some degree of modesty to the ministers—and even the journalists—who are so certain of their superiority.

Let us take as an example the problem of the Middle East. The European governments, with the French President in the lead, are announcing that the Palestinian people have the right to self-determination, and they are forging quasi-official links with the PLO. Nothing is easier for them to do, since they are making no commitments either to obtain the withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 or to guarantee the survival of the state of Israel. What would Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, or Lord Carrington do in the White House? One would like to know what their secret plan is for guaranteeing the peaceful coexistence between Israel and the PLO, which does not mask its aim: the destruction of the Jewish state. The Europeans can claim for themselves the virtue of lucidity because all they do is talk, collecting marginal gains and leaving to the United States the trouble of finding a solution or of avoiding a catastrophe.

Let us take another example: the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan. There again, the French and the Germans talked, condemning the occupation of that country by the Soviet army. But they both expressed their firm intention of preserving detente. Even though they had proclaimed detente to be indivisible, they were hoping to preserve both a relaxed climate in Europe and their commercial relations.

Very well! Perhaps, as Henry Kissinger used to say, the Europeans should behave like regional powers. They have a way of acting like spectators, keeping score and imputing to Carter's weakness the Soviets' use of force. If they looked at the map, they would readily see that, by using the Baluchi tribes that are spread over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, the Soviets can destabilize three countries and reach the Sea of Oman. The Persian Gulf concerns them as much as it does the United States.



Raymond Aron

The Europeans are not lacking in arguments to explain and justify their loss of trust in the United States. But I ask myself if they are following their thought all the way through. Are they concerned about the President, or about the United States as a whole? To be sure, Carter seems unable to control his team, and he himself appears to hesitate and to shift from one view and advisor to another. Nevertheless, he inherited an America which had been decreasing its defense programs for ten years, while the Soviet Union was arming itself beyond its needs. Even if there still exists a rough equality at the level of strategic nuclear weapons, Soviet superiority in conventional armaments cannot be doubted. Except for the protection of American territory, the nuclear threat seems to have less and less deterrent value.

Thirty years ago, when the Korean war broke out, the United States was able to triple its defense budget in two years, without imposing sacrifices upon its population. To increase this same budget by 5 percent, the President must trim domestic spending in a couple of ways. Today, the United States has neither an industrial nor a financial surplus. An increase in defense-related production would demand transfers of labor or machinery away from the civilian sector.

To be sure, the United States remains potentially the leading economic and military power of the world—potentially, not effectively. In the coming years, the American president, whoever he may be, will try to save what is most important. Since 1965, since the sending of an expeditionary corps to Vietnam, the United States has lost on every front: military power, prestige, moral unity.

Today, for the first time, American public opinion is aware of the sorry state of the Republic, and is prepared to respond to the call of a president who inspires confidence. The United States, humiliated rather than imperialistic, needs its allies' support more than their criticisms. □

Raymond Aron is a columnist for the French magazine L'Express, *from whose April 5th edition this essay is reprinted.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICA'S STOCK IN TRADE

by Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr.

You would never know it from all the talk about gold, silver, breakable Chinese porcelain, and the like, but common stocks have been one of the best investments you could have made in the past five years. Since 1975, the average equity has outpaced inflation (as measured by the Consumer Price Index) by a wide margin. Stocks have risen faster than houses, and many have out-performed gold and silver as well. As for the future, the odds are that equities will do better than most investment alternatives in the next ten years.

Even so, stocks have a bad image in these inflationary times, an image that results from the great crash of 1968-1974, when stocks lost more than half their value. In the aftermath of the most severe contraction since that of 1929-1932, millions of investors swore off stocks. Banks, pension funds, and insurance companies sharply reduced their investments in equities.

But what most people, including many economic journalists, have overlooked is that stocks, despite their recent volatility, have risen impressively since 1974. This good news, however, has been disguised by the popular Dow Jones Industrial Average. Although most experts concede that the Index is unrepresentative of the market as a whole—the DJI is made up of only 30 companies—the media treat it as *the* barometer of the market's health.

The DJI, for example, was lackluster in 1979, barely up from a year ago. But other measurements, more broadly based, told a different story. Stock prices, as measured by the Standard and Poor's 500, a weighted average of 500 large corporations, were up 13 percent from 1978; as measured by the New York Stock Exchange Composite, 16 percent. With dividends, the total return on either was over 20 percent. Stocks of smaller companies, commonly referred to as second- and third-tier stocks, as well as those not listed on the New York Stock Exchange, did far better. The Value Line Index (comprising about 1700 stocks) rose 24 percent in 1979; the NASDAQ Over-the-Counter Composite, 28 percent; and the American Stock Exchange Index, over 60 percent. The Wilshire 5000 Equity Index, which represents the entire universe of stocks, appreciated more than $175 billion in market value.

All in all, not bad in a year of incipient recession, energy shortages, roaring inflation, and record-breaking interest rates.

It is often pointed out that since 1975, when Americans were first permitted to buy gold, the price of gold has jumped over 150 percent. And the value of the average house has gone up 100 percent since 1975. Yet many stocks have done as well or better during the same period: The Value Line Index has rocketed 117 percent; the NASDAQ, 125 percent; the average mutual fund, 125 percent; and the American Stock Exchange, 290 percent. Even the Dow Jones Industrials, with dividends, have appreciated 70 percent. Of course, stocks never go up in a straight line; 1977, for example, was not a banner year for most equities. But even the bull market of the 1960s was punctuated by several spectacular sell-offs, and, besides, the trend line since 1975 has been very positive.

One reason why smaller stocks have performed so well recently is the 1978 capital gains tax reduction, which has benefitted individual investors, who traditionally buy smaller stocks. At the same time, institutions like banks and pension funds have been reducing their proportion of stocks, especially the kind you'd find in the Dow Jones Industrial Index, which again helps smaller stocks outpace bigger stocks. But that may be changing now—and for good reason. When these institutions first shunned stocks, they bought bonds. Why take a chance on stocks, they reasoned, when you could get a sure 8 to 9 percent yield on bonds? And many individual investors reasoned the same way, purchasing bonds in record numbers. The bond market today, though, is a shambles: Individuals and institutions alike have suffered staggering losses.

So, considerable buying power is going back to stocks, because people are beginning to discover that American companies have generally coped with inflation better than was expected, despite the burdens of regulation, environmentalism, and increasing taxes. The proof is dividends. Companies pay them in cash, not by means of accounting gimmickry. Contrary to popular impression, dividends have kept up with inflation throughout the decade. Dividends for the S & P Composite Index, for instance, grew 88 percent; for the CPI, 87 percent. Moreover, the interest on a bond is fixed; dividends are not. They can fall, but usually they rise. Collectibles don't pay dividends, nor do gold and silver.

And what about the 1980s? Despite their impressive rise since 1974, stocks of major corporations have rarely in this century been so cheap as they are today. For one of the few times in modern history, most big stocks are selling below book value. (Book value is how much money would theoretically be left if a company closed its doors, liquidated its assets, and paid off all its debts and liabilities.) In 1973, an investor had to pay $18 for each $1 of a company's earnings; the price/earnings ratio was thus 18. Today, it is around 7. Major stocks are so low, in fact, that it is cheaper to purchase an existing factory than it is to build a new one. That's why hundreds of American companies have been buying back their own stock. And that's why foreign corporations are purchasing American companies in record numbers.

Naturally, this does not mean that all stocks are the same, that each will do as well as the others. Smaller stocks have done so much better in recent years than those of large corporations that it's no surprise they dropped in price in March. Conversely, among the best values today seem to be the stocks of the bigger corporations, such as IBM, International Paper, and Dow Chemical.

It is true that right now high interest rates are hurting stocks, and with all the bad economic news many investors are staying away from the market, figuring that they'd better wait until all the uncertainties go away. But you pay a high price for certainty. No one can pick the precise market bottom, or its top. Smart investors realize they might look foolish for a while by moving against the crowd, but they figure that they will be handsomely rewarded for doing so. And they usually are.

The best time to buy stocks is when they are cheap and when everyone else wants to sell—like now. □

Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., is a senior editor of Forbes *magazine.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK REVIEWS

A HISTORY OF THE WORLD

Hugh Thomas / Harper and Row / $17.95

Fred Baumann

At the close of his history of the world, Hugh Thomas observes that while modern industrial society sometimes seems free of its past, modern tyrannies are usually driven by a strong sense of the past. They have appreciated, he says, that an excellent way to capture their peoples' minds is to distort their historical imagination. One might add that it is just those people who think they are free of the past who are therefore the easiest makes for manipulations whose very possibility they can scarcely conceive. That is why histories are important. And of histories, world histories are in this sense the most important, because, unlike other histories, world histories claim to offer us a comprehensive and thus authoritative account of what we are and what has made us what we are. Some world histories have therefore not confined themselves to the past. Early Christian universal histories told their readers about the triumphant coming of Christ. Somewhat similarly, H.G. Wells predicted the triumph of Science. When world histories understand themselves fully as comprehensive accounts of man, their authors sometimes grow impatient with the conventional limitation of only writing about that part of time that has already happened to happen.

Histories of the world are thus a literary genre, like the novels and books of prophecy they somewhat resemble. They offer the whole in microcosm, even if they stop at the present. While they must be based on the best and most contemporary historical scholarship in order to be able to claim a comprehensive and authoritative account, they cannot, given the magnitude of the task, seek the kind of monographic precision proper to the historian narrating, for example, the exact sequence of events at the Battle of La Hogue. Thus, what matters about histories of the world is the judgments they make. Partly and necessarily we are interested in their historical judgments: what interpretation seems soundest to the author, what kinds of connections are emphasized, etc. Yet underlying the author's historical judgment and informing it is his judgment about what man amounts to, and it is that judgment we most seek to learn and judge in turn from a history of the world. Hugh Thomas's contribution to this genre gives welcome voice to an interpretation of history and a judgment of man that has not been as much in evidence as it used to be. I think that is the reason the book has puzzled some reviewers who really shouldn't have been puzzled by it. For Thomas offers an account of man as seen by a Whig, an old-fashioned English liberal.

The Whigs, of course, were the party of the Glorious (because bloodless) Revolution of 1688, of free trade and enlightened, prudent reform, of respect for privacy and of tradition, of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke linked in uneasy coexistence, of Gladstone and of Fox, of high principle and low cunning, and, finally, of the Whig School of History, whose most prominent exponents, like Thomas Babington Macaulay, managed to invest the politics of compromise and moderation with the unearthly dignity and sonorous condescension of the statue of the Commendatore dropping in for dinner at Don Giovanni's.

Unsurprisingly, the differences between Macaulay and Thomas, especially as historians, are at first more evident than their kinship. Macaulay wrote a *History of England* that covers a mere 20 years or so and that emphasizes the details of political intrigue as well as profound constitutional issues. Thomas, like the most influential school of contemporary historians, spends most of his time describing the social and economic history of ordinary life: what people ate, how they worked, what they built, and how they died. It is especially noteworthy that Thomas, whose contributions to political history in the form of studies of the Spanish Civil War and Cuba remain classics, agrees with the historians of the *Annales* school that *la longue durée* should be treated with little reference to politics. Again, Macaulay breathes a near-divine assurance that the peculiar virtues of the English constitution and customs are just what the world should have ordered to solve its fundamentally needless problems. Thomas writes in the tones of an ordinary mortal, and often a remarkably funny one too, but he is deeply worried about what lies in wait for liberal societies.



The puzzlement of reviewers may therefore not be too surprising. What to make of something that dares call itself a history of the world, but then announces that it is just an essay, a try, something incomplete that only suggests the shape of a true history of the world? What to make of a history of the world full of engaging detail about "the history of the grape" and the career of the founder of Reuters? Yet just when Thomas seems no more than a charming guide to the eccentric byways of the past, off comes his Mr. Pickwick mask to reveal the grim visage of Margaret Thatcher in a fighting mood.

In fact, the book is a consistent whole. Its structure already tells us a lot. It leads off with a long section on "The Age of Agriculture," Thomas's name for the millennia between the beginning of human settlement and the industrial revolution. By treating this vast span as one, Thomas points to the exceptionality of our society and prepares us to appreciate how our's is both the answer to perennial human longings and at the same time something utterly strange and problematic. A special section goes to the last part of the age of agriculture when clocks and sailing ships and banking and guns started to change the ancestral world. The last section is devoted to "Our Times," but is bifurcated, like a divided mind, between "Industrial Triumphs" and "Political Failures."

In treating pre-industrial life, Thomas has two tasks. He has to show its peculiar character as it differs from modernity, taken as wholes. And he has to show the roots of modernity within the age of agriculture. As he ranges back and forth over the centuries, talking about population growth, farming, plague, war, famine, weaving, medicine, politics, and religion, one obvious, banal, but nevertheless fundamentally important fact comes through. For the most part, pre-industrial life was a constant battle just to stay alive. Colorful and charming as are his descriptions of everything from the

Fred Baumann is a program officer at the Institute for Educational Affairs in New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gradual development of the plough to pre-modern means of contraception, Thomas throughout prepares the way for the case he will convincingly make when discussing "Industrial Triumphs": We are far better off with plumbing than without, with china plates than with trenches dug in a wooden table, with penicillin than with various plagues. Like the coal miner from "Beyond the Fringe," Thomas makes us appreciate the absence of falling coal and therefore leads us to think well of those who struggled successfully, to whatever small degree through the pre-industrial era, to take their fellows' lives and their own a little farther from the edge of pure necessity. It is these men, the traders, the anonymous inventors, who, in the magnified circumstances of the industrial revolution, will emerge as Thomas's heroes.

Yet Thomas must explain why it is that the history of the world has not been a universal march to modernity, by means of a wise accumulation of small advantages. If all men wanted to live better eclectically, what, on the whole, stopped them for so long?

Here Thomas suggests his central theme early on. Climate, he contends, created two kinds of agricultural civilization. One depended largely on rainfall, with some small-scale irrigation added. The other depended on vast irrigation schemes. Irrigation required a higher degree of civilization, of cooperation, of organization, and hence of direction than simply staring upwards hopefully from time to time. But where irrigation meant cities and culture and civilization, it also meant despotism and the ideal of a static and manageable society. Liberty and innovation therefore, while they result ultimately in far greater material progress, originated in those rude places where farmers depended on rain.

This explanation leads to a categorization that has been familiar all the way back to Tacitus. The contrast between the urban despotism of Rome and the rude liberty of the Germanic forest, which Thomas in effect universalizes here, was once a staple of the older liberal historiographers like Bishop Stubbs. And it serves Thomas much as it did his Whig ancestors to account for his unapologetic emphasis on the history of Western Europe and, within that, on the history of England. For Europe has been the engine that has made the world modern and England (which for Thomas includes its creations, like the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) has been the engine of Europe.

However familiar, Thomas's distinction between the "oriental" despotisms that have characterized most times and places (including, for example, pre-Columbian Central American cultures) and the few, strange societies that remain unbalanced and striving is a good one. How much of it is rooted in agricultural technique and how much in odd events like the triumph of Christianity, which offered its transcendent God at a time when a great empire was falling apart, is something one could argue. And it should be noted that Thomas is careful to give at least some due to memories of classical democracies and to Christianity's preservation of an alternative allegiance to the state as a force in creating the West. But on the main point of distinction he is right. In what nearly becomes a litany, Thomas shows that almost every invention ultimately developed in the West had in fact been discovered first by the Chinese, who discarded it as of no particular use to a society whose goal was permanence and order.

"Our Times," however, were made, if by any group of individuals, by the inventors and entrepreneurs of the industrial revolution. These are

Waiting for the inside truth about Watergate? Here's the one book that everyone is praising.

"Maurice Stans tells what it is like to be caught up in prosecutorial hysteria...'must reading' for the civil libertarian of today and revisionist historian of tomorrow."

—William Safire

"When the liberal hysteria that accompanied Watergate really comes to an end and the real history of the incident begins to unfold, Stans' book will be the classic reference providing the balance."

—R. Warren Pease
New Hampshire Press

"For those who wish to expand their understanding of Watergate beyond the one-dimensional accounts, Stans' book is worth reading."

—Ronald Reagan

"...as a cry of pain for a host of (persons) stained by Watergate, this sad memoir carries a punch."

—James J. Kilpatrick

"...someday, a scholar will pick up this book and read it. Then—and only then—the revision so desperately needed by our nation and by history will begin. This book is a time bomb."

—William F. Gavin
Human Events

"...A genuinely harrowing tale."

—James A. Neuchterlain
Commentary

"...a book all Americans who believe in justice should read."

—Victor Lasky

"If you read only one of the score of Watergate books published in recent years, the one you should read is *Terrors of Justice*."

—Earl Butz

"...a highly creditable account of how persons on the fringe of Watergate were swept up in the hysteria of the times, accused of crimes they did not commit, subjected to years of mental anguish...before their innocence was established..."

—James Cary
San Diego Union

"...reveals the untruths about Watergate."

—Paul Harvey

"...Makes clear without histrionics that the Watergate investigation ruined reputations to a degree Joseph McCarthy could only have wished to attain."

—John Willson

"Stans makes a forceful, if controversial, argument to support his belief that because of Watergate many people were accused falsely and pursued relentlessly in a McCarthy-like witch hunt."

—Richard Heller
Gannett Syndicate

"(This) book has hooked me."

—Eugene Patterson
St. Petersburg Times

"...the greatest document and the best exposition of the truth about the whole Watergate business."

—Norman Vincent Peale

"...it is a time bomb, quietly ticking. When it sinks into national consciousness, and in time it will do so, it will blow away much of the hypocrisy and phony piety surrounding the Watergate affair."

—Jeffrey Hart

"Who needs another book on Watergate? Unfortunately, we all do—and this is the book."

—Charles E. Rice
Chronicles of Culture

"The implications for all Americans—on justice, on judgment, on power and its abuses—cannot and should not be ignored."

—Conservative Book Club

"...a valuable addition...amassing convincing information on guilt by association, by indictment, by news release..."

—El Paso Times

"Well worth the time to read it. The *Terrors of Justice* has restored a sense of balance to my thinking on Watergate."

—Peter Lesser
Dallas Morning News

"Stans attempts to set the record straight with this book, and for the most part, he does just that."

—West Coast Review of Books

"...when the historians begin to examine the Watergate fever, Maurice Stans' book will be an invaluable document."

—Ralph de Toledano

THE TERRORS OF JUSTICE
Maurice H. Stans



If not at your bookstore, mail this coupon.

Everest House
1133 Ave. of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036

YES! Please rush me *The Terrors of Justice*. Enclosed is $12.95, publisher will pay postage and handling (N.Y., CA. residents please add appropriate sales tax). If I am dissatisfied for any reason, I may return the book(s) within 30 days for a full refund.

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

AS 5/80

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the men Thomas celebrates, in the best Whig tradition of the heroism of peaceable commerce. They do not appear here in their mid- and late-Victorian avatars as captains of industry. Rather they appear for the most part as martyrs, misunderstood by the workingmen their inventions were ultimately so greatly to benefit, persecuted by solicitous governments as enemies of the public peace. Many seem to have ended insane, in poverty or in France.

Yet, while Thomas rightly emphasizes the previously unimaginable benefits of the industrial revolution for the great mass of men (which, as everybody before the industrial revolution knew, meant the poor), he does not try to deny that during the first stages of the transformation of society the conditions in some industries became worse and the work much harder. Yet these conditions began to improve, often because of government intervention, at a very early time, he observes, noting furthermore that the legal regulation of working conditions and hours of labor was, remarkably enough, in part the work of some of the same men who owned the factories. Thus, the first factory inspection law in England that also set limits to the working hours of children under 14 (the limit, one should note in fairness, was 12 hours), was introduced by Sir Robert Peel, a cotton manufacturer, in 1802. And Thomas makes us understand what a difference in the relative decency of life the availability of cheap, reliable pottery and mass-produced clothing made to all those who could not have afforded them before.

When he comes to the twentieth century, Thomas remains evenhanded about industrial triumphs. He notes, for example, the effect of the loudspeaker and television on politics, turning debate into sloganeering and participation into voyeurism. But, as the example indicates, Thomas is not in favor of entrepreneurship simply because it creates wealth. He is a Whig, too, in his concern for political liberty. He distrusts the regulating state for familiar reasons: because it officiously frustrates the endeavors of private men who might otherwise better the lot of all in bettering their own, and also because it tends to make men dependent and less than they might be. But characteristic of Thomas's outlook seems to be the suggestion his examples constantly make: that individual initiative, while self-interested, need not be demonic or make demons of others. By liberating men from the incessant struggle for survival, modernity makes civility possible and with it, self-government.

Yet how then account, not only for the relatively petty vices of the modern democratic state, for OSHA or the over-mighty British TUC, but for the horrifying fact that the splendid material achievements unleashed by the creativity of liberal economics and political thought have proved a perfect medium for the rebirth of those oriental despotisms that Macaulay's generation thought were fading away in disgrace? The reliance on industry to create the civility that made liberty possible seems not to be secure, in the light of the twentieth century's descent into political barbarism. This is perhaps the chief reason why we haven't heard much from Whigs recently; even the taste for civility, in which the old liberalism may have had its deepest, pre-philosophic roots, seems bland today.

Thomas treats the problem as "quite simply" a matter of political failure; technological innovations have not been complemented by political achievements of comparable ingenuity. This does not seem adequate. One can of course show persuasively the intellectual and moral

CUSTOMER INFORMATION FROM GENERAL MOTORS

HOW GM "PROJECT CENTERS" CREATE CARS

FROM CONCEPT TO CUSTOMER IN THREE YEARS AND THREE BILLION DOLLARS

Throughout the history of the automobile industry, product change was almost always evolutionary. But in 1973, GM determined that the times required revolutionary changes. It started its first Project Center—which by itself heralded a revolution in the use of science and technology to meet the changing demands of the marketplace. A few months later, the Arab countries launched the oil embargo. Fortunately, machinery was already in motion in GM to create and develop new cars and components in a new way and faster than ever before.

GM's first Project Center brought out totally new full-size cars: smaller, yet roomier, and far more efficient than their predecessors. The advertisements said they were "designed and engineered for a changing world"—and they were. Another Project Center, begun in 1975, developed the immensely popular GM X-cars.

Led by the five car divisions, Project Centers gather people, ideas, and knowledge from all 30 divisions and staffs of General Motors. In the first stage, which we call "concepting," experimental engineers, environmental scientists, forward planners, and marketing experts pool their thinking. Their objective: what the marketplace will require. This is the most important stage. Here we must determine not only what kind of car, but how many we might be able to build and sell years later. Economics, customer tastes, availability of various kinds of fuels must be compared with state-of-the-art technology—and what steps must be taken to advance that technology quickly yet surely.

In the "concepting" stage, a new car is conceived. If the car is to be sold to customers three years later, construction of new plants must begin and basic tooling must be ordered.

The second phase of the Project Center takes 24 to 30 months. It encompasses development, design, structural analysis, handling analysis, emissions, noise and vibration, safety, reliability, serviceability and repairability, manufacturing, assembly, marketing, financing.

Advanced product engineers and research scientists work with the one hundred fifty to two hundred people at the Project Center and thousands more in the staffs and divisions to transfer new science and technology to the new car. Components are hand-built and "cobbled" into existing models for road testing.

Prototype cars are hand-built at a cost of more than $250,000 each. These enable the Project Center team to determine how newly developed, pretested components operate as a unit. Then, pilot models will be built from production tooling and tested some more. New technology, such as structural analysis by computer, saves time. Lead time has been reduced by 25% from ten years ago, when cars were far less complex.

After almost four million miles, nearly three billion dollars, and nearly three years of work, the new cars—quite unlike anything before them—start coming off the production line at a rate of better than one a minute.

There are now eight Project Centers in General Motors. Four are developing new cars using hydrocarbon fuels, one is creating an electric car, and others are working on computerized engines and emission controls, a new kind of automatic transmission, and the inflatable restraint system.

New and revolutionary cars can't be mass produced for the road overnight. But by putting all the parts of General Motors to work together, we found a way to speed up the process. We have integrated the creativity of thousands of human minds to make invention into reality when it's needed.

This advertisement is part of our continuing effort to give customers useful information about their cars and trucks and the company that builds them.

General Motors

People building transportation to serve people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

errors men have made and Thomas does it creditably. Those who took capitalism for granted and sought "higher moral values" may have indeed paved the way for the stagnation of democracies, while those who gave themselves over to the intoxication of nationalisms or the phony eschatology of class-war theories have industriously created hell on earth. But the liberalism of Macaulay knew all about fanaticism and superstition; it did not expect it to reinherit the earth.

A passage in *The Wealth of Nations* illustrates the point. Smith gets surprisingly sharp in condemning those who fund scholarships. They are as bad, Smith says, as those who encourage the young to enlist as soldiers and get themselves killed for dreams of glory. The market cannot support all the ambitious young lawyers seeking fame and prestige; thus, many talented lives are blighted. Smith's economics are doubtless sound, but his anger sounds like a confession of helplessness. What can be done about the desire for honor and glory, that willful blindness to rational self-interest that destroys all calculations of mutual benefit? Refutation doesn't help when the taste is lacking for the goods reason can afford. Similarly, Thomas is surely right, with Carlos Rangel, when he attributes the political failure of the Latin American republics to themselves and not to malevolent Yankee corporations. But does this say more than that what we call political success, the perpetuation of dull, moderately honest parliamentary democracies, is not of much interest here?

In celebrating the peaceable hero, the entrepreneur, or inventor who conquers nature rather than man, Thomas adopts the traditional liberal solution to the problem of glory. Thus Goethe's aged Faust, after a career of devilish glamor, finds fulfillment in what he thinks is a public works project. Yet this solution is only provisional. For there is evidently a kinship between the conqueror of nature and the conqueror of man, just as there is a tension between that good, sane, and peaceable state of mind that has characterized Whiggism from John Somers to Orwell and Thomas and that restless desire to better one's condition which ultimately gave most men something to feel reasonably peaceable about. One wonders, is even building Xerox or IBM enough for ambition today?

In the end, though, it may not be fair to ask Thomas for something persuasive to say to people whose chief fun is ordering executions or attending them. What he has done is to show us the whole course of human history in order to bring home vividly how rare has been the opportunity for a life that is both decently comfortable and decently free, and how therefore those of us who have it should be willing to defend it cheerfully, confidently, and without shame. □

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES

James Q. Wilson / D.C. Heath and Co. / $14.95

James Piereson

Those who are in the business of knowing such things estimate that more than 200,000 students in colleges and universities around the country will sit down this year to take their introductory course in American government. There most will encounter one of the more familiar landmarks of American higher education —the textbook in American government, from which they will learn, chapter and verse, the dark secrets of American politics.

The study of American government has a long and honored history on the campus, and it has never been separable from the larger political issues that have shaped the life of the Republic. In a far different time, this study consisted of the examination of those principles that inspired the Revolution and the ratification of the Constitution. As all principles were thought subject to corruption and heretical interpretations, teachers and political men were on their guard to maintain the true principles of republican liberty. When Jefferson, with Madison's advice, formulated a course of study in government at the University of Virginia, he recommended a selective list of republican writings that could be used to combat the consolidationist principles then being taught in the New England colleges. The teaching of principles, however, in addition to being highly political in intention, was also connected to the formation of character, since a system of self-government was thought to depend on citizens who were themselves self-governing. The teaching of principles was in this way directed to the ends of virtue, self-restraint, and patriotism.

The traditional course in American government, like the American university itself, may be understood as a victim of the modern corruption of democracy. As the modern university was transformed into a "representative" institution, it increasingly required that teachers adopt the skills appropriate for the politician in a representative democracy. The teacher often faces a large and diverse audience of students, a great number of whom would justly prefer a more productive adolescence. Because teachers lack real authority, they are led unwittingly to adopt the strategems of the politician—appealing to a diverse constituency, eager to please and fearing to offend anyone, and excessively sensitive to the varied claims entertained by members of the audience. Faced with this, they quite naturally embrace the twin idols of democracy and equality, all other values being understood as mere disguises for interest or as appropriate only to limited times or places.

From such a standpoint, "interest" appears as the safest unifying principle, and the lowest common denominator, according to which one can understand politics. It is the lubricant that keeps the system together and the fuel that keeps it lurching along. Politics thus appears as a contest among interests, all of which are accorded equal status, save for those which question the fundamental equality of interests and which invariably provoke savage outrage. The concern for the poor, the dispossessed, and the historically neglected, so noble from a certain standpoint and so evident in the American university, is doubly reinforced by the belief that these groups are left unrepresented in the combat among interests. This peculiar version of the equality principle, which is of such recent origin, is also used as a standard by which to judge the past; accordingly, the past is found wanting.

In the hands of those who are strongly predisposed to think well of themselves, this can be blown up into a high-sounding doctrine indeed. Amid the bluster it is easy to forget that this version of the equality principle is itself grounded on the rather

James Piereson teaches political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

There is opportunity in America!

Sarkes Tarzian Inc. Bloomington, Indiana

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

low foundation of interest. And though the proponents of this principle usually purport to be above material things, in reality they use them as the only standard by which to judge the society. Because this view is often richly elaborated to students, one is left wondering whether they are learning the most important things about government and politics. Democracy is held out as standard, but one searches in vain for a principled justification for it. Students are told to assert their interests, but they are not instructed as to what their interests ought to be. Nor are they shown why they ought not to make it their interest to obliterate the entire structure of interest politics.

The textbook, like it or not, has become an indispensable feature in such American government courses. Academic purists, by now a rare breed, are never so upset as when they contemplate the expanding market for the textbook in the university, which they regard as the most tangible sign of the collapse of academic standards and the inevitable result of the triumph on the campus of democratic ideas. In an earlier era, students read *The Federalist* or Locke as their texts in government; now they usually read a brief summary of their doctrines in a more comprehensive volume (the older writings are now called "original" sources). The attractions of the modern textbook are not difficult to grasp: It is comprehensive, it makes a point quickly and does not indulge subtleties, it has an understandable theme, and it is generally concerned with the processes rather than with the ends of government. In contrast, the older writings, drafted in a more leisurely era, are filled with hidden messages, make an identical point in several different ways, are seemingly concerned with obsolete issues, and require careful and patient study to understand fully. The textbook is therefore indispensable when most students approach a subject as they might a cold shower—quickly in and quickly out again. It is perhaps fitting that democratic principles should be taught with such a democratic instrument.

All of this brings us to James Q. Wilson's newly published textbook, *American Government: Institutions and Policies*. Mr. Wilson is Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Government at Harvard University and familiar to many through his earlier writings on city politics, political parties, and public policy. Having decided to write a textbook, Wilson has proceeded to write a very good one, far superior to any of the other American government texts currently on the market. The book is written with all the grace, style, and intelligence that we have come to expect from its author. It sustains a high level of discussion throughout, which is remarkable in an enterprise that requires one to know something about subjects as diverse as *Marbury vs. Madison,* the Electoral College, and the congressional committee system. What is more, in contrast to most texts, which are about as inspiring and entertaining as a toilet lid, Wilson's book is surprisingly enjoyable to read.

As a textbook stands or falls on the scope of its coverage, Wilson has included chapters on all the important institutions, processes, and programs which together make up the American system. But he takes a large and detached view of affairs, his object being to show how the different parts of the system fit together into an intelligible whole. In so doing, he encourages his readers to take a broader view of their own interests. He does not argue for moderation, but demonstrates it in his writing, which is always balanced and rigorous, and entirely free of

The Squeeze.

They're strangling you 9 different ways.

Stanley Tretick

They are the taxspenders—and they've got the American middle class by the throat. They're the bureaucrats who do nothing but create work for other bureaucrats. The well-connected corporations feeding at the public trough you pay for. The legal lobby that has given us a rule not of law, but of lawyers. The doctors who feed on Medicare. The government contractors only the government keeps in business.

While they are spending your money, you are being robbed by unchecked inflation, rising taxes, and soaring interest rates. The taxpayers of the world's greatest middle-class nation can no longer expect to end their lives better off than they began.

What has gone wrong? Can any of us do anything about it?

James Dale Davidson, chairman of the National Taxpayers Union, is the driving force behind the Constitutional Convention to Balance the Budget. In THE SQUEEZE, he shows us exactly where the division between taxspenders and taxpayers over the past 50 years has left us:

THE MONEY SQUEEZE: Every decade we need to double our paper money—just to break even.

THE ENERGY SQUEEZE: Is there an "energy crisis" at all—or is it really a crisis of inflation and political policy?

THE TAX SQUEEZE: Between 1967 and 1978, the U.S. population increased by 10%; the cost of government by 212%.

THE BUREAUCRATIC SQUEEZE: Each business day, 1,300 bureaucrats are added to the public payroll.

THE LEGAL SQUEEZE: Outrageous fees are charged for routine legal procedures people could perform for themselves, but can't because it's "illegal."

THE HEALTH-CARE SQUEEZE: Doctors, hospitals, and laboratory owners have turned human infirmity into a lucrative business.

THE HOUSING SQUEEZE: In 1950, 7 out of 10 American families could afford a medium-priced house; by 1978, 7 out of 10 could not.

THE QUALITY SQUEEZE: Costs rise, real income declines, quality suffers.

THE UNDEREMPLOYMENT SQUEEZE: Workers are paid more and more for doing less and less.

THE SQUEEZE proposes radical remedies. Like breaking the professional monopolies doctors and lawyers enjoy. Abolishing future government pensions. Granting bonuses for bureaucratic efficiency. Closing down the Department of Energy. Taking the necessary risks to balance the budget, reduce taxes, and restore sound money.

It's not too late—yet. THE SQUEEZE tells why. For every American with the strength left to fight back, it is the year's most important, life-changing book.

"If you are outraged," says WILLIAM E. SIMON, ex-Secretary of the Treasury and author of *A Time for Truth*, "you will find this book particularly enlightening. Jim Davidson presents a devastating picture of our current predicament, and suggests some courageous solutions."

"Davidson's a hero," says SEN. WILLIAM PROXMIRE; "if you want to be prepared to do something truly effective about taxes and inflation, read this book. And if you love this country for its freedom and opportunity, you'll love this book."

"Liberal or conservative," says NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN— "anyone with money in the bank —ought to read this book."

"Really significant," says FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1974: "it is an original effort which I greatly welcome."


"If you are outraged about unchecked inflation, rising taxes soaring interest rates — the overall economic decline of America — you will find this book particularly enlightening. Jim Davidson presents a devastating picture of our current predicament, and suggests some courageous solutions."
—WILLIAM E. SIMON, author of A Time for Truth
The Squeeze
by James Dale Davidson

$11.95 at bookstores.

SUMMIT BOOKS

Distributed by Simon and Schuster, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York 10020

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moralizing and posturing. He understands that history matters, and his chapters typically begin by showing how present arrangements have developed out of the past. Though he never says so, he seems concerned with the modern tendency to elevate the narrowest prejudices into the most sublime political truths. By not taking these claims seriously, he deflates their pretensions.

He raises two questions at the beginning of the book: Who governs? And to what ends? The chapters that follow, though they contain all the minutiae of contemporary politics, never lose sight of these larger questions. His answers, given explicitly at the end of the book but implied throughout, are modest and provisional. To the first question, he answers that everyone governs in some sense but that no one governs in another. The American constitutional system encourages faction and coalition politics and the permanent search for a majority that is rarely found. As coalitions shift from issue to issue and from election to election, every group achieves some influence but none ultimately controls the system. The Constitution in fact encourages confusion over who actually rules through federalism, the separation of powers, and political decentralization. Those who argue over who *really* rules the system do not fully understand that this confusion is encouraged by the very nature of the regime and is directed to larger political purposes. By raising the question in this way, Wilson asks us to think about these larger political purposes.

The ends of government are therefore never fully separable from the means of achieving them. Because the American system is democratic and thus open to any group that can get itself organized, the government must pursue many different objectives, some of which are in open conflict with one another. Wilson shows that this does not arise from the perversity of public officials, but from the nature of democracy itself operating within a pluralistic social system. A democratic system thus pursues many different ends because the ends of society are many and complex. One is reminded here of Burke's characteristically perceptive observation: "The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity; and therefore no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature or the quality of his affairs."

Like Burke, Wilson has little patience either for the technocrat who thinks he can order human affairs according to some narrow principle of rationality or efficiency, or for the ideologue who thinks society can be ordered according to a simple abstract design. American political institutions thus encourage diversity at the same time that they shape that diversity into a politically manageable form. Political institutions, he suggests, are important in their own right, and are not merely arenas within which social and economic interests fight it out.

Wilson is at his best when he shows how the American political system has transformed itself over the past two centuries, and in particular over the past 30 years. These changes, while obviously complex, may be understood from a couple of points of view. On the one hand, they consist in the progressive nationalization of our politics and in the corresponding collapse of those institutions that once reinforced decentralization. At the same time, Americans now ask their governments to address a whole range of questions that were formerly left to private arrangements. As Wilson says: "Today, if one wants to know the objectives of government, the answer is 'practically everything.' The expan-

ANNOUNCING . . .

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE LIBERAL ACADEMIC ESTABLISHMENT

YOUNG AMERICA'S FOUNDATION'S
Second Annual
ORIENTATION CONFERENCE
for College Students

American University
Washington, D.C.
August 3-9, 1980

The Foundation's Orientation Conference is designed for responsible students who believe in America and its values. It is aimed at preparing these students to meet the attacks on our system and our way of life that they will face in college. The Foundation does this by rigorously preparing the student for the study of particular academic subjects that bear on public policy. This year's conference includes 2 one-week seminars; one on International Relations and one on Economics and Public Policy. Students may attend either of the seminars or may opt to attend both.

COST: $35.00 for one seminar; $50.00 for both sessions. (Price includes room, meals, books, lectures and tours.)

If interested in attending, please return the coupon.

Please send information on Young America's Foundation's Orientation Conference and an application to:

Name: _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Mail to: James B. Taylor, Young America's Foundation, Suite 812, 11800 Sunrise Valley Drive, Reston, VA 22091

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion of the scope of government has meant the proliferation of the goals of government." While the development of a national economy is connected to this process, and is usually held out as its chief explanation, Wilson suggests that it has been strongly aided and abetted by political ideas and claims that require national responses. Because he does not seem completely sympathetic with the more recent expressions of this national impulse, he is able to analyze the process with a clear and critical eye. In the end, however, the nature of his enterprise keeps him from drawing all the conclusions that the careful reader might find warranted.

In his chapter on federalism, Professor Wilson discusses the theory and practice of America's unique contribution to political organization. Originally conceived as a means of protecting liberty against centralized power and of governing a large and diverse land area, federalism has been a source of continuing conflict and controversy in American politics. While many continue to defend federalism in these terms, others attack it as an institution that protects local property interests against national majorities. In the past two decades the critics of federalism have found an indirect means of circumventing it through grant-in-aid programs which funnel federal dollars to states and localities under conditions and regulations formulated in Washington. In 1950 federal grants made up about 10 percent of all state and local revenues, but by 1978 the figure had grown to more than 27 percent, so that many localities are now heavily dependent on the marginal contributions of federal grants to their budgets. Given this dependence, they are vulnerable to regulations continually being promulgated in Washington, many of which bear no relation whatever to the purposes for which the grants are given.

Working hand-in-hand with this has been an expansion of the powers of the executive and judicial branches at the national level, and the decline of state and local political parties. Wilson shows how the federal bureaucracy has expanded its political role through congressional delegations of power which permit it to pay subsidies to political groups and organizations, to funnel money to state and local governments, and to devise rules which collectively influence nearly every major social activity. At the same time, the federal courts have become agents of political reform in their own right, inspiring changes in such areas as race relations, criminal procedure, legislative apportionment, church-state relations, and abortion. The courts once confined themselves to adjudicating disputes between parties in a way that did not involve large classes of citizens. Today, however, as Wilson points out, "judges design remedies that go far beyond what is required to do justice to the parties who actually appear in court. The remedies now imposed often apply to large groups and affect the circumstances under which thousands or even millions of persons work, study, or live." The advances of these institutions have been accompanied by a palpable decline in the vitality of the political parties and a general fragmentation and individualization of the electoral process. These developments are reflected in any number of current trends: the number of independents in the electorate, the recent upsurges in split-ticket voting, single-issue movements, and the ease with which insurgents like Jimmy Carter can capture one of the parties.

What lies behind all these changes in the American system? All have occurred in the recent past, and none has required a formal change in the Constitution itself. If he were forced to identify a single cause, Wilson might point to the powerful influence of a set of ideas revolving around the concepts of equality and individual rights. As the political process has become more fragmented and individualized, it has more and more fallen under the influence of these ideas, which both reinforce the process of fragmentation and provide a coherent set of principles with which the system can be rebuilt. The idea of equality, as Tocqueville observed long ago, is inherently centralizing, and it is therefore at odds with those institutions in the society, such as the parties and the state and local governments, which disperse political power. It encourages litigation in both the courts and bureaucracy because it provides an abstract standard according to which cases can be decided and it is sufficiently inclusive to justify almost any claim or complaint. Because it is a universal value, it must be addressed at the most inclusive political level. Since these ideas can never be fully realized, in part because they are continually being expanded and redefined, there is no end to the claims that can be pressed on government in their name. To some extent, these claims may be encouraged by government in its search for clients and supporters. It is at least ironic that the assertion of these excessively

Who reads The American Spectator?

Midge Decter. Photo: Jan Lukas

ALSO: Paul McCracken, Brock Yates, Albert Shanker, Ray Price, James Wechsler, John Roche, Lewis Lapham, Norman Podhoretz, Jack Kemp, John Chamberlain, Edith Efron, Henry Salvatori, David Meiselman, Martin Peretz, Jeff MacNelly, John Lukacs, William Rusher, Antonio Martino, Malcolm Muggeridge, Doris Grumbach, Colin Welch, Robert Bleiberg, James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jude Wanniski, Gen. A.C. Wedemeyer, James L. Buckley, Ben Wattenberg, Neal Kozodoy, Alan Reynolds, Walter Goodman, Harry Jaffa, William Safire, Charles Peters, Jeffrey Hart, Irving Kristol, David Packard, Henry Fairlie, Jean-François Revel, Richard M. Nixon, Robert Nisbet, Leonard Garment, Norman Mailer, Frank Shakespeare, Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., Melvin Lasky, Ronald Reagan, Anne Armstrong, James R. Schlesinger, Richard Whalen, Dana Andrews, Occupant, William E. Simon, Ernest van den Haag, James Q. Wilson, Lewis Lehrman, Woody Allen, Nathan Glazer, William F. Buckley, Jr., Thomas Murphy, William Proxmire, Suzanne Weaver, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton III, Elliott Abrams, Patrick Buchanan, Patrick Cosgrave, John Lofton, Larry Flynt, M. Stanton Evans, Huntington Cairns, Allard Lowenstein, Herb Stein, William Baroody, Tom Wolfe, William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Michael Kinsley, Tom Winter, Gerald R. Ford, Henry Regnery, Roger Rosenblatt, Richard Lugar, Anthony Harrigan, Robert L. Bartley, S.I. Hayakawa, Luigi Barzini, Nelson Polsby, Joseph Coors, Peregrine Worsthorne, Tom Charles Huston, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Clare Boothe Luce, Clay La Force, Roger Milliken, Edward Banfield, Victor Lasky, Raymond Aron, Roy Cohn, Joseph Hazan, Eugene V. Rostow, Michael Novak, Thomas Sowell, Gen. Alexander Haig, Randolph Richardson, George Will, Sidney Hook, Richard Perle, James Hitchcock, Philip Crane, Schmuel Moyal, Hugh Kenner, Eric Hoffer, Tom Stoppard, Charlton Heston, Jim Fallows, Alan Abelson, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and many others.

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, P.O. Box 1969, Bloomington, Indiana 47402

Please enter a
☐ new
☐ renewal subscription to *The American Spectator* for one year (12 issues) for only $12.

☐ Payment enclosed
☐ Bill me later

PLEASE PRINT

Name

Address

City State Zip

X91

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

democratic claims should have led to the decline of those institutions closest to the people—the parties and the state and local governments—and to the strengthening of two institutions very remote from them—the courts and the bureaucracy.

If all this poses a threat to our political institutions, and Wilson implies that it does, the remedy must come in the way we think about government. This remedy, it is clear, must be a fundamental one, and it will require a deeper understanding than the one that is generally offered of what is necessary to preserve a liberal regime. Liberalism is a difficult discipline, and we have seen in the modern era that the unreflective pursuit of liberal ends can undermine those institutions that are necessary to achieve them. The attempt to secure through the Supreme Court what cannot be secured through the legislative process leads directly to a contempt for public opinion and for those institutions which have traditionally represented it. Wilson does not provide the remedy, but he clearly diagnoses the problem, and he forthrightly attacks in both speech and deed the idea that ideas do not matter. In a society in which public sentiment ultimately governs, nothing could be more disastrous than the triumph of the belief that interest alone rules, because here the belief will make it so. The experiment in representative government, which is Wilson's subject, began out of an attempt to prove the doctrine false, but the nature of the enterprise presumes that it may eventually be proven true. □

LibertyPress
LibertyClassics



The Evolution of Civilizations
An Introduction to Historical Analysis
By Carroll Quigley

A comprehensive and perceptive look at the factors behind the rise and fall of civilizations. Quigley examines the application of scientific method to the social sciences, then establishes his historical hypotheses. He identifies seven stages of historical change for all civilizations –mixture, gestation, expansion, age of conflict, universal empire, decay, and invasion –and tests his hypotheses with a detailed analysis of five major civilizations: the Mesopotamian, the Canaanite, the Minoan, the classical, and the Western. "He has reached sounder ground than has Arnold J. Toynbee"–*Christian Science Monitor.* "Studies of this nature, rare in American historiography, should be welcomed" –*American Historical Review.* Hardcover $9.00, Paperback $4.00.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. A34
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

ZEBRA
Clark Howard
Richard Marek Publishers / $11.95

Mike Parrish

Zebra tells the story of 23 random, cold-blooded murders and attempted murders—chosen from an estimated total of 250—committed in San Francisco during the period 1973-1974 by a group of Black Muslims. It is not a pleasant book, and, suffering as it does from both a slight touch of sensationalism and the liabilities inherent in its "nonfiction novel" style, it is not even a particularly good book; but it ought to be read, mainly by those who may still have misgivings about capital punishment.

It is incredible that the acts of savagery described in this book could happen anywhere in the civilized world, but less so that they took place in San Francisco, where American liberalism reigns triumphant. Here, where the genius of Jim Jones and "General Field Marshal" Cinque reached fruition, the so-called Zebra murderers found their perfect milieu. The murderers were largely veterans of the California prison system, where the "there is no such thing as a bad boy" principle has been the dominant philosophy for a number of years. Although habitual criminals, they had been released after short terms in various correctional institutions. During one of these sojourns they discovered the glories of Islam, in particular, the variety of Islam inspired by the teachings of Malcolm X. Taking the precepts of Malcolm X to their logical conclusion, the Zebra group decided to embark on a campaign of killing "blue-eyed devils" and rewarding individual killers with high scores

Mike Parrish lives and works in Bloomington, Indiana.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with admission into a fraternity of "Death Angels." In adding up scores, high marks were given for killing women and children.

Despite the killers' fervent avowals, their religious commitment is somewhat suspect. Although Islam certainly believes in murder for correct reasons, it takes a less sanguine view of rape and robbery, in which the criminals, in their more lenient moods, also indulged. It seems that their secular inspiration must have come from the Black Panthers across the Bay, whose leader had shortly before been anointed by Jane Fonda as the only man who could be trusted in America.

The San Francisco police attempted to apprehend the criminals, of course, but groups like the American Civil Liberties Union continually frustrated them. Waving the Constitution and hurling about charges of "racism," the ACLU and its allies managed to bring to a halt a police search program which might have led to an early apprehension of the criminals. In the end, only the conscientious efforts of two detectives, and an unfounded fear of imminent capture on the part of one of the criminals, led to the group's arrest and conviction. Their crimes notwithstanding, they will be up for parole in 1981. According to Powell, the prisoners have shown no repentance and like many of their kind probably view themselves as "freedom fighters."

There is hope, however. By using the latest techniques of Synanon and *est* or by employing a new method of behavior modification, the mental health people so prevalent in San Francisco's psychobabble culture may well succeed in restoring the criminals to model citizens by the time of their release. If not, the outcome raises several questions, not least important of which is: Can our society deal effectively with terrorists when powerful voices try to justify crimes—no matter how heinous—as long as they are committed by a "repressed minority"? □

WHO'S ON FIRST

William F. Buckley, Jr. / Doubleday / $9.95

Joseph Shattan

Reviewers of mysteries and spy novels are apt to find themselves in an uncomfortable bind. They are not permitted to divulge the book's plot, since that would relieve the suspense novel of its *raison d'être*; they cannot say much about its characters, since these, in all but the best novels, are little more than what Ian Fleming once called "cardboard boobies"; and they are unable to analyze its argument, since a thriller usually has none. Thus, they fall back on generalities. They discuss the book's atmosphere and the author's style, pronounce the plot plausible or implausible, and, should they wish to bestow the highest accolade, declare that they read the entire work "in a single sitting," so enthralled were they by it.

As it happens, I read William Buckley's latest spy novel in a single sitting. This declaration, however, is not as laudatory as it might otherwise appear, inasmuch as I always read thrillers in a single sitting. Otherwise, I find that I lose track of the plot. Having qualified my enthusiasm somewhat, I can safely proceed to assert that Mr. Buckley's novel, though not quite up to his highest standards, is still an entertainment of the first rank. Its characters are credible, its plot is ingenious, and, though its tone is anything but didactic, it has a serious point to make.

A good part of the novel's attractiveness derives from its protagonist, CIA operative Blackford Oakes. A "perfectly proportioned young American male" with an "inviting informality of manner" that women (not unnaturally) find irresistible, the Yale-educated Mr. Oakes is no mere fop. On the contrary, he was trained as a nuclear physicist, he gained renown as a fighter-pilot during World War II, and he reads the geopolitical works of James Burnham for relaxation. Fluent in many tongues and related to—among other luminaries—the Queen of England, the young Oakes is at once effortlessly cosmopolitan and deeply patriotic. One is at a loss to imagine who on earth such an accomplished character might be modelled after.

Pitted against Oakes is the wily KGB Colonel, Boris Andreyevich Bolgin. A quondam victim of Stalin's purges, Bolgin is a man of regular

Joseph Shattan is Policy Director for the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in Washington, D.C.

Congressman Robert Dornan [R., Calif.] is one of the participants in the Politics Program at Christendom. Solidly trained, he bases his political activity squarely on the natural law.

Do you favor a strong U.S. posture against Communism?

THE POLITICS PROGRAM

CHRISTENDOM COLLEGE

Christendom College is a Four-year, co-ed, solidly Catholic liberal arts college located in Northern Virginia, with a 74-acre campus on the Shenandoah River.

Call or Write
Christendom College
Route 3, Box 87
Front Royal, Va 22630
703-636-2908

- Internships with P.A.C.'s provide first-hand political experience in Washington
- On-campus Practica with nationally known political leaders
- Classical and Catholic courses in Political Theory
- Five half-tuition Grants for junior transfers
- A Major Program, leading to the B.A.

FREE

conservative news weekly

If you're a conservative, you should discover HUMAN EVENTS, the National Conservative Weekly (the *only* one). Essential this election year. Only national publication covering Senate and House as well as presidential races. Reports from the deep inside Capitol Hill. Hot news — often not printed anywhere else. Tough writers. FREE sample. No obligation. Write A. A. Lee, 422 First St. SE, Washington, DC 20003.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

habits: He never travels without his capsule of cyanide, and he never goes to sleep sober. Devoted in equal measure to vodka and the Russian classics, Bolgin also follows the Western press. "Do you ever read the *National Review*?" he asks a subordinate at one point. "It is edited by this young bourgeois fanatic. . . . I always read the *National Review*, it makes me so funny-mad." Since such a reaction to *National Review* is hardly uncommon, it is far from clear whether Bolgin, *au fond*, is a dyed-in-the-wool Stalinist or merely a muddled Menshevik. Or perhaps Bolgin secretly admires *National Review,* and denounces it only to maintain appearances? In the crepuscular world of espionage, no possibility, however remote, can be summarily excluded.

Though Bolgin and Oakes are relentless adversaries, their relationship is by no means a straightforward "zero-sum game." In *Stained Glass*, one of Buckley's previous novels, the two antagonists actually cooperate in assassinating Count Axel Wintergrin, an idealistic German nationalist who does not subscribe to the doctrine of "containment," and is bent on unifying the two Germanies. That book—Buckley's finest, in my opinion—was both a superb thriller and an oblique criticism of U.S. foreign policy. Although *Who's on First* is a more conventional thriller, in that Bolgin and Oakes are engaged, as they quite properly ought to be, in fighting each other, in the end, interestingly enough, both men win. Obviously, Buckley is no fan of predictable denouements. (As to what Oakes and Bolgin fight about, suffice it to say that the balance of world power hangs on the outcome of their struggle.)

While Bolgin and Oakes clearly dominate the book, it contains a host of interesting minor characters as well. On the American side, there are vivid depictions of Acheson and Dulles, crotchety, shrewd Nestors whose conversations light up the novel with wit and charm. On the Russian side, there are also quite a few unusual personalities, among both the jailers and the jailed, all of whom share a pervasive fear of unauthorized behavior which often immobilizes them in moments of crisis, when snap decisions are called for. Buckley's point is a good one: Despite, or rather because of, their strict regimentation, Communist societies simply don't work well. In suspense novels, as in real life, ingenuity and audacity frequently carry the day, but Communist regimes discourage both attributes.

That they stifle these attributes is, however, merely the least of the Communists' many sins. Vastly more important is the fact that, to put it plainly, Communist regimes are profoundly evil, with oceans of innocent blood on their hands. Blackford Oakes understands this quite clearly. Though his father was active in the America First movement, and his own youthful sympathies were with the isolationists, the mature Oakes is a committed "cold-warrior" whose involvement with the CIA springs from an uncompromising hostility to Stalinism in all of its manifestations. "Blackford Oakes felt only this," Buckley writes, "that there wasn't any alternative for those few who *did* understand, or thought they did. They *had*, living in the same world, to do *something*." In his intellectual odyssey from isolationism to activism, Blackford Oakes is not untypical of an entire generation of conservatives who came to political maturity at the onset of the Cold War.

It is evident, then, that in Buckley's skilled hands the thriller becomes something more than a clever yarn of adventure and intrigue. It is also an affirmation of certain values—courage, cultivation, freedom—and a condign indictment of Soviet oppression. Even those who are ill-disposed to the entire *genre*, who feel, with the late Edmund Wilson, that the reading of suspense novels is "a habit wasteful of time and degrading to the intellect, into which people have been bullied by convention," will find *Who's on First* worth their while. Devotees of the *genre*, needless to say, have reason to celebrate. □

AUTHORS WANTED BY NEW YORK PUBLISHER

Leading subsidy book publisher seeks manuscripts of all types: fiction, non-fiction, poetry, scholarly and juvenile works, etc. New authors welcomed. Send for free, illustrated 40-page brochure H-80 Vantage Press, 516 W. 34 St., New York, N.Y. 10001

If You Love Words, you'll love **VERBATIM**. The Language Quarterly dealing with all aspects of language. Send $5.00 (U.S.) or $5.50 (elsewhere) for a 1-year subscription, starting with the current issue. Money back if not pleased. Allow 6 weeks.
VERBATIM POST OFFICE BOX 668AS ESSEX, CT 06426 U.S.A.

SAVE YOUR GAS! BEAT INFLATION!
Roam the world by freighter at savings of at least 50% . . . Deluxe accommodations
TravLtips
Dept. F106, 163-09 Depot, Flushing, NY 11358

THE RIGHT STUFF
Tom Wolfe / Farrar, Straus and Giroux / $12.95

Mitchell S. Ross

The archbishops of American letters have pretty much had their say about Tom Wolfe's latest book, and so have the hardcover customers. Both groups have been very kind to him, and justly so: *The Right Stuff* illuminates and invigorates a subject which I had thought to be as devoid of literary interest as the drinking habits of Christian Scientists. After all, none other than the Grand Poobah of American literature, Norman Mailer, had taken a crack at describing the most momentous of spacey subjects—the moon landing itself—several years back. The result was a fat volume called *Of a Fire on the Moon,* an incredibly windy and tedious effort which depressed me horribly. Reading it was like enduring a 400-pound woman on your lap all day long, and the subject seemed almost as much to be blamed as the author. The exploration of outer space marked the nadir of the history of heroism. The preparations were undertaken by batteries of technocrats. The work of the astronauts could mainly be done by simians with superior haircuts. The voice of mission control was a dreadful drone.

Wolfe recounts the years of Project Mercury, at the conclusion of which I was nine years old. Like millions of other shavers across America, I passed a number of flighty days in front of a television set which had been installed in the classroom. My schoolteachers had us huddle around the tube and observe the mighty doings. I do not remember anyone feeling patriotically uplifted; I do remember being bored. In the estimation of my classmates and me, Space Days were better than spelling quizzes but less fun than filmstrips.

Although I am not a subscriber to the children-are-wisest-because-they-are-the-most-innocent school of social philosophy, I do think that in this case the kiddies were ahead of the rest of the country. If ever a public event was likely to excite the imaginations of schoolchildren, space exploration was it. And yet we perceived the essential emptiness of the occasion by yawning while the grown-ups fired confetti at John Glenn's proud head. After all, it would be several more years before, as Wolfe notes in his closing sentence, "The day might come when Americans would hear their names and say, 'Oh, yes—now, which one was he?'"

Wolfe triumphs in his ability to recall the events of Project Mercury with a sense of irony and a sense of humor appropriate to the grandest hype job carried off in the Republic between the end of World War II and the start of Super Bowl I. Not that Wolfe is scornful of the astronauts—far from it. Indeed, I suspect he began his investigations in a genuflective mood, and thought of Glenn, Sheperd, Schirra, and the rest as modern Pizarros and Francis Drakes. The book's title is labored like a leitmotiv throughout the book in an effort to delineate the pilots' characters—a weakness, by the way, but a minor one. "The right stuff" suggests a combination of qualities inherently unique. What did these men have that others didn't?

The answer is: not much. What was important was their having the *appearance* of uniqueness, and so endless energy was applied to the propagation of appearances. The country needed to believe these men were special, their colleagues needed to understand why these men had it all over ordinary mortals, and, ultimately, the astronauts needed to convince themselves of their status as flying princes of democracy.

All of this is the stuff of comedy, and Wolfe has captured it well. No writer in our time has conveyed better the effects of abundant technology on the American mind. He understands the giddy exhilaration of men spellbound by gadgetry. He is less astute in his pronouncements on the moral corollaries of this fascination. To say, as Wolfe did a few years ago, that in its years of affluence the country has enjoyed a "happiness explosion" is to mistake absorption for satisfaction. But in his description of the matter itself he is unsurpassed.

Mitchell S. Ross lives in Detroit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stylistically, he shows signs of improving with age. I have disparaged his reliance upon pet phrases like "the right stuff" and "the Genteel Gent" (the press), but there seems to be less of this here than previously. There is also a more judicious employment of ellipses and exclamation points, which have tended in the past to become annoying. Hundreds of marvelous phrases remain: Lyndon Johnson "oozing protocol"; "fellows from the neighborhood who wear sports shirts designed in weird blooms and streaks of tubercular blue and runny-egg yellow hanging out over pants the color of a fifteen cent cigar." If I concur in Karl Shapiro's assessment of Wolfe as a "goddam joy," will Wolfe's publishers find a fresh blurb to paste on his jackets? I am tired of reading that one. □

C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

Against Capital Punishment

Walter Berns' *For Capital Punishment: Crime and the Morality of the Death Penalty* and Maurice J. Holland's favorable review of it in your pages (December 1979) invite the sympathetically critical discussion which the book has thus far failed to receive.

Both place their consideration of the ultimate sanction within the larger framework of criminal punishment and its traditional justifications. Rehabilitation is considered in this context only because of the abolitionists' confused notion that if it were shown to be a real possibility, they would have a strong argument against that punishment which, by definition, eliminates all hope of such reformation. On the preponderance of the evidence concerning the success rate of prison treatment programs, Holland finds security in rejecting rehabilitative claims against the finality of execution. While candidly acknowledging that such refutation in no way advances the affirmative argument that must be made in favor of capital punishment, he leaves implicit the suggestion that part of the retentionist's case has already been made. It hasn't, of course; though as a matter of intellectual and social history one would want to trace and try to fathom the connections between this decade's decline of faith in social progress and the increase in its calls for harsh criminal sanctions. But what if, it is fair to ask Professors Holland and Berns, a highly successful rehabilitation rate *could* be demonstrated among the denizens of death row? Should these individuals who have improved be spared the lightning? Should the practice of death as punishment be abolished?

This is but the converse of the question frequently put to abolitionists on the issue of deterrence. Since most opponents of the death penalty pronounce themselves smugly secure in the "knowledge" that execution is not a marginally superior deterrent than other, lesser forms of punishment, they invite the inevitable inquiry: But *what if* such demonstration could be satisfactorily made? Would you then change your views on the subject?

To hinge the imposition of punishment on the prediction or resolution of such empirical contingencies is, say Berns and Holland, to misconceive its proper basis, which lies in the realm of non-utilitarian morality. I completely agree. Simply put, if a punishment is deserved it ought to be imposed, no matter what if any deterrent or rehabilitative effect might thereby be achieved. Such agreement bespeaks shared acceptance of a legal order informed by and reflective of underlying moral values that do not themselves have origin in that order.

Importantly, we all endorse a retributivist punishment theory that is compatible with—indeed, conducive to—the morally pedagogic function of

AMERICAN SPECTATOR TEE SHIRTS NOW IN THREE COLORS!

The Saturday Evening Club met recently in Mitchell, South Dakota, and its members were so impressed by the city's slogan that we decided to adopt its message as our own. The slogan? "Home of the Corn Palace."*

It is in that spirit that The Saturday Evening Club has expanded its line of merchandise. Through the modern miracle of dyeing, we can now offer you blue or gold American Spectator Tee Shirts as well as the traditional (and more formal) white tees.

Our growing line of products also includes American Spectator Turkey Jackets, "Nuke The Whales" Tee Shirts, and a variety of bumperstickers and buttons.

So place your order today.

*P.S. Send us the name of your favorite city and its slogan. If we use it in our ad, we will send you a *free* American Spectator Turkey Tee Shirt. No purchase necessary, but it can't hurt.

Simply fill out the attached coupon and mail to:

THE SATURDAY EVENING CLUB
P.O. Box 877
Bloomington, Indiana 47402

MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE
Return in ten days if not satisfied.

THE SATURDAY EVENING CLUB'S ORDER FORM

Please send me my very own American Spectator Tee Shirt. Enclosed is $7 per shirt, three for $18.

Paris Green on White
.....Large, ...X Large
Paris Green on Gold
.....Large, ...X Large
Paris Green on Light Blue
.....Large, ...X Large

Please send me my very own American Spectator Turkey Jacket (White on Navy Blue) Enclosed is $12 per jacket, Three jackets for $30.
.....Medium .....Large .....X Large

Please send me ..... Political Buttons at $1. (Nixon's The One—in 1980)

Please send me these bumperstickers at $2 each, 3 for $5.
.....Caution: I Speed Up For Small Animals
.....Have You Slugged Your Kid Today?
.....Nuke The Whales
..... Nuclear Plants Are Built Better Than Jane Fonda

Total Enclosed: $.....
(Indiana residents please add 4% sales tax)

NAME _____
ADDRESS _____
CITY STATE ZIP
PLEASE PRINT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the criminal law, that which the Europeans have termed "general prevention." But regarding the implications of those moral values for capital punishment, our views diverge. According to Professor Holland, Berns finds in the need for condign punishment not merely the warrant but also the obligation for executing in response to particularly heinous crimes. Putting aside the formidable, though not insuperable, difficulties entailed in justly deciding which particular capital offenders ought to die, there remains the core issue: Of what character is the moral instruction that we, as a society, are imparting through the killing of this criminal? The meaning of execution might be dangerously more, and other, than that proclaimed for it by the executioners. The symbolism contained in deliberately terminating the life of a fellow human being (even though profoundly blameworthy) might take us well beyond the supposed goals of just punishment and, strangely, into the very realm of amorality that we most loathe in the sociopath or other variants of "cold-blooded" killers. For example, some find that execution's greatest utility, and hence attractiveness as a punishment, lies in its unequivocal demonstration to the condemned of the community's unrelenting hatred towards him, and its decision that he is not fit to continue living in any human society—even that of a maximum security prison. The purposeful and gratuitous inculcation of despair is not the content of any moral message that I would recognize as such, and I suspect Professors Holland and Berns would agree.

Berns stresses the defensive function of death as much as its role as affirmative repayment for harm caused: i.e., the society is protecting and preserving its moral consensus. To this end, according to Berns, execution is an unfortunate necessity. Interestingly, the criminal law has never accepted the justificatory defense of necessity to a charge of homicide. Further, the various states are split in their view of justified lethal force in direct defense of self or home or property; and in any event, there is neither moral nor legal obligation to exercise such a right where it is available. The simple legal answer to all of these suggestions is, of course, that there is a wholly separate category of lethal force that has traditionally been recognized as justified: killing in the performance of official duty, which includes the responsibilities of the executioner. But this formalistic response does not satisfy the substantive dimensions of the question.

If the primary value we wish to proclaim is the worth and dignity of human life, is the extermination of such life the appropriate mode of exhortation? Do we most effectively teach by counter-example? Are we well served by permitting the criminal to control the nature and contours of our response, since we kill through the state only because he did? Immanuel Kant, one of the major proponents of retributivism, acknowledged that some literalist punishments—such as those for rape and pederasty—are themselves crimes against humanity and hence beyond the authority of the state to impose. It is difficult to see why, under the "evolving standards of decency" which are the American hallmark in analyzing the constitutionality of punishments, the replication of death should not be found similarly beyond the pale.

The elimination of capital punishment need not—must not—portend abolition of crucial distinctions between right and wrong, guilt and innocence. What is proposed here is not evisceration of the criminal law or appropriately stringent punishments, but rather the voluntary renunciation

(*continued on page 43*)

All The Business News You Need... When You Need It.

Special 20-week trial subscription to The Wall Street Journal lets you sample the financial information and business intelligence you need to earn more from your business, your career, your financial planning.

It's not for everyone. But if you are a serious business executive or someone who is concerned about your financial well-being, The Wall Street Journal can be *pure gold.* Because you're just the kind of person who knows the value of up-to-date financial and business intelligence. And you know how to use it in your planning and strategy.

Every business day The Wall Street Journal gives you a fistful of facts, figures, and background information you can turn to your advantage in business and your investing. For example, you'll find revealing, detailed weekly reports such as:

- THE OUTLOOK, a review of current trends in finance and business — trends that can act as your personal Early Warning System.
- THE TAX REPORT AND WASHINGTON WIRE, reports that will certainly affect your investing and business decisions.

In addition to these and other weekly reports, you will find *daily* information you can turn into gold. Prices and other data on stocks, bonds, funds, and other securities and investment vehicles. Earnings reports. And related data you should factor into your planning.

Plus *deep background* reports on what people and companies are doing, and why. It's the kind of report that stimulates your thinking about new products or services and markets for your company, new business and career-building methods you can apply, and new ways to invest.

If you're serious about how you manage your finances, your business, your career — and you value the kind of information that can help you do it better and more profitably — The Journal is for you. It's all the business news you need. When you need it.

Sample what The Journal has to offer for 20 weeks for just $26 (you save $4 off the newsstand price). Or go the distance with a full year for just $63 and save over $12. In any case, mail the coupon today while you're still thinking about it.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 3HAB
c/o The American Spectator
P.O. Box 1969, Bloomington, Indiana 47402

The Journal has just the kind of information I need. Please enter my subscription for the period checked below.

☐ 20 weeks @ $26.00 ☐ One year @ $63.00
☐ Check Enclosed ☐ Please charge my:
☐ American Express ☐ Visa ☐ MC

Card# _____ Expires_____

Signature _____

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

Limited time offer—good in Continental U.S. only.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CURRENT WISDOM

Antioch Review

What follows are passages from one of a series of interviews with unemployed people conducted by Harry Maurer, who begins his dolorous task by stating his belief that "unemployed people have been robbed of something, and they know it." Read on and come to know one of the many sad figures inhabiting the bread lines of America's modern welfare state. *The Grapes of Wrath* has been surpassed:

ROBIN LANDAU

She grew up in Stamford, Connecticut. "My mother does nothing, and my father is in real estate from his father. He owns shopping centers and apartment buildings." She lives on the East Side of Manhattan and studies child psychology part time. She has been collecting unemployment for nearly a year. Before that she worked for a company in the garment center...and a film producer.... She left there for a job in publishing.

• • •

I thought publishing would be exciting because you're around all these books. What a *drag* publishing is. The only people who work in publishing are these creepy librarian women or *au naturel* girls....I don't know what it is about me, like I'm materialistic and I'm bullshitty, but I'm also extremely, extremely sensitive. In the business world I just can't make it unless it's fun and people are nice. But people are not nice in business that much.

How did you feel about taking the unemployment money?

Great! Oh, it was the best thing that ever happened to me. It was like a free $85 a week. Just to enjoy myself and fool around with, for doing nothing. For doing *nothing*. I mean when I was working, I was taking home maybe $40 more. Busting my ass. Well, not busting my ass, but just being very depressed and wasting a lot of time for $40 more a week. And here I was collecting $85, doing nothing. It was the best thing that ever happened to me. It was like a gift from heaven. Pennies from heaven. Dollars. It's terrific.

The fact is that I hate working....But the thing I really hate about work is getting up so early. Such an ungodly hour. And it's just too much. You work, you come home, you eat dinner, you're so tired, and you have to wake up the next day.

...And I certainly feel no guilt whatsoever about taking the $85. I think this government and the whole world is crazy and war-happy, and that I wasted a large part of my life by working for these people, doing nutty jobs. That's not what life is about, sitting in an office nine hours on your ass, typing or taking orders from somebody. So I feel they owed it to me.

So during the summer I went to the pool and I played tennis and I got skinny and I got a suntan. I was living here, but my parents belong to a club and my friends have tennis courts and pools and I have a car, so I took the car with me and my friends to the Hamptons. I'd bop around there, and I was really relaxing and getting mellow and nice again....I was doing nothing, and I think I could be happy doing nothing for the rest of my life....I think my whole life I could do that without getting a job....But I would never marry just for money because I couldn't do that. I would get sick to my stomach if somebody touched me who I didn't love. So like I need both. I need love and money.

...I can't live on $85 a week. I don't pay the rent. My parents pay the rent. I pay everything else and I still have to take money from them. It happens to be very difficult for me to live on $85 a week. I feel horrible about taking their money. But I've gotten past the point of feeling horrible; I feel one step worse than horrible; I feel like I don't care. Like the part about being horrible is already over because I know that I'm horrible and awful....you know, in a certain way they never taught me responsibility with money. All of a sudden I got out of school and there was this great pressure. Now be responsible! But during my whole life there wasn't even a gradual buildup. I got everything I wanted, everything. And all of a sudden I got out of college and I was so shocked. "OK, now do it yourself." But I was never *taught*....They should have been more responsible in that respect....But I'm very unliberated because I think men should still support women. Unless the woman finds something that interests her and she wants to work.

...Basically I'm happy with myself. I think Robin's a good, together nice person.

[*Winter, 1980*]

Us

An auspicious report on American belles lettres from *Us* magazine—a magazine that is for the 1980 intellectual what the *New Republic* was for his 1930s equivalent:

During the International Women's Year in 1975, husband-and-wife artists Isaac Weinstock and Daphna Ayalah decided they were fed up with the idealized and unrealistic pictures of women's breasts that were used to sell everything from cars to toothpaste and magazines.

The antidote, says Weinstock, 32, was to take their own pictures "to show the true appearance of women's breasts. The breasts you usually see are really adolescent breasts with no sagging or stretch marks. We thought we could counter that by showing what breasts really look like."

The result, the recently published *Breasts: Women Speak About Their Breasts and Their Lives* (Summit Books), turned out to be more than they planned. Not only did the photographs show what Weinstock calls "the variety of shapes and changes that occur through the cycles of a woman's life," but the picture-taking itself led subjects to pour out their feelings about their breasts.

[*April 15, 1980*]

News-Press

(Santa Barbara, California)

Another lucid ratiocination from Mr. James Reston, syndicated columnist and reader of *Ms.* magazine:

We need not only the registration of people who can make war, if necessary, but also the registration of people who can make peace. This would clearly include the registration of women, who know more about the creation and preservation of life than anybody else.

[*February 14, 1980*]

National Public Radio

Addressing the rapt audience of NPR's nightly "radio magazine," "All Things Considered," Dr. Richard Ellman, noted critic and belletrist, calls for emunctory demonstrations on behalf of peace and enlightenment:

The next time you hear a politician talking about nuclear war, why not vomit all over him. Or soon we'll be vomiting on each other.

[*February 15, 1980*]

The Washington Star

Reflections on the sublime and the beautiful from Professor Meade Andrews, a pedagogical colossus standing athwart the threshold of a heretofore unimagined era of aesthetic bliss:

Your article on Judy Chicago made me feel alternately depressed and angry. Depressed at the repetition of a centuries-long pattern of repression of women's work, as reiterated in a quote by Chicago herself: "It's either pay for storage [of her sculpture] for the rest of my life or destroy it....It means I will be just one of those...women who was stopped dead." Angry because I feel the controversy over the work (is it art, is the imagery too conspicuously sexual and therefore too controversial?) is irrelevant, a smokescreen designed to distract us from the real artistic and social impact of the work.

The work is a monumental statement unifying the artistic and historical struggle of women to express themselves as people. In her selection of imagery and structure, Chicago herself has turned this struggle into an artistic vision of unquestionable magnitude and power. The piece deserves to be seen, to be housed in a permanent collection as evidence of women's past heritage and our present commitment to making ourselves and our values known to society.

If the existing museums cannot or will not show this work, perhaps the time for a Women's National Gallery of Art has arrived. The work is already part of a history that can no longer be denied.

Dr. Meade Andrews,
Assistant Professor,
The American University
Washington, D.C.

[*September 2, 1979*]

The New Republic

Mr. Morton Kondracke speaks the grim truth about the Dark Age that stalks this Age of Carterian Glory:

Reagan believes in restoring America's credibility as an ally, in building up US military strength, and in resisting Soviet expansion. All that is fine. The question, though, is whether he will be prudent in choosing allies and committing US prestige. In the Middle East, for example, Reagan is a solid supporter of Israel, but he goes overboard, mouthing extreme Likud justifications for Israeli annexation of the West Bank. Elsewhere in the world, Reagan seems to believe—judging by past radio scripts and speeches—other American friends and allies include (or should have included) the shah of Iran, Chile's Pinochet, Somoza in Nicaragua, President Marcos in the Philippines, and the police state in Argentina. If Reagan means to defend every doomed dictator in the world just because he is anti-communist, that will be no improvement on President Carter's policies, and will do even less to inspire the world's confidence in American leadership.

[*April 5, 1980*]

The Harvard Crimson

A cultural and intellectual event of the first water, jubilantly reported on Page One of the eminent *Crimson*:

Sporting a Calvin Klein suit and black army boots, MARTIN SHEEN, star of "Apocalypse Now" and "Badlands," ducked into the Winthrop House JCR last Friday to deliver a quick plug for the presidential campaign of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy '54 [D-Mass.].

"Man, he's the guy that can lead us in a positive way now that everything's gone to such shit," Sheen told the crowd of approximately 150 in his energetic California dialect, adding that "nobody in Senate history—check it out, man—has the kind of reform record Kennedy does."

[*January 14, 1980*]

The Progressive

The pure and incorruptible musings of a subscriber to *The Progressive*, a journal for the right-minded and lobotomized:

Jeffrey Stein's article, "The Afghan Connection" (April issue), gave me background information I needed to understand the Afghanistan situation. But why did the author have to refer to the "brutality" of the Soviet invasion?

I have not seen any mention of brutality on the part of Soviet troops in the *Los Angeles Times*, and I am sure the mass media would have been only too pleased to have published the news of any such if there had been the slightest justification.

I wonder whether Jeffrey Stein used the word almost automatically, because he felt this was what a majority of American readers would naturally expect.

Robert Shillaker
Sierra Madre, California

[*May, 1980*]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

classified

HELP WANTED

Assistant Editor—Educational journal and newsletter looking for a young, high energy reporter-editor. Responsibilites would include investigative reporting, editorial writing and magazine lay-out. Individual should be familiar with current debates about higher education, particularly among the Ivies. Ivy education preferred, but not required. Must relocate to college town. Excellent opportunity for advancement, good salary and benefits. c/o Box AD, The American Spectator.

Entrepreneur seeks marketing pro for infant energy company in Minneapolis. No investment required other than talent, creativity, and ambition. Enormous growth opportunity for the right individual. Send resumé of aspirations and experience to Blake Joyner, 2880 Irving, Minneapolis, Minn. 55408.

ACADEMIC JOBS for non-academics. A weekly list of openings in universities, foundations and associations nationwide. Bachelors degree highest required. Fields include public relations, management, accounting, personnel, journalism, others. $25 for 3 months. ACADEMICS, Box 9126, Cincinnati, Ohio 45209.

OPPORTUNITIES

EARN MONEY, Commercial Art, Calligraphy, Personal Corrections, Yenney, Box 1181-M Piqua, Ohio 45356

Save or earn to $10,000 yearly in only one hour daily part-time. Send $15.00 today to Rich Howard, 3301 Joplin, Joplin, MO 64801.

WIN UP TO $10,000,000!
Completely new, unique opportunity. Send $2 for details. ABC, Box 1507/TR3, Kingston, Canada K7L 5C7.

FREE RUBBER STAMP BROCHURE (Dealers wanted!) Printing Unlimited 6788 Dixie Hwy., Franklin, OH 45005.

BOOKS

YOUR RETIREMENT may drive your wife crazy. Read "Move Over, Mama" by Marie Sorenson, $3.95, Osmar Press, P.O. Box 126, Modesto, CA 95353

PUBLISHERS' OVERSTOCKS* BARGAIN BOOKS. 3,000 titles, all subjects! Free catalog: Hamilton, 98-74 Clapboard, Danbury, CT 06810

PUBLISH YOUR BOOK!
Join our successful authors. Publicity, advertising, beautiful books. All subjects invited. Send for fact-filled booklet and free manuscript report. Carlton Press, Dept. ASO, 84 Fifth Avenue, New York 10011.

The Sum of Good Government, by Hon. Phillip Crane—$1.95, *The Newstates Constitution*—$2.00. Please add $.75 for postage and handling for one or both books. Opinion Books, Box 311, Wellington, Texas 79095.

BOOKS SAVE TO 70%
of Publisher's list price on top quality books. Some of the popular catagories are: self-help, business, psychology, inspirational, occult, beauty, health, hobbies and sports.
WRITE FOR FREE CATALOG!
FRANKLIN PUBLISHING COMPANY
BOX 208, EAST MILLSTONE, N.J. 08873

BOOKS

The Disease of Government—H.S. Ferns. Published in USA by St. Martin's Press, 173 Fifth Avenue, New York 10010. ". . . as refreshing as an ice-cold swim after a sauna." Malcolm Muggeridge.

THE UNFINDABLE FOUND. For our free and indefatigable search service, just send us your "hard-to-find" book wants. No obligation. Bookfinders General, Inc., Dept. SP, 145 East 27th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016.

MYERS' professional editing, rewriting, revising, typing. Box 1019, South Pasadena, CA 91030.

BOOKS LOCATED
Send wants. No obligation.
Bazaar Books, Box 496, Chico, CA 95927

SAVE GAS—SHOP BY MAIL
Get our book bargain catalog. Send SASE #10 for latest listing. J. Bolger, Dept. S, P.O. Box 704, Bridgeton, MO 63044.

"YOUR GUIDE TO CHANTING FOR MEDITATION"
Self-study reference. Send $6.00 to Danhart Music, Box 3143, Falls Church, VA 22043.

FAVORITE OLD SONGS AND POEMS
36 Pages, $2.00, T. Sexton, 188 W. Bernard, St. Paul, Minn. 55118

Do you or someone you know have arthritis of the hip? A conservative proven approach from a medical doctor who personally followed a non-surgical plan of treatment—with details and suggestions. Order "Arthritis of the Hip: Yours and Mine"—Robert C. Bartlett, MD, Arcy Publishing Co. Box B, 463 Emerald Road, Ocala, Fla. 32672; $6.50 postpaid.

PERIODICALS

THE INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY provides an international forum for the exploration of responsible, articulate alternatives to the positivist-analytical, Marxist, and narrowly academicist trends of contemporary philosophy. Subscription—$12.00 (Students, $8.50): Cobenzlgasse 13/4, A-1190S Vienna, Austria.

UFOs. Monthly reports from United States, foreign newspapers. Free details; sampler, $1.00., UFONS, Route 1, Box 220AS, Plumerville, Arkansas 72127.

Anti-New Think, anti-Vatican II letters. Send $1 for three sample copies. W.F. Strojie, 41695 Clark-Smith Dr., Lebanon, OR 97355.

The "minimum wage" is all the rage, but don't be fooled. Send a SASE to inflation-ending 50/50 ECONOMICS, Box 2138, Youngstown, Ohio 44504.

Our time on this earth is short unless we stretch it out a la Brainbeau. Send SASE to HEREBEFORES, Box 2138, Youngstown, Ohio, 44504.

CONGRESSMAN Praises NEW BOOK! YOU TOO! CAN CUT YOUR ELECTRIC BILL 50%; TRUE STORY
In August, Pete Hall paid $117.85 for his electricity... but August, one year later, his bill was only $46.96, using the same appliances. Only $3.98 plus $.95 postage.
Send to: RODDY, DSR. 14E,
EL CAMPO, TX 77437

PERIODICALS

"306 FREE MAGAZINES." Complete Directory only $3.00. Positive Enterprises-S, Box 695, La Mesa, CA 92041.

MAGAZINE & NEWSLETTER SAMPLES . . . only 50 cents each. Over 145 publications, covering a wide range of interests, to choose from. For free descriptive list send a stamped addressed envelope to Publishers Exchange, P.O. Box 1368, Dept. 129A, Plainfield, NJ 07061.

INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLETS

PICNIC TABLES for complete Plans send $3.00. MEYERS ENTERPRISE Box AM157, Capron, Illinois 61012

Indian artifacts. Old. Great investment. Send $1.00 for huge listings. Indian Shop, Independence, KY 41051.

Pancakes, best ever eaten. Send $1.25 to Super Pancake, Box 8R, Rt 1, Columbus N.C. 28722

"The Coming Holocaust-An Introduction to the Death Plan." Provocative, disturbing analysis about the death plans for our aging citizens. Each copy $1.25; over 10 copies $1.00 each. Check payable to Edutape-Dept. A, 140 Haverhill St., Andover, MA 01810

PREVENTING BURNOUT
THE NUTRITIONAL APPROACH
Seminar Your location, one day, C.J. Frompovich, Publications RD1 Chestnut Road, Coopersburg, PA. 18036

How your mind controls health! Easy method sheds stress. American Meditation, 1232 Race Road, Baltimore, MD 21237.

STOP POISONING YOUR PET! Insecticides are contact nerve poisons, absorbable and cumulative. REPEL FLEAS NUTRITIONALLY, a paperback. $4.95 ppd. Satisfaction guaranteed. Pet Health Publications, 740 N.E. 40th Ct., Fort Lauderdale, FL 33334, Dept. ASO.

INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLETS

Send $1 for a selection of United States Industrial Council Educational Foundation booklets on current issues. Write: USICEF, P.O. Box 2686, Nashville, Tenn. 37219.

Looking for an alternative? Reduce your electric bills using Mother Nature's free air. Write for your Wind Jennie information today. Product Development Institute, Box 200 TA, 4440 Secor Road, Toledo, Ohio 43623.

"Tips On Buying A Used Car" $1.00 Graylor, Dept. AS4, 1520 Center Des Moines Iowa 50314

MERCHANDISE

FINE WALKING STICKS AND CANES. Free color brochure. Marchele Co., Dept. AM, 720 Fort Washington Ave., New York, NY 10040.

ANTIQUE JUKEBOXES. The fun collectable. For parts, literature, or a complete machine see our FREE catalog. Write to: Jukebox Junction, Box 1081, Des Moines, Iowa 50311 or call 515-981-4019.

MR. BUSINESSMAN: Try our Advertising Memo Books. Better than a business card. Details and sample. FotoPress, 1313 Lombardy, Bay Shore, NY 11706.

OLD MAP REPRODUCTIONS
Write for free catalog.
Goldbug, Box 588-AS, Alamo, CA 94507

Emblems custom embroidered, minimum 10, TLCA, 1929 E. 52nd St., Indianapolis, IN 46205, (317) 257-1424.

LEGENDARY CULTURES
FASCINATING NATURE
PERU (Bolivia, Ecuador, Galapagos). **MAYA** (Guatemala, Mexico). **AFRICA** (Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles). **MID EAST** (Egypt, Holy Land). **8-Day** and longer trips for sophisticated travelers. **Groups or freelance**, reasonably priced. Expert leaders

EXPLORE
FORUM TRAVEL INTERNATIONAL
2437 Durant, Berkeley, CA 94704/(415) 843-8294

CLASSIFIED ORDER FORM

You can reach 70,000 informed and interested readers in the classified section of *The American Spectator*. Our rates are only $.50 per word (12-word minimum). Include an additional $3.00 if you want a box number, and we will forward all inquiries to you once a week. *The American Spectator* reserves the right to reject any copy for any reason. Please specify ad classification: Help Wanted, Positions Wanted, Books, Periodicals, Literary, Conferences, Personals, Travel, Bumperstickers & Buttons, Merchandise, Wanted. Miscellaneous

Yes, I'd like to place a classified ad in *The American Spectator*. Enclosed is full payment.

..... (# of words) x $.50 x ..... (# of issues ad is to appear) = $.....
(Check enclosed)

Ad classification: ..... Payment must accompany order.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

My ad reads:

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____

Please write additional ads on a separate sheet.

The American Spectator, Classified Dept., P.O. Box 1969, Bloomington, IN 47402

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MERCHANDISE

SOLAR ELECTRIC
BATTERY CHARGERS
Autos — Boats — Cabins — Motor Homes. Technical bulletin $1.00. Sunpower, Box 66, Carpinteria, CA 93013.

GOLD BULLION AND COINS for sale. No sales tax. Cheshire National Bank, 15 Main Street, Keene, NH 03431, (603) 352-5050. (Member FDIC)

DATE NAILS—$6.00 for 15 different plus literature. Glenn Wiswell, 29 Meadowbrook, Cedar Grove, NJ 07009.

IRIS-Tall, Median, Dwarf, Rebloomers, Japanese, Louisianas, Siberians, Spurias, Rare Species, Oriental Poppies. Catalog for stamp. IMPERIAL FLOWER GARDENS, Box 255 Cornell, IL 61319.

Enjoy
GIANT COLOR PROJECTION-TV!
New System-Just $39.95 Postpaid! 1-Year Guarantee! Orders or details: TeleIndustries, 1380 Montcalm, Laval, Quebec, Canada, H7W-1W6.

ARTISTS—USE "CLIP-IT"!
No nails—no tools—mount or exchange canvas paintings quickly and securely. The time you save pays for Clip-It! Box of 100, $14.95 UPS paid. ART-LITE ENTERPRISES, 365 Wizzow Street, San Jose, CA 95110.

OLD MOVIE STILL prints, circa 1920s. Perfect for wall decor, etc. 100 all-different scenes, six dollars, shipped postage prepaid. Studio Archives, 9348 Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, CA 90210.

FURNITURE 40% off retail. 150 major companies. Write for FREE brochure. Sobol House, Box 757AS, Black Mtn., NC 28711.

SURVIVAL FOOD FOR EASTERN SUBSCRIBERS. Buy direct from packer/distributor. Save high freight. Freeze dry/dehyd. Catalog: Stowaway, Independence Hiway, Cohasset, Mass. 02025.

Short-run custom belt buckles with your logo my speciality. Solid sandcast silicon bronze, all hand finished. Buckles by Mike, 1225 Manzanita, Dept. AS, Los Angeles, CA 90029

BUMPERSTICKERS & BUTTONS

BOYCOTT MOSCOW OLYMPICS!
Free Bumperstickers and Buttons.
Box 928, New York, N.Y. 10009

MISCELLANEOUS

PASSPORT POUCH prevents embarrassing pocket search in front of impatient customs officers and policemen; reduces chances of loss or theft. Also holds currency, keys, etc. Weather-resistant nylon, velcro closure, worn around neck underneath shirt. Great for vacationing runners. $5.00 ppd. Pak Foam Products, 181 Conant St., Pawtucket, RI 02862

BUMPER STICKER
"VOTE LIBERAL: STAMP OUT TAKE HOME PAY".
Send $1.50 each to The Jester Ltd., 17818 Woodruff, No. 213-A, Bellflower, CA 90706.

LUCKY AMULETS AMAZING
For Wealth, Love and Health
Can also prepare them for any other purpose—remove hexes, etc.
$10.00 each—Immediate delivery
GEMINIO, P.O. Box 2006
Glendale, Calif. 91209

MISCELLANEOUS

Providing an outstanding Address in Houston. Combine our Mail-Forwarding service and telephone-call forwarding and you have that Branch Office. Easy and inexpensive. Private Post Office Systems 1400 So. Post Oak Road., Suite 701 Houston, Texas 77056

SURVIVAL VILLAGE IN FLORIDA
Now in planning stage. 80 acre tract already acquired. 20 units proposed. Box GJ, The American Spectator.

MEDIEVAL FARTING CONTEST
Elizabeth, Shakespeare, other notables compete, with accompanying lewd remarks. Mark Twain's brilliant, wickedly lascivious underground masterpiece. Unbelievable; a real rip-snorter! (Eighty-page annotated edition; privately printed.) $10 to "1601," Box 69-S, Carrboro, NC 27510.

ANYWHERE BUT MOSCOW
Support common sense and nonpolitical Olympics. Red, white, and blue, 4"x15", removable vinyl bumpersticker. One-half earnings to alternative site, or to Afghan refugees. Long S.A.S.E. and $1.50: ABM Citizens, Box 6220, Arlington, Virginia. Distributors needed. (703) 527-1955.

Career, Home Opportunites Puget Sound, Seattle, $2.00, Living, Box 591, Tenino 98589

FOR MEN ONLY
Patented traction device as advertised in *Psychology Today* will enhance urinary control and penile circulation in most men over 40. Full instructions and money back guarantee. $7.95. Medical Assists Corp., U.S. 50, Loogootee, IN 47553.

Lucky twigs from my lucky tree. Good for capital formation, love, profits, vitality. Send $2 to Bob Colburn 5316 Harmony Ave. North Hollywood, CA 91601

PERSONALS

UNSECURED LOANS
$4,000 Up. $16,000 Income Qualifies. Write Fiesta-AMS, Springfield, IL 62708

LIFETIME ordination. Chaplain's commission. Many financial benefits. Chaplain's Association, Gatlinburg, TN 37738.

Join CHICKEN LITTLE CLUB. Help laugh out extremism. $15 (recoverable). Write Dept. B, Box 174 Cardiff, CA 92007

Correspondence Clubs
Catholic, Seniors, young singles, Sparks, Box 872, Troy, NY 12181

BOYNTON
A hard school for boys who want to learn—Christian emphasis—beautiful farm location, self helf, simple living, moderate tuition, enrollment limited to thirty. Contact Arthur J. Boynton, Jr., Oxford, New Hampshire, 03777

SCANDINAVIAN CAROLS
"Carl" Songs Unveiled, $2
ADMKT, Box 3012A, Chicago, IL 60654

U.S./STATE FLAG PINS *Lapel Pin
ALL 50 STATES AVAILABLE *Tie Tack
OFFICIAL FULL-COLOR STATE FLAGS



YOUR STATE TWIN FLAG EMBLEM—Etched brass, with gold finish. Red, white & blue U.S. flag pins. Ladies can wear as scatter pins. Great for your personal wardrobe or for use as business gifts, prizes or awards. Can be used as a fund raising project. 2/$3; 4/$5; 10/$10 ppd. Quantity prices available. Glendex Co., Box 440-S Flushing, New York 11365.

CORRESPONDENCE
(continued from page 40)

of a punishment unique in kind such that imposing it places both inflicter and recipient outside the boundaries in which those differences of value and role retain their forceful clarity.

Robert A. Pugsley
Associate Professor
Southwestern University
School of Law
Los Angeles, California

Afghanistan, My Afghanistan

The goodly Dr. George Yaney, who was quoted defending the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in your April "Current Wisdom," has succeeded in piling it the highest and deepest yet, though I'm not sure the University of Maryland should prove zealous of his honor. I could be wrong, but I'd swear he's the fella we saw over on the Terrapin side cheering for Duke during the final games of the ACC! In any event, it goes to prove an old and (excuse me) humorless cliché—that a man can spend the best years of his life and all kinds of money on college and never learn a damn thing.

Stephen C. Settle
Greensboro, North Carolina

Pidgin Food

What I like about R. Emmett Tyrrell's work (among many other things) is his dauntless use of words few readers know.

The contemporary way of pandering to the people's ignorance and laziness is reducing the English language to the equivalent of prechewed easily digested pet food. The vocabulary shrinks noticeably at every generation, until our grandchildren will end up with babytalk pidgin (and the few ideas that can be expressed in it).

Luigi Barzini
Rome, Italy

Developments *In Camera*

Stephen Miller, in "The Dogmas of the Modern-Day Mugwumps" (April, 1980), would have us believe that political action committees "would like to influence the course of legislation. But it is doubtful that their campaign contributions . . . affect the way many congressmen vote." That hard-nosed business executives —or labor union executives for that matter—would offer money for the altruistic pleasure of supporting the democratic process seems unlikely. In fact, in the same issue of the *Spectator* William Lucas has given us some pungent case histories of such purchases of votes in "The Best Congressmen Money Can Buy."

One does not have to be cynical about human affairs, only realistic, to affirm that constant vigilance and the means to implement that vigilance are the only barriers against the constant pressures of corruption. Miller correctly reminds us that governmental decisions made under the guns of an excited public are not necessarily made with wisdom, that time and *in camera* discussion are essential for the development of sound public policy. On the other hand, the erosion of the democratic process by purchased concessions to private interest has dangers of its own. Miller's article tends to confuse these two aspects of the problem.

Joseph Burlock
Poquoson, Virginia

Who Reads "Who Reads *TAS?*"?

I accept, in advance, your apology for failing to include my name as one "Who reads *The American Spectator?*" in your April issue.

Fritz Pettyjohn
Anchorage, Alaska

Felicitations

The editors of *The American Spectator* celebrate Steve Tesich, whose poetry appeared in some of our earliest issues, for winning the 1980 Academy Award for Best Original Screenplay, for the movie, *Breaking Away*.

Changing Your Address?

Please attach the address label from the *most recent* issue of your *American Spectator* in the space below. Print your new address and mail this form to *The American Spectator*. When writing to us about your subscription, always attach your address label or print your name and address exactly as they appear on your address label. Be sure to include the line of information above your name.

IMPORTANT: Allow six weeks for address change.

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR
Circulation Department
P.O. Box 1969
Bloomington, Indiana 47402

(Please attach address label here.)

☐ Please renew my subscription for one year (twelve issues—$12).
☐ Payment enclosed
☐ Please bill me

(please print)

Name.....

Address.....

City .....

State..... Zip.....

Date of change .....

X91

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Tyrrell's Prose and High Moral Character Judged by Readers Across America

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.'s writing—in *The American Spectator, Harper's, Commentary,* the *New York Times, Newsweek,* and in *Public Nuisances*—always elicits admiring and courteous responses from the *crème de la crème* of American intellectualoids. Hundreds of letters have poured in throughout the year. Here is a sampling of some of the most thoughtful:

"**I am appalled...**" Bridgeport, Conn. "...a new low in journalism." Boulder, Colo. "I do not worry about the Emmett Tyrrells of the world. The gutters are crawling with them." Jenkintown, Penn. "...the lowest kind of **journalistic prostitution.**" Calgary, Alberta, Canada. "...**disgusting falsehoods** and venomous generalizations..." Buffalo, N.Y. "...extremely **infantile and vulgar.**" Kokomo, Ind.

"**I am appalled...**" Annandale, Va. "Mr. Tyrrell's article illustrates everything that we at the university so passionately reject." Edwardsville, Ill. "...**a piece of trash.**" Buffalo, N.Y. "...uses language in an **irresponsible and dangerous** manner." Evanston, Ill. "The article is not only **outrageous.** It frightens me." Washington, D.C. "...**an exercise in bad taste.**" Toledo, Ohio. "...neither amusing nor intelligent." Washington, D.C. "...**flagrantly ignorant...**" Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

"**I am appalled...**" Bozeman, Mont. "Where does Mr. Tyrrell get his knowledge? From old movies?" Pontiac, Mich. "...**viciously biased...**" Lincoln, Neb. "...**juvenile stereotyping.**" Akron, Ohio. "...without purpose and **an insult to minimal intelligence.**" Venice, Cal. "I simply could not believe my eyes." Oxford, Penn. "...**ugly...**" Worcester, Mass.

Such thoughtful comments suggest that *The American Spectator* is unlikely to become required reading for the sensitive and idealistic of the Republic.

After all, *The American Spectator* obstinately defends and admires such quaint values as freedom, democracy, and excellence.

The American Spectator is unfashionably skeptical of such trendy piffles as women's liberation, reform politicians, Ralph Nader, hygiene of any kind, and singles bars.

And *The American Spectator's* editor revels in treating venerable world leaders with puckish irreverence. President Carter, for example, "remains adamant in going by the first name of a little boy," and Mao Tse-tung was, in Tyrrell's eyes, "the pudgiest revolutionary of the century...a plump little butterball."

If you are an aspiring intellectualoid, *The American Spectator* is poison. Stick with *Rolling Stone* or *Ontology Today.* But if you hold to *complicated* views of the world that bustles beyond your nose, if you delight in forming your own opinions, and if you want to know what some of the best writers in America are saying to discomfit some of the most preposterous lightweights, read *The American Spectator,* the magazine that appalls.

Subscribe to *The American Spectator* today and develop a relationship with the appalling.

THE
AMERICAN SPECTATOR®

102 West Sixth Street, P.O. Box 1969, Bloomington, Indiana 47402

Please enter my own ☐ new ☐ renewal subscription for
☐ 1 year (twelve issues) at $12
☐ 2 years at $22 ☐ 3 years at $30

Please send ..... one-year subscriptions ($12 per gift)

Total enclosed: $.....

Please print additional names and addresses on a separate sheet.

PLEASE PRINT

My name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Gift for: _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Gift card to read from "_____"

X91

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED